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Brief abstract 
 
Kierkegaard is well known as a witty writer mainly occupied with Christianity. 
In this thesis however, Kierkegaard is depicted as a philosopher who can 
provide us with some new and authentic ideas about the nature of history. 
Kierkegaard‘s approach to the problem of history is compared with Hegel‘s 
philosophy of history and Heidegger‘s view of history. 
Hegel‘s philosophy of history is examined and analysed first and the 
conclusion is that we can clearly detect two main Hegelian assertions 
regarding history: first that reason is the main historical agent and second that 
human beings can fully know their past history. 
 Kierkegaard‘s arguments follow a totally different approach from that of 
Hegel‘s. Kierkegaard argues that we cannot fully know our past history and 
that the crucial element in history is to decide about our future history instead 
of simply trying to understand our past history. It is also argued that 
Kierkegaard constructs human self in such a way that human beings must 
simultaneously create themselves and history by making decisions regarding 
their present and their future. 
It is further argued that neither Hegel nor Kierkegaard can, on their own, 
provide us with a total and full picture of the nature of history because Hegel 
on the one hand, focuses on the macroscopic view of history and Kierkegaard 
on the other, on the microscopic view (that is, from the point of view of the 
individual). This is why a possible synthesis of both views is suggested as a 
better way to truly understand history. 
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Heidegger‘s view of history is examined as a possible ‗existential‘ alternative 
approach to history from that of Kierkegaard‘s. The conclusion is that 
Heidegger cannot really offer us any help because he is either borrowing his 
main concepts from Kierkegaard or he is too vague.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
My thesis is to present Kierkegaard‘s contribution to the philosophy of history. 
I argue that Kierkegaard redirects history from its epistemological orientation 
towards human responsibility (and capacity) to take decisions about the 
future. Kierkegaard can help us understand history not as an effort to know 
our past but as a turn towards future orientation and praxis orientation, even 
ethical orientation; and this is something that history (and the philosophies of 
history) has neglected. 
The philosophical effort to extract a unified theory regarding Kierkegaard‘s 
philosophy of history from Kierkegaard‘s different texts runs contrary to the so 
called issue of Kierkegaard‘s pseudonymous authorship. That is, Kierkegaard 
wrote his texts under different pseudonyms. It can be argued thus that, for 
example, what Climacus states in Philosophical Fragments belongs to a 
different context from what Vigilius Haufniensis states in Concept of Anxiety 
and so on regarding all the different pseudonyms Kierkegaard uses in his 
texts. If this is true, then we cannot even try to examine Kierkegaard‘s texts for 
any Kierkegaardian theory because every text would have a different context 
and a different philosophical point of reference. Kierkegaard as a thinker 
would vanish in the multitude of his personae.  My thesis is that, no matter 
how many literary disguises Kierkegaard uses, the voice that animates them 
is one and only one: Kierkegaard‘s own authentic voice. I argue that it is more 
productive to focus our attention to the ideas and the arguments we can find 
in Kierkegaard‘s texts regarding the nature of history instead of viewing 
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Kierkegaard‘s authorship as a scattering image of many different literary 
personae. In this way, we can approach Kierkegaard‘s texts purely from the 
point of view of the ideas and the argumentation that they can provide us. 
 What I intend to provide in this thesis is an interpretation of history derived 
from some Kierkegaardian concepts, rather than the definitive statement of 
Kierkegaard‘s own ‗theory of history‘. This is why whenever I refer to 
Kierkegaard‘s approach to history I use the terms ‗Kierkegaard‘s concept of 
history‘ instead of ‗Kierkegaard‘s philosophy of history‘. Kierkegaard‘s main 
concern is to provoke his readers and engage them in an inner self-
exploration. History interests Kierkegaard only in terms of pointing out the 
absolute interrelation between historical and human existence; having said 
that however, I will argue that Kierkegaard can provide us with unique, original 
and useful philosophical answers to the problem of history.  
 In my analysis of Kierkegaard‘s approach to history I will mainly use the 
‗Interlude‘ from the Philosophical Fragments, The Concept of Anxiety, The 
Sickness unto Death, Johannes Climacus and the Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments. As I will explain in my second and 
third chapter I consider the ‗Interlude‘ to contain the main Kierkegaardian 
approach to the problem of freedom in history. The texts The Concept of 
Anxiety and The Sickness unto Death, I will argue, can provide us with the 
main characteristics which, according to Kierkegaard, constitute the historical 
core of the human ‗self‘. Johannes Climacus and the Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments will be used as a broader 
conceptual context to the ‗Interlude‘. 
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History is usually defined in two ways, namely: a) as events which have 
occurred, as things that have already happened and b) as the human account 
of these events.1 History thus is usually directed towards the past and is 
(usually) oriented towards an epistemological apprehension of this past. What 
signifies then the nature of history is on the one hand the past and on the 
other hand our effort to know this past.  
We have many different approaches to the problem of history.2 What all these 
approaches have in common is that they view history under the need to know 
something that has happened. Even those philosophies (like Ricoeur‘s3 and 
Gadamer‘s4 hermeneutics) which argue that history in fact is something that 
takes place in the present do not stay away from the epistemological view of 
history; even those efforts (like White‘s5 and Barthes‘6 narrativism) which are 
focusing on matters of interpretation instead of knowledge, do not see history 
as future. History‘s ‗futurity‘ and history as a human moral activity however 
play the crucial role in Kierkegaard‘s approach to history. 
 It is essential, before starting to analyse and argue in this thesis about 
Kierkegaard‘s concept of history, to clarify my initial presuppositions 
                                                 
1
 See for example Michael Allen Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger and the Ground of History, 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. xii and Edward Hallett Carr, 
What is History?, (London: MacMillan & Co Ltd, 1961), p. 3. 
2
 For a general introduction to the different philosophies of history we have see: Philosophies 
of History From Enlightenment to Postmodernity, introduced and edited by Robert M. Burns 
and Hugh Rayment-Pichard, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2000), The Philosophy of 
History in Our Time, introduced and edited by Hans Meyerhoff, (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1959), Mark Day, The Philosophy of History an Introduction, 
(New York: Continuum, 2008), and Philosophical Analysis and History, edited by William H. 
Dray, (New York: Harper & Row, 1966). 
3
 See: Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences, translated by John B. Thompson, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), and Paul Ricoeur, History and Truth, 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965). 
4
 See: Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, translated and edited by David E. 
Linge, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, Ltd, 1976) 
5
 See: Hayden White, Tropics of History, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). 
6
 See: Roland Barthes, ‗Historical Discourse‘, in Introduction to Structuralism, edited by M. 
Lane, (New York: Basic Books, 1970). 
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concerning what an adequate account of history should look like. As I intend 
to depict in my fourth chapter, any given theoretical account of history should 
be able to provide us with adequate answers to two major questions, namely: 
a) what is the relation of history and time and b) who is the main historical 
agent. I distinguish these particular questions because: a) time, on the one 
hand, seems always to interweave with history (any kind of history) and b) on 
the other hand, the question of who makes history is the question that every 
philosophy of history tries to answer. I will try thus to find out the possible 
answers that Hegel, Kierkegaard and Heidegger can give to these two 
questions. 
Kierkegaard‘s approach to history thus can be beneficial because: a) 
Kierkegaard is a particularly helpful figure for effecting a reorientation and b) 
this reorientation from knowing the past towards creating the future can reveal 
new and crucial elements of history and the historical. Kierkegaard then, if 
nothing else, can be used as an interesting (and philosophically profitable) 
occasion for history to start being understood in terms of future ethical praxis 
instead of being understood as knowledge of the past. 
Hegel is one of the first philosophers to make history central to the 
philosophical enterprise. For Hegel history can (and should) be understood in 
terms of human (philosophical) effort to understand and know what happened, 
the past. Hegel thus can be used as an example or illustration of a tendency 
within philosophy of history that focuses on the knowledge of the past. 
I consider Hegel to remain the paradigmatic philosopher of the large-scale 
‗macrocosmic‘ view of history. My reasons for this are very simple but, I hope, 
also very obvious and persuasive: a) in our modern western philosophical 
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tradition, Hegel‘s philosophy of history is the first philosophical effort to explain 
history in terms of a large-scale and macrocosmic view of history. This means 
that every philosopher of history that comes after Hegel cannot avoid ‗dealing‘ 
with his philosophy of history simply because is already there. It is the same 
that happens with poetry and Homer. Homer was the first person, in our 
modern western tradition, who wrote poetry and thus every poet after him 
must contrast his poetry with Homers, even if he know nothing of Homer. 
Hegel like Homer was the first and that cannot be overlooked. b) Hegel‘s 
analysis of history as something that must be understood as the product of 
reason through the actions of whole nations and states instead of viewing 
history as the sum of arbitrary actions of persons and his argumentation 
regarding the teleological nature of history remain the main historical 
arguments that every philosopher of history must accept or argue against if he 
aspires to provide us with his ‗macrocosmic‘ view of history. Marx, for 
example, although he strongly disagrees with Hegel‘s explanation of history, 
finds it necessary to engage himself with Hegel‘s philosophy of history. 
I choose Hegel because we cannot overlook either his primacy in terms of 
being the first who creates a whole new philosophical current in the 
philosophy of history or his tremendous influence on the philosophers of 
history who came after him.  
Hegel (as a philosopher of history) becomes the necessary interlocutor of 
anyone who aspires to say something about history. For those who come after 
him, Hegel becomes the necessary point of reference. For those who were 
before him, Hegel becomes the main criterion. Even those who are trying to 
critique him have to recognise Hegel‘s major contribution to the shape of our 
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understanding of what history is. For Hegel truth becomes the ultimate search 
in history and this truth is always: ‗what happened in the past and why’.7  
The main philosophies of history that try to distance themselves from Hegel‘s 
philosophy of history are ‗narrativism‘ and ‗hermeneutics‘. Narrativism argues 
that we cannot know what exactly happened and that we should focus on 
what has been written (about what happened). Narrativism however is still 
directed towards an epistemological view of history. To ‗know‘ how and why a 
certain history has been written in a certain way remains the main historical 
attitude. Hermeneutics argue that history has to do more about our present 
situation and less about the past. Hermeneutics however try to ‗know‘ history, 
even from the standpoint of the present. Hegel then, even as a philosophical 
opponent, remains at the centre of the ongoing philosophical discussion in 
regard with the nature of history. Furthermore, it seems that, even these 
philosophies of history that try to oppose Hegel, share some common traits 
with his approach to history; narrativism shares the  focus in the past and 
hermeneutics share the focus in the effort to ‗understand‘ history (although 
from the standpoint of the present and not of the past). 
In the chapter one I will analyse Hegel‘s philosophy of history. I will argue that 
Hegel makes two specific claims about history: a) a metaphysical one that 
reason rules in history and b) an epistemological one that we, human beings, 
can fully know our history (as past). 
                                                 
7
 Historical reasoning then, for Hegel, becomes the effort to know the ‗what‘ and the ‗why‘ of 
the past history. Mark Day directly connects historical reasoning with knowledge and past: 
‗Historical reasoning is the way it is because of material relations between the past and 
present. Those relations underpin the point of historical reasoning: to arrive at truths about the 
past.‘ Mark Day, The Philosophy of History, An Introduction, (London, New York: Continuum, 
2008), p. 25. 
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In order to demonstrate how bringing in Kierkegaard would be beneficial to 
philosophy of history, we need to get to grips with his own approach to history. 
In chapter two I will analyse how Kierkegaard argues against the necessity to 
know our past history and how he points out our freedom (and responsibility) 
to decide about our future history. 
In chapter three I will present how Kierkegaard constructs human self as the 
only historical agent. I will argue that Kierkegaard considers history as being 
always oriented towards future and that he considers human freedom as the 
only creative historical force. 
In chapter four I will compare Hegel‘s approach to that of Kierkegaard‘s. I will 
try to point out why both approaches fail to give us a whole and satisfactory 
view of history and accordingly I will demonstrate how a synthesis of both 
views can give us a better grasp of the nature of history. 
In chapter five I will analyse Heidegger‘s approach to history. I will do so 
because there is a possible objection to what has gone before. One might 
agree that philosophy of history needs an ‗existential‘ supplement, but 
disagree that it is Kierkegaard who can provide it. The other main existentialist 
contender who could make a substantial contribution to the philosophy of 
history is Heidegger. However, this chapter will demonstrate that insofar as 
Heidegger‘s philosophy of history is significant, it is almost completely 
derivative of Kierkegaard‘s; and insofar as it goes beyond Kierkegaard, it is 
philosophically vague. 
In my conclusion I will suggest that Kierkegaard‘s approach to history and the 
historical is: a) an important and original contribution to philosophy of history 
and b) significant for the contemporary practice of philosophy of history. 
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Chapter One 
 
HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 
 
Introduction 
 
To begin it is worth considering a paradigmatic version of what philosophy of 
history looks like when it is too objective or, to put it in other words, when it 
considers the nature of history as something which is only an object of our 
understanding and our knowledge without acknowledging the importance of 
individual existence in shaping of the historical phenomenon. 
Hegel‘s philosophy of history depicts history as the product of Spirit‘s self-
realisation through reason.8 Both ‗Spirit‘ and ‗reason‘ transcend human 
subjectivity. Hegel also claims that human subjects do not create history. 
History instead is created by organised communities like states and nations.                    
Hegel‘s philosophy of history thus is an ‗objective‘ one in the sense that it 
does not consider human subjects to be the actual historical subjects. It is 
also ‗objective‘ because Hegel claims that the only thing that human beings 
can succeed in their effort to realise and understand history is objective 
knowledge of their past history. This knowledge is ‗objective‘ because, for 
Hegel, it can be validated without the interference of any individual (and thus 
subjective) interpretation. The meaning and the aim of history is always there 
for us to discover it and we can do so only if we follow Hegel‘s method. 
                                                 
8
 Hegelian Spirit can be understood either as an absolute metaphysical entity that grounds 
and creates our reality or as something that arises from the collective activity of human beings 
but at the same time surpasses them. Hegelian Spirit however, as the main historical agent is 
always something that both grounds and surpasses individual historical activity. In this 
context, I interpret the Hegelian Spirit as the ‗ultimate historical subject‘. That is, I interpret it 
as an actual historical force which always is (ontologically) primary to human historical 
activity. 
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Historical research thus can arrive at an absolutely certain (and thus 
objective) knowledge of the ‗what‘, the ‗how‘ and the ‗why‘ of our past history. 
It is then quite obvious that Hegel in his philosophy of history tries to 
transcend human subjectivity in terms of: a) making history and b) knowing 
history. Hegel‘s philosophical effort then can be an excellent example of an 
‗objective‘ approach to history and the historical. In a way, we can claim that 
Hegel tries to create a subjectively undisputed method to know history in a 
similar manner our sciences (like physics and chemistry for example) try to 
acquire ‗objective‘ knowledge, i.e. knowledge that does not depend on 
individual interpretations but depends instead on objective facts.  
The purpose of this chapter will be to point out two basic Hegelian claims in 
regard with: a) who is the actual historical agent and b) which must be the 
actual object of our historical research. I will argue that Hegel makes a 
metaphysical claim that Spirit through reason and not human individuals 
creates history and an epistemological claim that we, human beings, can and 
should know our past history.  
I will argue accordingly that the Hegelian philosophy of history fails to do 
justice to the subjective individual contribution to history and as such fails to 
provide us with a complete picture of the nature of history. I will try to indicate 
Hegel‘s lack of any interest in the idea that the individual human is a crucial 
historical agent. 
My argument in this chapter runs as follows: a) Hegel understands history 
only as something which already is past (and thus for him completed), b) 
history for him can be approached only through our cognitive powers, and c) 
individual human beings are not important factors in the constitution of history; 
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Spirit9 is the crucial historical agent and besides Spirit only nation-states can 
play any (important) role in history.  
My method will consist of: a) a close examination of Hegel‘s original texts, 
focusing mainly on his Introduction to the Lectures on the Philosophy of World 
History (hereafter IPH),10 but analysing also parts of his Lectures on the 
Philosophy of the World History,11 his Philosophy of Right,12 and his 
Phenomenology of Spirit;13 b) an effort to define certain Hegelian terms such 
as ‗Spirit‘, ‗Reason‘, ‗Understanding‘ in order to point out the exact 
philosophical argumentation of Hegel. 
The chapter will be structured as follows:  
1) A basic approach to Hegel‘s ambiguous use of ‗reason‘ and ‗rational‘. 
My point is that Hegel cannot be approached considering his 
philosophy of history without having first a definite grasp on some key 
concepts he uses, such as ‗reason‘ and ‗rationality‘. 
2) I will give a detailed analysis of what Hegel considers to be ‗the wrong 
way to do history‘. My point is that if we aspire to fully understanding 
his philosophy of history we must be aware of Hegel‘s criticism against 
other ways of doing history. What emerges from this discussion is the 
overarching motif that Hegel, even in his critiques of other positions, 
never concerns himself either with individual human beings as 
                                                 
9
 Geist is the original Hegelian term. I will continue using the word ‗Spirit‘ as the english 
translation of that term but I have here to acknowledge the possible problems regarding this 
translation, because Geist means also ‗mind‘. 
10
 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Introduction: Reason in History, 
translated from the German edition of Johannes Hoffmeister by H.B. Nisbet, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975).  
11
 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, translated by J. Sibree, (New York: Dover Publications, 
1956), hereafter PH. 
12
 G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, translated by Malcolm Knox, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1952), hereafter PR. 
13
 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A.V.Miller, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), hereafter PS. 
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historical agents or with history as something other than a past to be 
known. In fact, I argue that Hegel chooses to be totally blind to such 
possibilities regarding the nature of history. 
3) The idea of ‗Reason in history‘ forms the heart of my argument and the 
most important aspect of my analysis. I will examine closely the 
Hegelian argumentation to this conclusion from IPH and I will argue 
that Hegel bases his whole philosophy of history on the particular way 
he chooses to interpret Incarnation. My claim is that both the 
metaphysical claim and the epistemological claim on which Hegelian 
philosophy of history is grounded (rehearsed above) are informed by 
this particular interpretation of reason in history. 
The Hegelian enigma 
One is not able either to analyse or to comprehend Hegel‘s philosophy of 
history without first understanding his particular philosophical method as well 
as his philosophical aims in general. Only through acquaintance with the 
overall context of his philosophy can one do justice to his philosophy of 
history. To begin, therefore, I must provide the basic parameters of Hegel‘s 
philosophy in general. 
Each philosopher presents a distinctive challenge to their reader; but if 
someone decides to read Hegel‘s philosophy he will find himself sorely 
challenged—not only owing to his notoriously obscure writing but far more 
significantly owing to the ambiguity of Hegel‘s philosophy.14  
                                                 
14
 John Watson refers to Hegel‘s ‗impenetrability‘ and he tries to give us a general guide 
through Hegel‘s overall philosophy. He concludes that, for Hegel, we can grasp the real 
nature of the things through a systematic categorisation of man‘s intellectual actions because 
―all is rational‖. John Watson, ‗The Problem of Hegel‘, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 3, No. 5 
(Sep., 1894), pp. 546-567. Watson, however, fails to recognise that in the very heart of 
Hegel‘s ‗impenetrability‘ lies Hegel‘s ambiguity and thus every effort to understand Hegel 
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Everybody, not only the philosopher, in her effort to understand both the 
external and her internal world, makes distinctions. Rational subjects 
customarily, separate the objects of knowledge from the subjects which know 
them. Hegel, however, argues for the coincidence of the subject of knowledge 
with its object. He believes that he has found a distinctive logic, ‗reason‘ 
(Vernunft) which, instead of separating, always unifies.15 Whenever, then, one 
tries to approach Hegel‘s philosophy through customary distinctions, one will 
fail to fully grasp Hegel‘s effort to surpass these very distinctions, and so one 
will end up viewing Hegel either from one side (the subjective) or the other 
(objective).16  
One consequence of this refusal to distinguish the subjective from the 
objective is that there is no way to arrive at a univocal interpretation of Hegel‘s 
philosophy. To this extent, ambiguity stands at the very core of his philosophy. 
Hence, every possible interpretation of Hegel‘s philosophy is confronted with 
                                                                                                                                            
must acknowledge the fact that Hegel cannot be univocally defined without the risk of been 
misunderstood. 
 
15
 For an excellent analysis of Hegelian dialectical logic in point of its relation with common 
(Aristotelian) logic see: The International Library of Critical Essays in the History of 
Philosophy, Hegel, vol.II, edited by David Lamb, Robert Hanna, ‗From an Ontological Point of 
View: Hegel‘s Critique of the Common Logic‘, pp.137-170 and Katalin G. Havas, ‗Dialectical 
Logics and their Relation to Philosophical Logics‘, pp.185-196, (London: Darmouth Publishing 
Company Limited, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1998). 
  
16
 The most characteristic term which can clearly depict this Hegelian attitude is ‗mediation‘. 
Hegel understands mediation as an active process rather than viewing it as a special kind of 
relation. To give an example, to say that England‘s population is larger than Scotland‘s 
population, is to depict a certain relation between England and Scotland. To argue however 
that a state as a whole consists at the same time of the total sum of its citizens and of every 
individual person that is a citizen of this state is to point to the state as the mediation of 
individuality and totality. In other words, Hegel argues that mediation can preserve within it 
the antitheses which it ‗mediates‘. This is, for Hegel, why we cannot argue that mediation is a 
synthesis. Synthesis, Hegel argues, depicts a certain relation between two or more things 
while mediation is an active process which while brings together different things is able 
nevertheless to provide us with a further development. To remain with the same example, a 
state is a mediation and not a synthesis of totality and individuality because both totality and 
individuality can really exist only within the state that ‗mediates‘ them. 
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one almost insuperable problem: how can one transpose Hegel‘s unique 
terminology into common philosophical language? 
It is, of course, natural for every thinker to adopt their own vocabulary, but 
Hegel initiates a different logic as well. How, then, are we to translate Hegel‘s 
logical conclusions into a logic that he considers to be inherently inferior? 
What is more, one always has to be aware of Hegel‘s mixing of philosophical 
and theological terms. In his Introduction to the Lectures on the Philosophy of 
World History for example he uses ‗reason‘, ‗Idea‘ and ‗God‘ as synonyms. 
Again, although it is not unnatural for a philosopher to appropriate the concept 
of ‗God‘, Hegel tends to equate ‗God‘ with ‗reason‘ or with ‗Idea‘ or with 
‗Absolute‘ without providing any explicit definition of any of these terms. Is 
‗God‘ to be understood in the same way as it is understood in every Western 
Christian community or, at least, in every Western Protestant community? If 
yes, how can we explain Hegel‘s idiosyncratic interpretation of the 
‗Incarnation‘? Of course, this is only to hint a problematic character which 
besets every interpretation of Hegel‘s thought: it is not the purpose of this 
thesis to solve this problem; yet it needs to be borne in mind in what follows.17 
    Thus, there are not only many different interpretations of Hegel‘s 
philosophy, but many contradictory ones.18 Some interpreters consider Hegel 
to be an exponent of ‗panlogism‘ (because he believes that ‗everything is 
rational‘), others believe him to be the father of ‗irrationalism‘ (because he 
uses a different kind of logic). Some define him as utterly religious and others 
                                                 
17
 Later, I will attempt to spell out the significance of the Incarnation for Hegel‘s philosophy of 
history. At this stage, however, what is crucial is to underline the ambiguity of the Hegelian 
use of certain concepts, including the concept of God. See: J. A. Leighton, ‗Hegel‘s 
Conception of God‘, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 5, No. 6 (Nov., 1896), pp. 601-618. 
18
 I will refer to the specific secondary bibliography when I will examine each particular view of 
Hegel. 
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as an atheist who transformed religious faith into a categorial system. Some 
view him as someone who reduces everything to one absolute principle and 
some as a ‗historicist‘ (because he reduces everything to its historical 
situation).19  
I think the reader has the idea by now. My way of approaching this 
fundamental ambiguity is to begin with Hegel‘s statement that ‗What is rational 
is real; And what is real is rational.‘ (PR, 18). I do take him to be claiming that 
the very core of reality is rational and thus can only be essentially understood 
by reason.20  
                                                 
19
 In order to give a specific example of the above mentioned difficulty I adduce a rather long 
fragment of William Desmond‘s essay ‗Thinking on the Double: The Equivocities of Dialectic.‘:  
‗The first opposition or doublet is: On the one hand, Hegel has been with Goethe against 
Newton, and for resorting to a priori reasoning accused of ‗panlogism,‘ and on the other hand, 
of being the progenitor of ‗irrationalism‘ in his successors. One views Hegel as marked by an 
excess of logic, the other by an excess of illogic, masquerading as logic…On the one hand, 
Hegel is excessively religious, to the point of ‗mystifying‘ the processes of reality; on the other 
hand, he is an insidious ‗atheist,‘ equivocally masking his godlessness in a categorial system 
that seems to sing a hymn to God.…Here Hegel is seen, on the one hand, as supremely a 
foundationalist, insofar as all of being and thought seem to be reducible to one absolute 
principle, named the idea or Geist, or simply the absolute. On the other hand, Hegel is said to 
be an essentially historicist thinker who deconstructs the metaphysical appeal to eternal 
foundations. Hegel as foundationalist is the philosopher of absolute identity, Hegel as 
historicist/deconstructionist is the first philosopher of difference, as the high priest of 
deconstruction, Derrida himself, put it. Hegel is Hegel, but he is also other than Hegel; Hegel 
is the first post-Hegelian philosopher…In the first case, Hegel is accused of being an enemy 
of science, for criticizing empirical and mathematical science, siding in his philosophy of 
nature. Hegelian ‗science‘ is only metaphoric imagination. In the second case, he is accused 
of lacking metaphoric imagination, of not being sensitive enough to art, proclaiming its end, of 
making excessive claims for his science of philosophy as putatively subordinating art and 
religious to its own absolute comprehension. He seems to be either too scientific or not 
scientific enough, too metaphorical or not metaphorical enough. He is too much of one or the 
other, or too little, or perhaps even not one or the other. What strange figure is this?‘ The 
International Library of Critical Essays in the History of Philosophy, HEGEL, vol.II, edited by 
David Lamb, ‗Thinking on the Double: The Equivocities of Dialectic‘ by William Desmond, 
pp.225-226, (London: Darmouth Publishing Company Limited, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 
1998).  
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 Hegel himself gives this kind of explanation in the sixth paragraph of the  Introduction of his 
Logic, in the Being, part one of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences,(1830),  
translated by William Wallace. 
The main problem with this Hegelian declaration is that it is so general and abstract that it 
becomes vague. The historical fact of the existence of two opposite to each other 
interpretations of Hegel‘s philosophy exactly after his death (with the so called right and left 
wing Hegelians) is enough to point out the problem. Hegel‘s rationalism, and the way we will 
choose to interpret it, grounds every possible effort to analyse and understand Hegel‘s 
philosophy in general and his philosophy of history in particular.  
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Hegel himself underlines this interpretation with the following remark: 
The courage of truth, faith in the power of the spirit, is the first condition 
of philosophising. Because man is spirit he should and must deem 
himself worthy of the highest; he cannot think highly enough of the 
greatness and power of his spirit. For a man of this faith nothing is so 
inflexible and refractory as not to disclose itself to him. The originally 
hidden and reserved essence of the universe has no force which could 
withstand the courage of knowing; it must expose itself to that courage, 
bring its wealth and depths to light for our enjoyment.       (IHP, 3). 
 
  It should be noted that in this passage Hegel speaks of ‗the courage of truth‘, 
‗faith in the spirit‘ and ‗enjoyment‘, whereas in PS Hegel speaks of the ‗desire‘ 
of the consciousness to know the world and the other consciousnesses. It 
seems that either Hegel quite frequently uses metaphoric language or else he 
really does ascribe vital inclinations and impulses to our abstract logical 
capacities. This, of course, is one more example of Hegel‘s disregard for 
distinctions: he unifies passion and thinking and so transforming thinking into 
a vital, living force. 
‗The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence 
consummating itself through its development.‘ (PS, 11).  Hegel rejects 
                                                                                                                                            
My point is that it is enough for us to understand Hegel‘s ‗rationalism‘ as an epistemological 
belief regarding our ability to know the world. It goes without saying that the Hegelian 
rationalism can be a lot more than this, but it is my aim to point out that Hegel in his 
philosophy of history believes that we can know our history without having any kind of 
problems regarding the nature of our knowledge. 
Morris R. Cohen offers us a general summary of the problems regarding Hegel‘s rationalism. 
He concludes by stating that: ‗It must admit [rationalism] that rational order is only one phase 
of a world which always contains more than we can possibly explain.‘ Morris R. Cohen, 
‗Hegel‘s Rationalism‘, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 41, No. 3 (May, 1932), p. 301.  
I argue that Hegel‘s basic flaw in his approach to the nature of history is exactly his belief that 
we can fully know history. And this flaw comes from Hegel‘s fundamental belief that our reality 
is (mainly and crucially) rational. 
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habitual distinctions; for him the truth is both inside us and out there, it can be 
grasped by us but only in its totality. My suggestion for a plausible reading of 
Hegel‘s thought is therefore the following: whenever we find philosophical 
characterizations of Hegel‘s philosophy we must extend them to totality to 
ensure they possess the absoluteness Hegel would require of them. Reason, 
for example, is not just a faculty; reason is the sum ‗total‘ of human 
comprehension—and, indeed, sometimes reason is ‗absolute‘ knowledge.  
Hegel specifically ascribes to reason purposeful nature: ‗What has just been 
said can also be expressed by saying that ‗Reason is purposive activity.‘ (PS, 
12, the italics are not mine). Reason is a living totality: living because it is an 
‗activity‘ and totality because it carries its own purpose within itself without 
needing to depend on anything else. 
A further illustration of the difference between Hegelian terminology and other 
employments of the same terms is ‗understanding‘. Hegel characterises the 
understanding as follows: 
To break an idea up into its original elements is to return to its 
moments, which at least do not have the form of the given idea, but 
rather constitute the immediate property of the self. This analysis, 
to be sure, only arrives at thoughts which are themselves familiar, 
fixed, and inert determinations. But what is thus separated and 
non-actual is an essential moment; for it is only because the 
concrete does divide itself, and make itself into something non-
actual, that is self-moving. The activity of dissolution is the power 
and work of the Understanding, the most astonishing and mightiest 
of powers, or rather the absolute power. The circle that remains 
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self-enclosed and, like substance, holds its moments together, is 
an immediate relationship, one therefore which has nothing 
astonishing about it.           (PS, 18-19) 
 
               Understanding separates in order to ‗understand‘, to comprehend. It 
is powerful but it is not ‗real‘. What is ‗real‘ and concrete is the union or rather 
the active unification of these elements that have been separated by the 
understanding. Such unification is the product of reason. It might be true that 
in this way understanding is more ‗effective‘ than reason, but it is also ‗non-
actual‘, it is fixed. What is critical for our knowledge of reality is reason. In this 
way, understanding only provides a prelude to knowing. We cannot ‗know‘ 
through our understanding because in life nothing is segregated; instead, 
everything is whole, everything lives through its totality. The IPH has the title 
‗Reason in History‘. This reason has nothing to do with understanding, nothing 
to do with making distinctions. This reason is not merely a cognitive capacity. 
It is the core of reality itself. Reason unifies, gives meaning and most of all 
actualises our comprehension of the reality. It is in this way that Hegel not 
only tries to overcome the Kantian restrictions on knowledge, but tries also to 
sketch the very nature of reality and consequently the very nature of history.21 
    It is worth rehearsing one further problem when faced with Hegel‘s 
philosophy of history. Hegel gives his philosophical approach to history in 
                                                 
21
 The importance of these preliminary clarifications regarding some of the most basic 
Hegelian terms lie not only in their elementary nature but also in their central position in the 
Hegelian philosophy of history. What Hegel means by writing ‗reason‘, or ‗understanding‘, or 
‗God‘, or ‗spirit‘ in his philosophy of history is the necessary key for us to wholly understand 
his philosophy of history. 
For a general discussion on the possible reasons that drove Hegel to have his particular 
philosophy of history see: Steven B. Smith, ‗Hegel‘s Discovery of History‘, The review of 
Politics, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 163-187.  
Smith however views Hegel‘s philosophy of history only from the point of view of politics and 
thus narrows his approach. 
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many different texts without earmarking any text in particular as definitive. 
Regardless of the systematic structure of the Hegelian philosophy in general, 
we must look in many different places to fully understand his philosophy of 
history.     
What is more, Hegel never published any kind of philosophy of history. All we 
have are the notes that his students kept from his lectures and some personal 
notes he made for these lectures. In consequence, it must be borne in mind 
that the Lectures on the Philosophy of the World History and its Introduction 
are not something that Hegel prepared for publication.  
We do have, however, Hegel‘s ‗official‘ synopsis of his philosophy of history in 
the Philosophy of Right. At the end of the work, under the title ‗World History‘, 
Hegel provides a definitive overview of his conception of history. It will thus 
form the touchstone for my interpretation. 
The Varieties of Historical Writing 
To get to grips with Hegel‘s model of the correct way to know history, one first 
has to rule out the wrong way. And, indeed, Hegel himself begins by criticising 
other approaches to history in his discussion of ‗varieties of historical writing‘. 
My argument is that even here, when criticising other views, Hegel fails to 
view history as anything but a past to be grasped through our understanding 
and he cannot even acknowledge the possibility of individual human beings 
being the main agents of history. My main argument here is that Hegel is so 
blind to these possibilities that he cannot even criticise them. 
Hegel does not write history or, more accurately, he is not a historian. Hegel is 
interested only in a ‗philosophical history of the world‘ (IPH, 11). He thus 
concerns himself not with the usual modes of historical writing, but with what 
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he takes to be the fullest comprehension of world history, which he calls 
philosophical. He distinguishes it from two other modes of history, namely 
‗original history‘ and ‗reflective history‘. However, even in these two rejected 
forms of historiography, there is still no mention of individuals as historical 
agents or history as present or future or even history as moral choice. 
         Original history is simply the narration of the deeds of the heroes. 
Herodotus and Thucydides wrote this kind of history. ‗Such historians 
transplant [the past] into a better and more exalted soil than the soil of 
transience in which it grew, into the realm of the departed but now immortal 
spirits (as the Ancients describe their Elysium), so that their heroes now 
perform for ever the deeds they performed but once while they lived.‘ (IPH, 
12). The main purpose, then, of original history is the narration of deeds in 
order for them to be eternalized through such narration. There is no proper 
reflection upon these historical facts. ‗His first concern, therefore, (of the 
historian) will not be to reflect upon his subject;‘ (IPH, 13). The historian and 
the historical facts that he describes are one. The author lives in the period he 
writes about and never tries to distance himself from his history. ‗The writer, 
then, does not depict and interpret this (historical) consciousness by means of 
personal reflections; on the contrary, he must allow the individuals and nations 
themselves to express their aspirations and their awareness of what their 
aspirations are.‘ (IPH, 14). For Hegel ‗original history‘ is the ‗unreflected‘ 
narration of historical events, and its purpose is to preserve human activities 
that deserve to be preserved because of their ‗heroism‘. 
Two conclusions emerge from this Hegelian critique of ‗original‘ history: a) 
even in this history only ‗heroes‘ and not every human being create history 
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and b) this history refers only to the past and is intended to be known. 
Historical record is the only possible approach to history.22 
Hegel moves on to criticise ‗reflective‘ history. Again, I want to show that 
Hegel here also considers that this ‗wrong‘ approach to history is restricted to 
the past as an object of knowledge and understanding. History remains 
restricted to nations or states without attributing any historical agency to 
individuals. 
Reflective history aspires to be something more than simple 
narration. Reflective history tries to analyse and explain the 
historical events that it is dealing with.                                                                                             
The most important thing about it (the reflective history) is the way 
in which it treats the historical material. For the writer approaches it 
in his own spirit, which is different from the spirit of the object itself; 
everything therefore depends on the maxims, ideas, and principles 
which the author applies both to the content of his work (i.e. to the 
motives behind the actions and events he describes) and to the 
form of his narrative.     (IPH, 16). 
As this quotation makes clear, reflective history (besides being simply a 
narration) is now a means of thinking about this narration, and so the historical 
reflection itself becomes an active factor in this narration. In other words, the 
writer of reflective history does not constrain himself to merely recording of 
historical events but tries to ‗understand‘ them. History is thus still only an 
                                                 
22
 One can argue that this knowledge of the past is actually about the present or at least it is 
about the present age. Hegel‘s approach however, still is purely orientated towards the 
knowledge of the past. We, as people who are living today and yet we search to know our 
past history, cannot but view history as an epistemological research of past events. 
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object of our understanding, a matter of the right epistemological approach to 
the past. 
        For Hegel the danger of such an approach to history is obvious. Every 
writer imposes his own spirit on the historical period he examines. If it 
happens that the writer‘s country has not developed a historiological culture, 
then the historian will be forced to create their own individual theory of how 
history should be written, resorting to arbitrary and falsified conclusions. In this 
way Hegel judges that the German historians of his period produce history of 
a lower quality then their French and English counterparts, simply because 
Germany has not yet arrived at a mature historical culture. 
           There are four kinds of reflective history: a) general, b) pragmatic, c) 
critical and d) specialized history.23 ‗General history‘, as its name suggests, is 
history that provides a general survey of the history of a nation or a country or 
even of the whole world. Livy constitutes a fine example of such a historian. 
His history of Rome and the Roman people (Ab Urbe Condita) gives us the 
history of Rome and its people from before the foundation of the city through 
to the reign of Augustus in Livy‘s own time. Hegel complains about the ‗lack of 
coherence and the inconsistency which often prevails in the main sequence of 
                                                 
23
 George Dennis O‘Brien makes an interesting point regarding Hegel‘s analysis of the 
varieties of historical writing: ‗Hegel is universally regarded as a speculative philosopher of 
history, but it would seem that from the standpoint of his own system no such philosophical 
enterprise can be derived.‘ (O‘Brien, 1971, p. 298). O‘Brien however is not interested in 
pointing out any lack of ‗existential aspects‘ in the Hegelian philosophy of history. My point 
however, is that we need to be fully aware of the Hegelian criticism against these varieties, 
not only because (as O‘Brien underlines) at the end it could appear that Hegel‘s own 
philosophy of history makes the same mistakes as the ‗reflective history‘, but also because 
Hegel even in his negative criticism neglects to recognise the importance of individual human 
beings as makers of their own history and does not concern himself with the future as a basic 
dimension of history. 
My point in analysing Hegel‘s argument against these varieties of historical writing is to give 
an indication of Hegel‘s ‗blindness‘ towards history as future and towards human beings as 
historical agents. Hegel, even in his criticism of other approaches to history, cannot 
disengage himself from viewing history as a past and as something that can be approached 
only by our cognitive capacities.  
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events.‘ (IPH, 17). The main flaw in any general history is that, instead of 
history, we are usually confronted with ‗a motley assortment of details, petty 
interests, actions of soldiers, private affairs, which have no influence on 
political interests, - they are (the historians) incapable [of recognising] a 
whole, a general design.‘ (IPH, 19). History must be something more than a 
detailed and useless narrative. However, we should once again note that, 
even as ‗general‘ history, history is still purely concerned with the past. As for 
human beings, although somebody might argue that general history considers 
them as historical agents, they are still confined to the status of ‗historical 
details‘. My overall argument is that even if these varieties of history approach 
history not as past and even if they consider human beings as historical 
agents, Hegel fails to acknowledge it.  
‗Pragmatic history‘ aspires to be ‗a fully developed [impression] of a past age 
and its life.‘ (IPH, 19). This kind of historian tries, instead of narrating mere 
events, to give them a determinate meaning. He aspires to bring to light the 
‗inner continuity‘, and ‗universal aspect‘ of the historical events he writes about 
(IPH, 19). The problem in Hegel‘s opinion begins when these historians try to 
look for subjective motives or when they focus on their own moral system and 
‗…attacking events and individuals in the flank with their moral onslaughts, 
and throwing in an edifying thought, a word of exhortation, a moral doctrine, or 
the like.‘24  
The problem with Hegel‘s criticisms, however, is still that he confines any 
approach to history to his own view. Pragmatic history refers only to the past 
and only to ‗universal‘ aspects of history.  
                                                 
24
 Ibid, p. 20. The sentence is slightly altered. 
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One very strong indication of Hegel‘s reluctance to view history as something 
else besides knowledge of the past is his view on the possibility of extracting 
any moral lessons from our historical knowledge. Hegel strictly limits history to 
the field of epistemology. And in so doing, he makes an important remark 
about the possibility of using history as a ‗moral lesson‘ for educating the 
people:  
Rulers, statesmen and nations are often advised to learn the lesson 
of historical experience. But what experience and history teach is 
this – that nations and governments have never learned anything 
from history or acted upon any lessons they might have drawn from 
it.    (IPH, 21). 
History cannot be used as an example either for imitation or for avoidance. 
We cannot depend on history in order to learn how to deal with possible future 
difficulties. But if this is what Hegel believes, then history cannot be a science 
in the way that chemistry (for example) is. Because in chemistry, if we know 
the laws that govern the mixture of two elements, we can predict the viability 
of their chemical bond. In history though, we cannot use our past to predict 
the future. The reason that Hegel believes in the inability of history to provide 
us with a secure prediction of the future is that history never repeats itself.   
Each age and each nation finds itself in such peculiar 
circumstances, in such a unique situation, that it can and must 
make decisions with reference to itself alone… Amid the pressure 
of great events, a general principle is of no help, and it is not 
enough to look back on similar situations [in the past];   (IPH, 21). 
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           Here we can discern the different way in which Hegel uses the 
concepts of reason and science. Although he maintains that his philosophy is 
the (only) completed scientific system of philosophy, in his philosophy of 
history he does not believe that history can be treated as our sciences, that is, 
in order to find general laws and use them for our own purposes. As we shall 
see, he believes that history has a general law, reason, and the Spirit, that 
tries to fully comprehend itself and thus to be free. But we cannot regard 
Hegel‘s reason and Hegel‘s law along the lines of the causes and effects 
which we detect in the natural sciences. Every historian, who treats history in 
analogy with the other fields of common scientific research, is doomed to 
failure, according to Hegel. ‗Only a thorough, open-minded, comprehensive 
view of historical situations and a profound sense for the Idea and its 
realisation in history can endow such reflections with truth and interest.‘ (IPH, 
22). The ‗Idea‘ here is a law that governs history, but it does not operate like 
our usual ‗scientific‘ laws. It possesses necessity and does have a 
determinate function, but its necessity has nothing to do with the trivial 
mechanical necessity of the laws that are used in every other field. We will 
return to this point in more detail below.25 
         My claim is that Hegel so narrows his view on history that he cannot 
even allow to history to be used as a moral lesson for future historical 
decisions. What is more, he cannot allow history to function as the other 
sciences. His historical knowledge therefore seems to have no use at all.26  
                                                 
25
 Here we have an anticipation of Hegel‘s metaphysical claim that reason and the idea of 
freedom reigns in history.  
26
 In my conclusions I argue that Hegel inclines to view history as ‗theodicy‘. Historical 
knowledge for Hegel has one and only one use, i.e. to persuade us that the historical process 
has a certain meaning and follows a certain pattern.  
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At the same time, when he speaks of the third kind of reflective history, 
namely ‗critical history‘, Hegel, again, speaks only about knowledge and the 
past. Critical history is the principal method employed by Hegel‘s 
contemporary German historians: 
‗It does not constitute history as such, but rather the history of 
history; it evaluates historical narratives and examines their 
authenticity and credibility… Its distinguishing characteristic and 
intention are to be found not so much in the subjects it deals with, 
but rather in the acuteness with which the writer wrests new 
information from the narratives he examines.‘  (IPH, 22). 
For such a historian, though, the greatest danger is to write, instead of a 
history, a script full of ‗subjective fancies‘. (IPH, 23). 
             The fourth and last kind of reflective history is ‗specialised history‘. 
This is, as its name indicates, a history of a specific part of the general life of a 
nation. ‗History of the Art of the Ancient Greeks‘ is an example of this kind of 
history, or ‗History of Roman law‘. If this history can understand its subject in 
light of the general context of the history of the nation as a whole, then it can, 
according to Hegel, be a very interesting history. If, for example, we want to 
write the ‗History of English law‘, we need to fully grasp the general history of 
the English nation. Knowledge remains the sole characteristic, for Hegel, of 
this history. 
Having dealt with the different types of reflective history, Hegel now asserts 
that the third kind of history (besides original and reflective history) is the 
‗philosophical‘ history of the world: 
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The general perspective of philosophical world history is not 
abstractly general, but concrete and absolutely present; for it is the 
spirit which is eternally present to itself and for which there is no 
past. [Or it is the Idea.] Just like Mercury, the guide of departed 
souls, the Idea is truly the leader of nations and of the world; and it 
is the spirit, with its rational and necessary will, which has directed 
and continues to direct the events of world history. To gain an 
understanding of it and its guiding influence is the aim of the 
present investigation.  (IPH, 24). 
With this passage, Hegel closed his introduction to the 1822 and 1828 
lectures on the philosophy of history; however, it raises a number of 
questions. First of all, is not every general perspective, by definition, an 
abstract one? In other words, how can Hegel argue for both the concreteness 
and absoluteness of his philosophical history? What is this ‗spirit‘ which is 
eternally present to itself, and if it has no past, how can we speak of history? 
What exactly is the nature of such rationality and in what does the necessity of 
spirit‘s will consist? If that spirit directs the events of world history, and if we 
can be aware of its nature, why can we not predict the future course of our 
history? 
Hegel himself tries to answer all these questions by means of a complete 
analysis of ‗philosophical history‘. In order to begin to grasp this analysis, I will 
now expand on some hints we have already come across that explain 
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philosophical history and supplement this discussion by quoting passages 
from Hegel‘s final paragraphs in PS that refer to history.27  
I will begin with the last question. ‗Spirit‘, (or ‗reason‘ or ‗Idea‘) is not a 
customary law in the sense that we can outline its function and implications. 
As we have already seen, Hegel‘s reason operates on a different (and, for 
Hegel, higher) level. It has nothing to do with cause and effect; on the contrary 
it consists in the active unification of them both.28 In this way, although we can 
comprehend its nature, we cannot make any kind of predictions about Spirit, 
because such predictions are dependent on a cause/effect structure. 
The necessity of spirit is its rationality. Its rationality consists in the fact that it 
follows its own purposes, its own goals. Spirit has to follow its own purposes 
and by doing so it possesses necessity. Once again, it is important to 
underline the fact that Hegelian reason is purposive. That means that it has 
nothing to do with the mechanical necessity of physics (for example). 
As for the nature of Hegel‘s ‗Spirit‘ and its concrete and absolute presence in 
history, I quote the following passages from his PS. 
 
Consequently, until Spirit has completed itself in itself, until it has 
completed itself as world-Spirit, it cannot reach its consummation 
as self-conscious Spirit. Therefore, the content of religion proclaims 
earlier in time than does Science, what Spirit is, but only Science is 
                                                 
27
 This ‗philosophical‘ history is Hegel‘s philosophy of history. As such, Hegel will analyse it in 
detail later in IPH. My only concern for the time being is to outline the basic characteristics of 
this approach.  My intention is to show in what way Hegel believes that this is the right way to 
do history.  
28
 Our understanding and its ‗need‘ to separate the phenomena sees causes away from their 
effects. Hegel‘s reason, on the contrary, unifies through its holistic view what seems to be 
distinguished.   
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its true knowledge of itself… The movement of carrying forward the 
form of its self-knowledge is the labour which it accomplishes as 
actual History. 
                                                                    (PS, 488) 
 Nature, the externalized Spirit, is in its existence nothing but this 
eternal externalization of its continuing existence and the 
movement which reinstates the Subject… But the other side of its 
Becoming, History, is a conscious, self-mediating process – Spirit 
emptied out into Time; but this externalization, this kenosis, is 
equally an externalization of itself; the negative is the negative of 
itself. This Becoming presents a slow-moving succession of Spirits, 
a gallery of images, each of which, endowed with all the riches of 
Spirit, moves thus slowly just because the Self has to penetrate 
and digest this entire wealth of its substance. As its fulfillment 
consists in perfectly knowing what it is, in knowing its substance, 
this knowing is its withdrawal into itself in which it abandons its 
outer existence and gives its existential shape over to recollection. 
                                                                                     (PS, 492) 
    In regard to the first passage, one can conclude first, Spirit is very similar to 
or exactly the same as the concept of God in Christianity. That is why religion 
can comprehend Hegelian Spirit, even if its comprehension is imperfect. By 
science, Hegel is here referring to his own philosophical system. Science can 
truly know Spirit, because science (philosophy) uses the appropriate 
language. That is, philosophy uses conceptual language, whereas religion 
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uses faith, feeling and representative language.29 Spirit needs philosophy in 
order to attain self-knowledge, because only logic can bring to light what Spirit 
has previously known in a merely abstract way. Hence, human beings (insofar 
as they are logical) partake in Spirit‘s life but Spirit also transcends their 
knowledge in the name of its own self-knowledge. 
It is questionable if Hegel is a monist.30 If however we accept that for him 
everything in this universe is the manifestation of what he calls Spirit, then we 
have to understand his philosophy as a monistic one. Spirit becomes nature 
when it externalises itself. In nature, however, Spirit cannot understand fully 
itself, because nature, for Hegel, has no consciousness. Human beings with 
their reason do have consciousness. Spirit, through human beings and their 
historical efforts to understand themselves and their world, understands, 
‗digests‘ its nature through conceptualisation. Recollection for Spirit can be 
accomplished only through conceptualising. In this way Hegel appears to 
consider human history as the most essential part of Spirit‘s route to 
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 Imaginative language, for Hegel, is not as clear and direct as the language of philosophy is. 
Hegel does not deny the power of literature and the power of faith to point towards truth. For 
him however, imaginative language is always a ‗vague‘ language which uses myths, symbols 
and analogies instead of concepts.   
  
30
 The debate continues between those who view Hegel as a philosopher who grounds (and 
reduces) everything in a single power (Spirit) and those who understand him as something 
different. 
See: James Kreines, ‗Metaphysics without Pre-Critical Monism: Hegel on Lower-Level Natural 
Kinds and the Structure of Reality‘, The Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, Vol. 
57/58, 2008, pp. 48-70. 
See also: Emilia Digby, ‗Hegel‘s Monism and Christianity‘, The Monist, Vol. 7, No. 1 (October, 
1896), pp. 114-119. 
See further: F. la T. Godfrey, ‗Hegel‘s Dialectic in Historical Philosophy‘, Philosophy, Vol. 16, 
No. 63 (Jul., 1941), pp. 306-310. 
See also the very interesting view of Jon Stewart: Jon Stewart, ‗The Architectonic of Hegel‘s 
Phenomenology of Spirit‘, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Dec., 
1995), pp. 747-776. 
It seems that both sides have strong arguments, which is more proof (if any were needed) of 
Hegel‘s ambiguity. My view, however, is that Hegel is a monist. I recognise in his philosophy 
(especially in his philosophy of history) an irreplaceable monistic attitude. Spirit is what makes 
everything to move like the Aristotelian God (the unmoved mover). 
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fulfillment. Yet of course, Hegel still needs to prove his theory by closely 
examining human world history. What remains to be done, then, is to follow 
him as he explains ‗Reason in History‘. 
Reason in History 
My aim will be to make apparent that the Hegelian reason renders history: a) 
something that can be a past that we can know and b) something that cannot 
be the product of individual human beings. Hegel, as I intend to point out, 
bases both his metaphysical claim (that reason and its necessity reign in 
history) and his epistemological claim (that we can know history) in the 
particular nature and historical role of his reason. More than that, Hegel 
clearly distances his reason from individual historical activities and confines 
our historical knowledge to our historical past.  
Hegel‘s approach to history is grounded on the peculiar way Hegel 
understands God‘s presence in history. God‘s existence in our world functions 
as the crucial Hegelian argument in favour of the actual existence within every 
single human being of the cognitive capacity to know history‘s pattern and 
history‘s plan. Hegel, however, although he acknowledges the possibility of 
knowing our history, denies to us (as historical individual existences) the 
ability to make history or to refer to history as something else besides a 
completed past. Kierkegaard‘s contribution thus to philosophy of history can 
be the underlining of exactly these points: we (human individuals) can create 
history and our history is not only (and mainly) our past as something to be 
known, but future as something to be decided about.31  
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 I will say more about these points in my next three chapters. For the time being, it is enough 
for my argument to point out the direct philosophical connection, for Hegel, of God and history 
as Hegel perceives it. 
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Hegel uses one further word to refer to Spirit: ‗absolute‘. The Hegelian 
absolute can be considered either as something that transcends human 
experience or as something which is immanent to human experience. Walter 
A. Kaufman interprets the Hegelian absolute as something which is immanent 
to human experience.32 J. N. Findlay does the same.33 Karl Popper on the 
other hand views the Hegelian absolute rather as something that transcends 
human experience.34 Anselm K. Min summarises all the views regarding the 
nature of the Hegelian absolute and he argues that the right way to view 
Hegel‘s absolute is to come with a third way to understand Hegel‘s absolute. 
Min argues that we must take the Hegelian absolute as something which 
synthesises finite and infinite while at the same time preserves the difference 
between them.35  
I believe that in view of the Hegelian argumentation in IPH about God and 
considering also his argumentation in IPH and PR about the historical 
importance of the state, we must understand Hegel‘s absolute as immanent to 
human experience, but also as something that surpasses human individuals. 
This will be apparent from the forthcoming paragraphs. 
What it is important however for my overall argument regarding Hegel‘s 
philosophy of history, is the fact that Hegel believes: a) that his ‗absolute‘ can 
be approached by human understanding (and thus can be known) and b) that 
this ‗absolute‘ one way or another exceeds human individuals.  
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 See: Walter A. Kaufmann, ‗The Hegel Myth and its Method‘, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 
60, No. 4 (Oct., 1951).  
33
 See: J. N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-Examination, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1958). 
34
 See: Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. 2: Hegel and Marx, (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1945).  
35
 See: Anselm K. Min, ‗Hegel‘s Absolute: transcendent or Immanent?‘, The Journal of 
Religion, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Jan., 1976), pp. 61-87. 
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Hegel identifies his ‗reason‘, his ‗Idea‘, his ‗absolute‘ with God. Positive 
knowledge of God through our rational capacities is the solid ground that 
Hegel can count on for his historical analysis: ‗‗When God reveals himself to 
man, he reveals himself essentially through man‘s rational faculties;‘ (IPH, 
39). Christianity provides the proof for Hegel‘s claim:  
God has revealed himself through the Christian religion; that is, he 
has granted mankind the possibility of recognising his nature, so 
that he is no longer an impenetrable mystery. The fact that 
knowledge of God is possible also makes it our duty to know him, 
and that development of the thinking spirit which the Christian 
revelation of God initiated must eventually produce a situation 
where all that it was at first present only to the emotional and 
representational faculties can also be comprehended by thought. 
Whether the time has yet come for such knowledge will depend on 
whether the ultimate end of the world has yet been realised in a 
universally valid and conscious manner.36 
We can reconstruct Hegel‘s basic assertions as follows: 
a) Christianity demonstrates the logic by which God reveals himself to 
humanity. 
b) We, human beings, can penetrate God‘s mystery through our cognitive 
capacity of reason. 
c) If we can, then we ought to know Him. 
d) In order to arrive at that knowledge we have first to realise the ‗ultimate 
end of the world‘ in a ‗universally valid and conscious manner‘. 
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 IPH, p.40. I quote the whole paragraph because I believe that it is central for my 
interpretation of Hegel‘s philosophy of history. 
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The points that Hegel wants to make aim to directly connect God‘s revelation 
to human beings‘ cognitive ability to ‗penetrate‘ God‘s mysteries. Christ took 
the shape of a humble man and taught us about the true nature of Him and 
His father. In this way Christianity showed that it was possible for humanity to 
know (through their logical capacities, that is, their reason) God, because now 
God is not anymore somewhere outside our world but lived in this world 
through Christ and still lives through Holy Spirit. 
Hegel has already argued that human beings can know God through their 
rationality, although, indeed, he takes it for granted that we can know God in 
other ways (by means of faith or belief), even if this is not ‗positive‘ 
knowledge. Nevertheless, we do now have the possibility of knowing God 
through our reason because God appeared in our world. Hegel, however, 
stresses the fact that, for him, this possibility is also our duty. He believes so, 
because reason is positive and objective knowledge, while faith is something 
subjective. This ‗objectivity‘ obligates our logical capacities, (our reason) to 
always try to discover and understand it. 
The notion of ‗end‘ referred to above is not intended temporally. ‗End‘ here 
means ‗purpose‘. That is, Hegel is arguing for knowledge of this ‗purpose‘ as 
positive knowledge of God‘s nature, in human history. This (philosophical as 
Hegel names it) knowledge is objective, undeniable and common to all people 
(potentially) and, most of all, it is conscious. This ‗end‘, this ‗purpose‘ is the 
‗Idea of human freedom.‘ (IPH, 46).  
Hegel, thus, uses Christian religion and theology for his own philosophical 
purposes. He translates theological arguments into philosophical ones. In 
Hegel‘s philosophy of history then, God is at the same time the presupposition 
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and the ultimate goal. James Kreines brings forward Hegel‘s ‗metaphysical 
rationalism‘ as the crucial Hegelian doctrine.37 He stresses Hegel‘s claim 
about the ultimate capacity of reason to ground and transcend human 
experience. In this way Kreines seems to point out the overall Hegelian logic 
but nonetheless he also recognises the importance of God for the Hegelian 
philosophy. Kreines however examines Hegel‘s approach to God as the basis 
of Hegel‘s overall philosophy and this is something that goes further then the 
scope of this thesis. Thomas J. J. Altizer also argues that Hegel grounds his 
philosophical thinking on God‘s existence in this world.38 Altizer, however, 
focuses more on the general Hegelian reliance to Christianity, while my 
argumentation focuses on the significance of the Incarnation for the Hegelian 
philosophy of history. 
Ultimately, Hegel‘s philosophy of history can be viewed as a theodicy, that is, 
as ‗a justification of the ways of God.‘ (IPH, 42). Reason in history aims to 
disclose, analyse and know this theodicy. As we have already seen, Hegel 
argues that we need to arrive at a secure (and objective) knowledge of the 
‗ultimate end‘ of the world. Philosophical history above all, according to Hegel, 
serves the purpose providing meaning; otherwise by approaching history 
through causal thinking or pure skepticism one can be lead to the precipice of 
total and incurable despair. 
Incarnation provides Hegel with evidence of the presence of God in this world. 
And it is from this point that he goes on to examine world history. Hegel does 
not attribute any historical importance to individuals because, according to 
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 See: James Kreines, ‗Metaphysics without Pre-Critical Monism: Hegel on Lower Level 
Natural Kinds and the Structure of Reality‘, The Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, 
Vol. 57/58, 2008, pp. 48-70. 
38
 Thomas J. J. Altizer, ‗Hegel and the Christian God‘, Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 71-72. 
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him, philosophical world history must ignore everything finite and subjective. 
The objective consists in the Spirit and its strife for self-realisation through 
human history. 
Only nations/states can play a historical role. Hegel is quite clear about it 
when he states that: 
The right which governs the ethical existence of nations is the 
spirit‘s consciousness of itself; the nations are the concepts which 
the spirit has formed of itself. Thus it is the conception of the spirit 
which is realised in history.  (IPH, 51).  
Individuals have no objective role in Spirit‘s self-realisation (and thus in 
history) because they are only partly rational beings.39 Nations are the 
privileged means through which Spirit becomes conscious of itself 
historically, because they transcend the lives of their members. Nations 
exhibit no animal impulses. Nations have, (or try to acquire through their 
evolution in history), ethical existence, and these ethical principles are 
the laws by which they develop.40 Freedom then is the sole ultimate 
historical fruit of Spirit‘s consciousness. This freedom can be historically 
actualised only through nations. As Hegel states: 
  ‗…the ultimate phase of its [spirit‘s] consciousness, on which 
everything depends, is the recognition that man is free. The spirit‘s 
own consciousness must realise itself in the world; the material or 
                                                 
39
 With the exception of world-important individuals, who make through their actions history 
move on the next level. Even these individuals however, are not actual agents of history 
because they simply serve reason‘s will. 
40
 Nation‘s laws are the heart of their ethical existence in Hegel‘s opinion because they 
objectify the desires of individuals that partake in them. 
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soil in which it is realised is none other than the general 
consciousness, the consciousness of the nation.‘    (IPH, 52). 
The above mentioned passage seems to constitute a contradiction. How 
can, on the one hand, ‗the recognition that man is free‘ be the ultimate 
phase of Spirit‘s consciousness, when, on the other hand, it is ‗the 
consciousness of the nation‘ that grounds that consciousness? If we talk 
about man‘s freedom, then we refer to individual freedom and not to the 
nation‘s ethical existence. This looks contradictory; we need therefore to 
try a different approach. The ethical existence of the nation is constituted 
by its laws and these in terms consist in its ‗general consciousness‘. 
Hegel here claims that only if national laws have recognised that man is 
free, can this nation be genuinely ethical. 
In this way, Spirit comprehends itself and its freedom through nations, 
but Spirit‘s ultimate self-consciousness will come only when a nation 
acknowledge that ‗man is free‘ in its laws. ‗Man is free‘ means for Hegel 
that every man is free. This freedom is the direct historical product of 
nation‘s ethical evolution and it is reflected in nation‘s laws. 
So far I have analysed Hegel‘s approach to the role that reason plays in 
history and I have argued that this reason renders history a past to be 
known from people‘s logical capacities, while at the same time only Spirit 
and nations/states are historical agents. In order to further explicate 
Hegel‘s claim that individuals do not play any (significant) historical role I 
need to clarify the exact nature of individuality in Hegel‘s philosophy of 
history. 
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I have to stress once more that I analyse ‗individuality‘ in the context of 
the Hegelian philosophy of history only in order to point out that Hegel 
does not consider individual human beings as historical agents. My 
interest lies purely in the historical role that individuals have according to 
Hegel‘s philosophy of history. Although we cannot avoid the obvious 
political implications of this Hegelian claim, I cannot expand my analysis 
farther than this towards political philosophy.41  
Hegel writes: ‗The world spirit is the spirit of the world as it reveals itself 
through the human consciousness; the relationship of men to it is that of 
single parts to the whole which is their substance.‘ (IPH, 52). Two points 
emerge from this quotation. The first is that when Hegel refers to ‗world 
spirit‘ he means something that needs human consciousness in order to 
be revealed (to be historically actualised and to become object of 
knowledge). This does not mean that world Spirit is something outside of 
this world, though. The second point is that every single human 
consciousness is just a part of the whole. Moreover, the whole always 
surpasses its parts, so, although the parts are necessary for the 
existence of the whole, they are not of the same nature. In fact, single, 
finite human consciousness is nothing; it requires the whole to gain 
value and life. 
It is through the repeated objectification of human consciousness in the 
organised life of the state that the world Spirit is constituted. This world 
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 Esperanza Seade tries to give us a full depiction of the way Hegel defines ‗people‘ and 
‗state‘ in his philosophy of history. See: Esperanza Duran De Seade, ‗State and History in 
Hegel‘s Concept of People‘, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Jul.-Sep., 1979), 
pp. 369-384. While Seade recognises that Hegel does not attribute to individuals historical 
importance, he fails to point out the philosophical implications. 
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Spirit, on the other hand, is not merely the sum total of individuals; it is 
the whole that through its ‗wholeness‘ transcends its individual parts. 
Hegel then does not recognise the freedom of individuals because these 
individuals must be part of a nation in order to have any kind of 
freedom.42 It is precisely this Hegelian argument that drove many of his 
interpreters to accuse him of failing to recognise atomic human rights.43 
However, this rests on an oversimplification, for Hegel insists that every 
human being must take part in an organised society in order to have the 
opportunity of being a (complete) human being. Otherwise man would not be 
man. Spirit then uses reason and nations for its historical actualisation. ‗Great 
individuals‘ are purely means to reason‘s will. The way Hegel defines the 
historical role of these ‗great individuals‘ expands even further his claim about 
the historical role of individual human beings. Even Napoleon and Socrates 
are not straight-forwardly historical agents. They do not create history 
themselves. They simply obey ‗the cunning of reason‘. It is thus important for 
my argumentation to point out his claims about these ‗great individuals‘, 
because this Hegelian claim proves even more my claim about the 
insignificance (in Hegel‘s philosophy of history) of individuals as historical 
agents. 
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 Hegel uses by turns the term ‗nation‘ and the term ‗state‘. But as we can see also in his PR, 
state with its objective structure is that which Hegel refers to. 
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 Karl Popper is the most obvious example of such an interpretation towards a Hegelian 
concept of freedom. Kaufman and Findlay argue (in my opinion successfully) against 
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recognises that Hegel directly connects individuals‘ freedom to their belonging in a state, he 
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Philosophical Review, Vol. 3, No. 6 (Nov., 1894), pp. 655-671. 
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 Spirit in history realises itself in human activities as these form political 
structure and are articulated in laws. Human beings as realised in historical 
activity are recognised through the laws of the state as free without further 
conditions. 
The Orientals had despots as the leaders of their organised states, thus the 
Orientals granted freedom only to their despots. However, that cannot have 
been genuine freedom, according to Hegel, for it did not extend to every 
human being. The Greek and Romans granted freedom only to their citizens 
and had no problem keeping slaves; thus they too refused to acknowledge the 
freedom of every human being. Germanic nations (every single nation in 
North-Western Europe) came to realise that every human being is free. (IPH, 
54-55). 
 ‗Reason in history‘ furnishes Hegel with his epistemological claim too, that is, 
that history is entirely past-orientated and (history) can be approached only as 
an object of knowledge. Hegel confines himself to an epistemology of history 
and is solely interested in discovering this knowledge in the past, finding there 
‗reason in history‘. Even when he refers to the future he does so simply to 
insist that future is valid only as long as can be deciphered by reason. This is 
immediately apparent from his references to future in IPH. 
For example, Hegel makes specific statements about the future:  
‗As to the politics of North America, the universal purpose of the 
state is not yet firmly established…North America cannot yet be 
regarded as a fully developed and mature state, but merely as one 
which is still in the process of becoming…In physical terms, 
America is not yet fully developed, and it is even less advanced in 
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terms of political organisation. It is certainly an independent and 
powerful state, but it is still engaged in developing its purely 
physical assets…America is therefore the country of the future, and 
its world-historical importance has yet to be revealed in the ages 
which lie ahead…‘ (IPH, 168-170).  
The movement of world-history will not end with Hegel‘s time. Even 
philosophy will not be completed with Hegel‘s philosophy. Hegel gives us the 
USA as an example of the future of world-history. And in so doing, he admits 
that the world-historical importance of the USA is to be revealed in the future, 
suggesting thereby, an open and unknown future. However, he also maintains 
that the same necessity will prevail even then. This is the necessity of Spirit‘s 
evolution through human strife. Hegel‘s future, therefore, is nothing but a 
‗future past‘, for ‗Spirit‘ and ‗reason‘ will continue to prevail over individual 
human beings.44 
Hegel clearly states how history becomes an object of knowledge: 
Freedom discovers its concept in reality, and has developed the 
secular world into the objective system of a specific and internally 
organised state. It is this triumphant progress which gives history its 
interest, and the point at which reconciliation and existence for itself 
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Future?‘, History and Theory, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Feb., 1988), pp. 14-29. 
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are reached is now an object of knowledge: reality is transformed 
and reconstructed. This is the goal of world history: the spirit must 
create for itself a nature and world to conform with its own nature, 
so that the subject may discover its own concept of the spirit in this 
second nature, in this reality which the concept of the spirit has 
produced; and in this objective reality, it becomes conscious of its 
subjective freedom and rationality. Such is the progress of the Idea 
in general; and this must be our ultimate point of view in 
history…The further labour of history is that this principle should 
develop and unfold and that the spirit should attain its reality and 
become conscious of itself in the real world.     (IPH, 208-209). 
Reality is ‗transformed and reconstructed‘ through reason and becomes so 
‗objective knowledge‘ of the historical reality. History then, according to Hegel, 
must follow reason‘s necessity and must become an object of human 
cognitive capacities. 
     Conclusions 
Now that we have the basic parameters of Hegel‘s approach to history I want 
to conclude the chapter by arguing for three crucial characteristics to his 
philosophy of history: 
1) Hegel approaches history as an object of knowledge. For him, history 
can be known and we, as thinking human beings, can have a full and 
secure grasp on history‘s pattern, structure and ultimate goal. A 
correlate of this contention is that Hegel views history only as a 
completed past. Present and future must first become past and only 
then do they become history. 
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2) History can be known, because it has a specific goal: the realisation of 
the freedom of every human being as part of a well-structured state. 
Thus, Hegel bases his epistemological claim on a metaphysical claim. 
History has a specific agent which is Spirit; it has a specific method, 
which is reason, and individual human beings can only submit to such 
principles; they can never change them. In short, Hegel clearly does 
not attribute historical agency to individual human beings.45 
3) This entire conception of history is grounded in the way Hegel defines 
and explains Incarnation. The (historical) presence of God in our world 
is Hegel‘s evidence for his peculiar conception of philosophy of history. 
Hegel‘s main purpose in his philosophy of history is to persuade us that 
history does have a purpose.46 His ultimate goal is not to predict or to forbid 
any kind of future. His ultimate goal is to reconcile us with our human past, 
present and future. Yet, he achieves this goal in an extremely ambiguous 
fashion. On the one hand, he places all humanity under the general guidance 
of reason, but, on the other hand, he does not provide any comprehensive 
way to understand what reason is. Its peculiar mode of procedure—unifying 
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instead of separating—does not solve the problem; it only a posteriori justifies 
historical events. Individuals do have rights, but what they lack is ultimate 
accountability for their actions. Whatever they do, they do not make history; 
they simply help reason make it. 
Ultimately, Hegel is trapped in his own schema. History can be comprehended 
only in a way that makes history totally incomprehensible. Hegel‘s reason is 
active in our world and historical, but is simultaneously free from temporal 
limitations. Hegel‘s absolute view of history, (even if it is to be considered as a 
form of inter-subjectivity), cannot give us any proof of historical activity without 
at the same time forfeiting its metaphysical status. We are thus left only with 
the solace of Hegel‘s promise of reconciliation. The price we have to pay, 
though, is rather high; we have to abandon our historical primacy as active 
historical subjects.                                                                         
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Chapter Two 
 
Kierkegaard’s Concept of History 
 
Introduction 
 
In order to demonstrate how the appropriation of Kierkegaard would be 
beneficial to philosophy of history, we need to get to grips with his own take 
on history. Therefore, the next two chapters will consist of a detailed 
reconstruction of Kierkegaard‘s philosophy of history. 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, to provide an overview of the 
Kierkegaardian approach to history; second, to define in more detail some of 
the main characteristics of his concept of history. Throughout the chapter, my 
overall aim will be to demonstrate my orienting thesis that Kierkegaard, 
although he never provides a complete theory or philosophy of history, 
nevertheless presents us with a concept of the nature of history. I refer to a 
‗concept‘ because I consider his thinking about history to constitute a coherent 
intellectual effort to describe and understand the nature of the historical. A 
concept is not a full-blown theory, but nor is it a mere rhapsody. 
Kierkegaard wrote three texts under the same pseudonym, Johannes 
Climacus: Johannes Climacus, (1841-2), Philosophical Fragments (1844) and 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments (1846).47 
Without attempting to argue that the existence of a shared pseudonym is 
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sufficient evidence for considering these texts to be proposing the same 
philosophical theory, I will claim that Kierkegaard‘s understanding of 
‗actuality‘, ‗possibility‘, ‗necessity‘, ‗knowledge of history‘, ‗doubt‘, ‗belief‘, and 
‗passion‘ remains constant through-out these three books. Thus, my argument 
presupposes the conceptual unity of these texts. 
In PF, Kierkegaard‘s primary interest is the problem of the Incarnation. On the 
face of it, therefore, the work may seem theological. My point of departure, 
however, is that through his struggle to theorise the Incarnation, Kierkegaard 
passes by way of history. Hence, in order to discuss the Incarnation, 
Kierkegaard ends up exploring the very nature of history. 
In this chapter, I will contend that: a) for Kierkegaard history is always the 
history of human beings; hence its nature is directly related to their freedom of 
will. In other words, human beings make history by using this freedom; and b) 
Kierkegaard considers historical fact as an uncertain object of cognition. To 
put it bluntly, we cannot achieve the same scientific accuracy in our 
knowledge of history as we do in the natural sciences. 
Therefore, in what follows I focus on the answers that Kierkegaard gives: a) to 
the ontological question ‗What is the nature of history?‘ and b) to the 
epistemological question ‗Which is the nature of our historical knowledge?‘. I 
will argue that these questions cannot be separated from each other, 
according to Kierkegaard: ontology and epistemology are intertwined. In fact, 
Kierkegaard argues that for his epistemological thesis that historical 
knowledge cannot be of the same precision as knowledge of the laws of 
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nature, precisely because of an ontological thesis that there is no necessity in 
history, hence no general and necessary laws.48  
In order to demonstrate the above interconnections between the ontological 
and the epistemological in Kierkegaard‘s concept of history, I pursue an 
extended and detailed analysis of ‗The Interlude‘ in PF. I do so because, in 
many ways the Interlude provides the very core of Kierkegaard‘s concept of 
history. 
‗The Interlude‘ 
It is, of course, by no means a startling claim to emphasise the significance of 
the ‗Interlude‘ for an understanding of the Kierkegaardian concept of history. 
Many commentators have drawn the same conclusion. For example, Robert 
C. Roberts takes ‗the Interlude‘ to be ‗a defense of a thesis concerning 
historical beliefs in general.‘49 Jacob Howland argues that ‗[C]limacus‘s 
general aim is clear: he wants to safeguard faith from the tyranny of 
philosophical reason…[H]e hopes to refute the doctrine that history is the 
unfolding of necessity…‘50 Peter Fenves claims that Climacus here argues 
against any kind of secure historical knowledge because ‗such a [temporal] 
moment discloses only the constant annihilation of possibility in actuality…‘51  
What all these commentators share, despite all their ultimately divergent 
interpretations, is the contention that ‗the Interlude‘ contains Kierkegaard‘s 
concept of history in nuce. 
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However, this is where agreement ends, for each of these commentators 
diverge considerably both in what they understand Kierkegaard‘s concept of 
history to be and in their evaluation of how cogent Kierkegaard‘s argument is. 
Hence, Roberts, Fenves and Pojman argue that Kierkegaard in ‗the Interlude‘ 
tries to answer the epistemological question of the nature of the historical 
knowledge. For example, Roberts holds that: ‗[T]he Interlude is organized as a 
refutation of two theses: First, that the truths of history are necessary truths; 
and second that they are knowable by the direct deliverances of the senses.‘52 
Similarly, Peter Fenves understands ‗the Interlude‘ as an argument against 
historical knowledge and he argues that for Climacus: 
…[I]t no longer makes sense to assert that one can recognise a 
temporal moment and thus gain historical knowledge…So faith is a 
form of knowledge; it both provides a criterion for unification and 
refuses the principal criterion of all thought.53 
On the other hand, Mercer focuses on the ontological questions the Interlude 
raises. He argues that the ‗Interlude‘ is ‗related to the structures of the self and 
its relation to time…The problem of necessity is discussed, but in relation to 
the problem that necessity creates for human freedom, history, and 
existence.‘54  
Finally, there are a number of scholars who treat the Interlude merely as a 
polemic against Hegel. It is here, they argue, Kierkegaard reveals himself in 
direct opposition to Hegel (or to Martensen). For example Niels Thulstrup 
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argues that within the Interlude Kierkegaard is able to demonstrate the 
differences between his own ‗conceptual clarification of history‘ and Hegel‘s 
philosophy of history. The main difference here, moreover, concerns the role 
that necessity plays in history. Hegel finds necessity within history while 
Kierkegaard is excluding necessity from history. 55  
Jon Stewart similarly conceives the Interlude in terms of Kierkegaard‘s 
relationship with Hegelian thinkers. He argues that ‗Climacus uses the 
argument about the categories of possibility, actuality, and necessity as the 
preliminary analysis for his account of history, which now follows in ―the 
Interlude‖.‘56 And what is crucial is that this account of history was a polemic 
aimed at Martensen, specifically his ―Lectures on the History of Modern 
Philosophy from Kant to Hegel‖ delivered in the Winter Semester 1838-
1839.57  
In what follows, I argue that all the above interpretations are incomplete. 
Rather, in the Interlude Kierkegaard attempts to answer both the ontological 
and the epistemological question simultaneously. Indeed, furthermore, even if 
Kierkegaard did intend to polemicise against a specific philosopher, in so 
doing he generates his own authentic concept of history; hence, what is at 
stake in the Interlude is not the question of whom it is directed against but 
rather the question of what Kierkegaard‘s arguments are. 
 Kierkegaard himself underlines the importance of the ‗Interlude‘: 
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If a speculative thinker were to say that he comprehended the 
necessity of a historical phenomenon, I would indeed bid him to 
occupy himself for a moment with the misgivings set forth in all 
simplicity in the Interlude between chapters IV and V of Fragments. 
                                                                        (CUP, 53-54) 
      Kierkegaard here refers specifically to ‗the Interlude‘ in order to underline 
his own alternative approach to the ‗necessity of a historical phenomenon‘ to 
that of a ‗speculative thinker‘. While the question about who Kierkegaard 
considers to be a ‗speculative thinker‘ is one which continually rages in the 
critical literature, for my purposes the crucial point is that Kierkegaard intends 
the Interlude as an argument about the nature of a historical phenomenon.58 
PF itself begins with these three questions: 
a) ‗Can a historical point of departure be given for an eternal 
consciousness?‘ 
b) ‗How can such a point of departure be of more than historical interest?‘ 
c) ‗Can an eternal happiness be built on historical knowledge?‘ 
All of these questions are questions of ‗history‘. And yet Climacus says 
nothing about history in the first few chapters of the book. It is only when the 
reader reaches the Interlude that one finds Climacus discussing issues closely 
related to historical phenomena. At this point, there are two questions being 
considered:  
a)  ‗Is the Past More Necessary than the Future?‘ 
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b) ‗Has the Possible, by Having Become Actual Become More Necessary 
than It Was?‘59 
What becomes apparent to the reader at this point is the focus of the Interlude 
on temporality (past and future) and the relation of necessity to this 
temporality (along with the latter‘s relation to the other modalities). History 
concerns the past and any historical fact is by its nature something that is 
temporal. Hence, it becomes even clearer that the Interlude is essentially 
concerned with history, when one reads its subtitles: 
a) ‗Coming into existence‘ 
b) ‗The historical‘ 
c) ‗The past‘ 
I will examine each of these in turn in what follows. 
‗Coming into existence‘ 
Before we proceed to an analysis of Climacus‘ arguments, we must clarify one 
central issue, namely the meaning of ‗existence‘. The Hongs write that 
‗―Existence,‖ ―exist,‖ pertain to temporal and spatial being or actuality.‘ (PF, 
297). Climacus explains his own view of the meaning of ‗existence‘ in the third 
chapter of PF, ‗The Absolute Paradox‘. Here, Climacus defines ‗existence‘ in a 
long note, arguing against Spinoza‘s theory of ‗existence‘: 
Consequently, [for Spinoza], the more perfect, the more being; the 
more being, the more perfect. This, however, is a 
tautology…Consequently, the more perfect the thing is, the more it 
is; but its perfection is that it has more esse in itself, which means 
that the more it is, the more it is…He [Spinoza] explains perfectio 
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by realitas, esse [he explains perfection by reality, being]…But to 
go on, what is lacking here is a distinction between factual being 
and ideal being… 
                                                                                   (PF, 41) 
     Kierkegaard wrote on the front flyleaf of his copy of the Gfroerer edition of 
Spinoza‘s Opera: 
 
Re pg. 15. Lemma 1. Note II. This dissolves in a tautology, since 
he explains perfectio by realitas, esse. The more perfect a thing is, 
he says, the more it is; but in turn he explains the perfection of a 
thing by saying that it has in itself more esse, which therefore says 
that the more it is the more it is. In a logical sense, this is correct—
the more perfection, the more it is; but here being has an altogether 
different meaning than it factually is. 
                                                                           (PF, 290) 
This argument is well-known as a proof of God‘s existence: God is the most 
perfect being; the most perfect being incorporates existence; therefore God 
exists. Yet, in opposition to this, Climacus (and Kierkegaard in the last 
quotation) identifies a radical difference between ‗factual being‘ and ‗ideal 
being‘. Climacus dissociates essence from existence. Hence, Climacus 
separates the ideas we have of objects (any kind of object, even God) and the 
actuality of the existence of these objects. Theologically, what is at issue here 
is the possibility of a logical explanation of the Incarnation, and it is for this 
reason he concludes this note: ‗…for the difficulty is to grasp factual being and 
bring God‘s ideality into factual being.‘ (PF, 42). 
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   It seems that Climacus considers existence to be completely different from 
ideality. Ronald M. Green argues that Climacus here relies heavily on Kant‘s 
arguments against the ontological proof of the existence of God.60 The most 
important issue here, however, is Climacus‘ account of existence. Existence is 
not simply an attribute of essence. Existence is ‗factual being‘. The simplest 
way to understand ‗existence‘ is to relate it to spatio-temporal ‗facts‘. ‗Factual 
being‘ is not an essence but a given fact within the spatio-temporal conditions 
of our universe.61 
With this conceptual clarification in mind, the first question that Climacus asks 
in the Interlude runs: 
How is that changed which comes into existence [blive til], or what 
is the change (κίνησις) of coming into existence [Tilbivelse]? All 
other change (αλλοίωσις) presupposes the existence of that in 
which change is taking place, even though the change is that of 
ceasing to be in existence [at voere til]. 
                                                                             (PF, 73) 
Every change that occurs in an entity that exists, presupposes that something 
in that entity remains the same, ensuring an identity before, at the time of and 
after the occurrence of change. If the change is a change in space (motion or 
κίνησις), then, what remains the same through this movement is the entity‘s 
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body. If the change is a change in the body of an existing thing (αλλοίωσις), 
then what remains the same through this change is the identity of the thing. 
When people get older, their body changes but their identity remains the 
same. If I put on some weight over the years and acquire some wrinkles, I am 
still the same person. 
          When something comes into existence, what exactly is the change that 
occurs to that thing? In other words, when something comes into our world, 
can we talk of a change, and if yes, what exactly is that change? Kierkegaard 
is here tapping into a whole philosophical tradition which struggles to theorise 
such change adequately. This is because in order for a thing to change while 
entering our world, something must remain the same and so ensure an 
identity before, during and after the entrance of that thing into existence.62 
If, in coming into existence, a plan is intrinsically changed, then it is 
not this plan that comes into existence; but if it comes into 
existence unchanged, what, then, is the change of coming into 
existence?      (PF, 73) 
Climacus argues that the only change we can identify in a thing that comes 
into existence ‗is not in [its] essence but in [its] being‘ and more specifically 
‗from not existing to existing‘ (PF, 73). In this way when something new comes 
into existence, what really happens is a change in its being; before the 
change its being was ‗not-being‘ and after the change it consisted in a 
‗positive‘ being. Having said that, Climacus argues, can we talk of the same 
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thing before and after its coming into existence? In response, he argues that 
only in the case of possibility and its actualisation can we legitimately speak of 
the same thing passing through the change of ‗coming into existence‘. To 
understand this, however, we must proceed further with his argument. 
      Climacus‘s next step is to identify ‗not-being‘ with possibility and ‗being‘ 
with actuality: 
But such a being that nevertheless is a non-being is possibility, and 
a being that is being is indeed actual being or actuality, and the 
change of coming into existence is the transition from possibility to 
actuality.  (PF, 74) 
On the basis of such identification Climacus goes on to pinpoint the essential 
difference between ideal being and factual being. Only the latter exists in our 
spatio-temporal world and participates in actuality. Immediately, one must 
consider a possible objection to Climacus‘ thesis: the only thing that seems to 
remain the same when a possibility is actualised is its essence or its ideality. 
For what underlies the transition from non-being to existence, is the very ‗idea‘ 
of that being. Climacus however, has already refuted the existence of the 
‗ideal‘. Furthermore, he now reinforces this refutation by stating that: ‗[T]he 
necessary is always related to itself and is related to itself in the same way, 
[thus] it cannot be changed at all.‘ (PF, 74). His argument is clear: if the 
necessary cannot change at all, then the necessary cannot come into 
existence, because every coming into existence is a change. 
In consequence, the following picture emerges: Climacus ascribes necessity 
to the ideal and distinguishes both of them from ‗existence‘. What remains to 
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be understood, however, is the absolute opposition that Climacus goes on to 
infer between existence and necessity, ideal and historical occurrence. 
Mercer interprets Kierkegaard‘s absolute opposition between necessity and 
existence, as a logical conclusion. He argues that if the necessary is an 
actuality, then the necessary must first becomes possible. If however, the 
necessary is possible, then ‗one could conclude that the necessary is also not 
possible.‘63 Hence, necessity is not an actuality. 
I argue that to interpret Kierkegaard‘s absolute dissociation of necessity and 
actuality in this way may provide the basis of his argument, but ultimately it 
does not fully capture Kierkegaard‘s point regarding history and necessity. 
Kierkegaard is providing more than a logical analysis. As we shall see, 
Kierkegaard argues that doubt is not a matter of a possible lack of knowledge 
but a matter of will. In this way, Kierkegaard argues that we cannot aspire to 
overcome doubt with the acquisition of more knowledge. To overcome doubt 
is not a matter of knowing ‗historical‘ necessities. To overcome doubt is purely 
a matter of (free) will. Kierkegaard thus does not remain at the level of a 
purely logical analysis of the paradox of a possible necessity. Rather, his 
argument aims to make apparent the need (regarding historical existence) for 
a shift from epistemology to moral decisions. If we want to rule out doubt from 
history we do not need knowledge but will. We fail to fully understand this if 
we believe that Kierkegaard wants to make a logical analysis.    
If we accept that the necessary is always in the same way, is it possible to 
entertain the thought that it either possibly is or possibly is not? Such is the 
line of thought by which Climacus ascribes necessity to the ideal and 
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separates it completely from the actual: the actual, before becoming the 
actual, is only possible (hence, it either will be actualised or will not be 
actualised). In conclusion, therefore, Climacus generates a mutually exclusive 
pair of binary terms: on the one hand, there are necessity and ‗ideality‘ and, 
on the other, possibility and actuality.64  
Necessity/Freedom 
One of the basic claims of this thesis is that Hegel and Kierkegaard hold 
different positions regarding the existence of necessity in history. Hegel 
argues that necessity lies in the heart of history while Kierkegaard argues that 
necessity cannot be part of history. Hegel also directly associates necessity 
with freedom within history. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, considers the pair 
necessity/freedom in history mutually exclusive. In order, for us, to fully 
capture the way Kierkegaard understands the nature and the role of freedom 
in history we must closely examine and analyse his overall argument about 
necessity and freedom in history (coming into existence). 
Climacus‘ next step in the Interlude is to claim that if necessity cannot be a 
part of any ‗coming into existence‘, then ‗All coming into existence occurs in 
freedom…Every cause ends in a freely acting cause.‘ (PF, 75). At stake in this 
claim are the following presuppositions: 
a) Necessity and existence are incompatible spheres (a point we have 
already discussed in detail). 
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b) Everything that comes into existence, (thus into actuality), has a free 
cause. 
c) Even if we can detect natural laws in actuality and hence some kind of 
‗necessity‘, this does not refute the above, for if we were to follow 
events back to the beginning of the causal chain, we could discover 
freely acting causes alone. 
For Climacus, as we have seen at length, there are only two possible ways of 
‗being‘: either as the ‗ideal‘ and therefore as necessary or as the factual in 
which there resides no necessity. The crucial inference which Climacus now 
makes on the basis of this already established dichotomy is that a complete 
lack of necessity indicates freedom. So, although Climacus does not here 
provide us an elaborate definition of either necessity or freedom, he does 
indicate the relation that exists between them – one of mutual exclusion: 
either freedom is posited or necessity, but never both. Therefore, it becomes 
evident that Climacus directly opposes any kind of mediation between 
necessity and freedom; a point which will be crucial when comparing 
Kierkegaard‘s thought with that of Hegel. 
Kierkegaard (through Climacus) is so absolute about the incompatibility of 
necessity and freedom within history that for him even the so-called necessary 
laws of nature do not demonstrate the presence of necessity in actuality. What 
is Climacus‘ reasoning for this contention? It runs as follows: when we 
discover causes (natural laws) that seem to necessarily produce certain 
effects, regression down the causal chain to the first cause will always return 
us to a freely acting cause. Thus Climacus writes: 
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The intervening causes are misleading in that the coming into 
existence appears to be necessary; the truth about them is that 
they, as having themselves come into existence, definitively point 
back to a freely acting cause. As soon as coming into existence is 
definitively reflected upon, even an inference from natural law is not 
evidence of the necessity of any coming into existence. (PF, 75) 
Climacus‘ argument can be reconstructed as follows: 
a) Any ‗coming into existence‘ has to undergo a change. 
b) Necessity prohibits any kind of change. 
c) Thus, no ‗fact‘ can occur necessarily. 
d) When we come across certain natural laws that imply that certain facts 
occur in a necessary way, returning to the first cause in the causal 
chain will always demonstrate the occurrence of this ‗coming into 
existence‘. 
e) Thus, even strict causal chains necessarily have a free beginning. 
The nature of necessity is still to be determined. It might be argued on this 
basis that causal necessity can coexist with history and with historical 
contingency. If, however, this is the case, it is difficult to conceive 
Kierkegaard‘s absolute separation of them. The answer, I argue, is simple: 
Kierkegaard‘s specific conception of ‗necessity‘ here is a form of logical 
necessity. This is apparent because of Kierkegaard‘s acceptance (even within 
the Interlude) of the existence of natural laws and the existence of causal 
necessity. I would contend, therefore, that his argument proceeds as follows: 
whenever we wish to fully know historical existence by means of causal 
necessity, this involves the application of logical analysis. This logical 
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analysis, however, is incompatible with the very nature of historical existence. 
I return to this issue at length in what follows. 
Climacus thus, creates an insurmountable hiatus between ‗necessary‘ and 
‗existing‘ being. For Climacus freedom can only be where necessity cannot 
be. A radical dualism is in play. Although Climacus has yet to define these 
concepts, their meaning does become determinate by means of their mutual 
opposition. 
Roberts interprets Climacus‘ argument in the following way: ‗Even If we can 
explain the actualisation of possibility a by reference to the actualisations of 
other possibilities (which are the causal antecedents for a) still this string of 
possibilities is only one among an indefinitely large set of strings.‘65 
Roberts thus emphasises the contingency of the first cause in any causal 
chain as the crucial argument Kierkegaard uses to demonstrate the lack of 
necessity within historical existence. 
Kierkegaard indeed makes this point but only to underline the contrast 
between absolute causality and historical existence. As we shall see, by 
‗historical existence‘ he means specifically human historical existence. 
Roberts‘ point is useful for the examination of causality in nature but not 
enough to successfully reconstruct Kierkegaard‘s analysis of ‗historical 
existence‘. 
‗The Historical‘ 
As I have already established, one primary characteristic of history is that it 
‗has come into existence‘ and thus we have to attribute to it freedom and lack 
of necessity. Another primary characteristic is that history refers only to 
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human history and not to nature‘s history. Nature does exist, but has no 
memory of its existence; and although nature has a past, a present and a 
future, nature cannot be ‗free‘ because nature cannot be aware of its past in a 
way that could enable it to decide about its present and its future. It is in this 
vein that Climacus speaks of a ‗redoubling‘ of human being‘s ‗coming into 
existence‘: 
Yet coming into existence can contain within itself a redoubling, 
that is, a possibility of a coming into existence within its own 
coming into existence. Here, in the stricter sense, is the historical, 
which is dialectical with respect to time.   (PF, 76) 
I am arguing that Kierkegaard is here clear that ‗history‘ refers solely to human 
history. Only human beings have the capacity to relate themselves to their 
past in a way that makes them capable of freely choosing their future.66   
Mackey nicely sums up this direct connection between freedom and history: 
The eternal, which is also the necessary, has no history in any 
sense. It sustains no relationship to possibility, actuality, change, or 
freedom. Nature is pure synchrony (spatiality), save for the fact that 
it has, as a whole, come into being. History is pure diachrony 
(temporality), save for the fact that it presupposes space as its 
locus…Strictly speaking, nothing happens in nature. It is always, if 
cyclically, the same, for which reason there are laws of nature. But 
historical events, for which there are no laws, are the operations of 
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freely working causes terminating in the working of an absolute free 
cause.67 
While I agree with Mackey‘s stress on the absence of necessary laws in 
historical events, it strikes me that Mackey fails to take his conclusion far 
enough, so as to draw out the philosophical implications of Kierkegaard‘s 
approach to history. As I have already argued, what previous commentators of 
the Interlude have failed to discern is that Kierkegaard is attempting to answer 
both the ontological question and the epistemological question about history 
therein. 
In order to defend properly my above mentioned claim I will schematise the 
way in which Climacus answers both of these questions. In regard to the 
ontological question about the nature of history Climacus argues: a) history is 
always human history and b) freedom reigns within it, (the kind of freedom 
that excludes any kind of necessity). In terms of the epistemological question, 
there is still much to determine; however, preliminarily one can conclude that 
the knowledge we have of nature by means of natural laws is unavailable for 
historical cognition. 
However, before proceeding further with the epistemological question, we 
need to emphasise once more the fact that Climacus states that history, 
human beings and freedom constitute a fully unified nexus. Furthermore, this 
implies that such a direct connection between the ‗historical‘ and ‗freedom‘ 
leaves human beings as the sole historical agents. Human beings alone make 
history through their own free choices. Past and present are human actualities 
while human future is human possibility. And so to redefine the present in the 
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light of the past and the future is the distinguishing mark of a properly human 
freedom. 
Howland makes a similar point in regard to Climacus‘ argument in the 
Interlude: ‗[O]nly human beings are self-consciously historical, continually 
redefining themselves in terms of their actual pasts and possible futures. And 
this ―dialectical‖ process of redefinition, or of mediating the present in the light 
of actual pasts and possible futures, is a sign of human freedom.‘68 
However, missing from Howland‘s account are the following elements: a) 
human freedom is mainly oriented towards future decisions and b) human 
freedom is a matter of human will (and so of human ability to make decisions). 
I will argue further below and in Chapter Three that for Kierkegaard human 
beings can become complete selves only within history and only by 
continuously actualising their freedom to make decisions. What is more, what 
Howland fails to see, is that this freedom is always accompanied by an 
acceptance (from the side of the people who freely make these decisions) of 
human responsibility. 
The Past 
It has been already argued that for Kierkegaard necessity cannot be found 
within history. In what follows, I will give further details on how Kierkegaard 
defends the absolute lack of necessity in history. To be more specific, I will 
analyse how Climacus argues against the notion that the past can be 
necessary. By doing so, I intend to further exhibit Kierkegaard‘s rejection of 
necessity in history. 
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Usually, when we think of history we think of the past. In fact, the customary 
and perhaps most trivial definition of history is the ‗past‘ of something, or 
something that happened in the past. Yet, as we have seen, for Climacus, 
although nature has a past, it cannot really have a history. Only human beings 
have history, because only human beings can understand what it means to 
have a past, a present and a future. Moreover, Climacus argues at the same 
time that necessity cannot be found within history. One possible objection to 
this latter point runs as follows: the past is necessary because the past cannot 
be changed: 
What has happened has happened and cannot be undone; thus it 
cannot be changed. Is this unchangeableness the 
unchangeableness of necessity?... What has happened has 
happened the way it happened; thus it is unchangeable. But is this 
unchangeableness the unchangeableness of necessity? 
                                                                                     (PF, 76-77) 
Climacus‘ response is, once more, simple: every past, before becoming a past 
was a present; this present became present through ‗coming into existence‘. 
And, as we know, the present comes into existence freely. Although we 
cannot undo or change the past, we can think of this past as different: it could 
have been other than it is, i.e. the past is contingent. 
Here we have one more indication of the nature of Kierkegaardian necessity: 
it is logical necessity. Contingency allows room for causal necessity (under 
specific conditions). As previously noted, this logical necessity has certain 
philosophical implications regarding the ability to fully know historical facts. 
We cannot expect ourselves to be able to fully know and understand history 
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by applying logical analysis to historical facts. The existence of causal 
necessity applies merely to nature and not to human history. Moreover, logical 
analysis is totally incompatible with (human) historical existence. In this way 
Kierkegaard does not depend on contingency to exclude necessity. 
Kierkegaard renders history a field of actualisation, instead of a field of 
cognition. 
For example, we cannot change how World War II ended; this, however, does 
not mean that this past could not have developed in the opposite direction. 
Mercer is thus right to underline that: 
The past is the result of the choice or choices made among the 
possibilities of the future in the present and those possibilities are 
different and varied. It does not follow that one particular choice 
result in a particular past… If the past and the future are necessary 
then they are neither past nor future, but simply are.69 
The concept of history involves continuous change, and consequently 
involves freedom to so change. Mercer‘s analysis, however, still fails to 
acknowledge that Kierkegaard‘s analysis is not focused on the effort to 
understand how past history ‗results‘ in present and future history. On the 
contrary, Kierkegaard argues in favour of the actual existence (and thus 
historical existence) of (human) freedom of will and (human) freedom of 
choice. 
As Climacus spells out, there exists a continuous interaction between our 
past, present and future. We understand ourselves and our reality through the 
continuous effort to choose between different possible choices. Hence, 
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Climacus points out that, if it is asserted that we lack the freedom to make 
choices, so that we are simply subjected to necessity, then we end up living in 
a permanent present, instead of willing history. In fact, as we have seen, 
Kierkegaard has already made clear that ‗necessity always relates itself to 
itself at the same way‘ (PF, 74). It follows therefore that, necessity is eternally 
and so cannot become ‗history‘. What is absolutely crucial here is that 
Kierkegaard focuses on the capacity of human beings to will and so choose to 
make history, rather than focusing on the ability of human beings to know 
history. 
Furthermore, Climacus goes on to provide another reason to avoid attributing 
necessity to the past. He claims that if we consider the past necessary, we 
must attribute such necessity to the future as well, because: 
If the past had become necessary, the opposite conclusion could 
not be drawn with respect to the future, but on the contrary it would 
follow that the future would also be necessary. If necessity could 
supervene at one single point, then we could no longer speak of 
the past and the future. To want to predict the future (prophecy) 
and to want to understand the necessity of the past are altogether 
identical, and only the prevailing fashion makes the one seem more 
plausible than the other to a particular generation.  (PF, 77). 
In order to understand Climacus‘ argument here, one needs to keep in mind 
that for him ‗necessity is and it always is in the same way‘. If we accept that 
the past is necessary, then, one must also accept that the future, which has 
already been transformed into the past, was also necessary. That is, each 
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past moment is previously a present moment and, before that, a future 
moment. 
By arguing the above, Climacus intends to indicate that, if we accept that our 
past is necessary, then the future and the present of that past must also be 
necessary. Such is the reason behind his claim that ‗prophecy‘ and 
understanding the past as necessary ‗are altogether identical‘. We can predict 
the future only if it occurs in a necessary way (i.e. according to necessary 
laws). Moreover, and this is the crucial point, Climacus employs the same line 
of reasoning on the past: we cannot understand the past as necessary, for the 
past is merely one out of many equally possible pasts that could occur. 
Therefore, we are now able to take a step back to reflect on Climacus‘ 
argument so far. This argument, we have seen, constitutes an answer to the 
ontological question of history: the nature of history is to be conceived 
exclusively as the history of human beings and so must be directly connected 
with ‗freedom‘. Provisional conclusions are also possible concerning the 
epistemological question of history: one cannot apply ‗scientific‘ methods to 
history in order to know it in the same way as one applies them in the field of 
nature. We cannot aspire to find necessary laws in history. 
This is also the reason why Climacus goes on to argue that knowledge of the 
past does not confer necessity upon it: 
The past is not necessary, inasmuch as it came into existence; it 
did not become necessary by coming into existence (a 
contradiction), and it becomes even less necessary through any 
apprehension of it… If the past were to become necessary through 
the apprehension [of it], then the past would gain what the 
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apprehension lost, since it would apprehend something else, which 
is poor apprehension. If what is apprehended is changed in the 
apprehension, then the apprehension is changed into a 
misunderstanding… [K]knowledge of the past does not confer 
necessity upon it—for all apprehension, like all knowing, has 
nothing from which to give.   (PF, 79-80) 
Climacus‘ argument can be reconstructed as follows: 
a) While the past certainly existed, it is not necessary. 
b) Our apprehension of the past cannot make it necessary.70 
c) If, through apprehension, one could make it necessary, then either one 
would apprehend the past in the wrong way, (because the past is not 
necessary), or such apprehension would have the power to change the 
essence of the past, which—for Climacus—is absurd.71 
Hence, Climacus here turns far more explicitly to the epistemological question 
of history and so the question of the knowledge we are able to have of history: 
no logical necessity is either discernible in history or can be attributed to it by 
means of cognition. While one can be sure, for example, about simple facts 
(the defeat of Germany in the Second World War, for example), one cannot 
fully apprehend how exactly it happened that this outcome occurred rather 
than any other. 
Such an example demonstrates why for Climacus it is so important to directly 
connect the ontological issue of the nature of history to the epistemological 
issue of the knowledge of history. Freedom (which is defined as lack of 
necessity), on the one hand, characterises the nature of history, but, on the 
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other hand, excludes any scientifically accurate historical knowledge. Causal 
necessity applies only to nature, so human history cannot be totally analysed 
by means of causal thinking. 
That is, what emerges in the Interlude is a demand to approach the whole 
field of philosophy of history from another perspective. A demand emerges to 
treat history differently. Such an alternative conception of history would ensure 
that historical knowledge remains open to doubt and alternative forms of 
apprehension. And such an alternative conception of history is only made 
possible for Climacus by means of the central contention that ‗history‘ is par 
excellence the field of freedom and so a realm in which human beings cannot 
be totally secure about their knowledge. When Climacus excludes necessity 
from history, this brings about a complete paradigm shift in the philosophy of 
history, starting with the ineluctable ‗uncertainty‘ of our historical knowledge. 
Moreover, the significance of such a shift is precisely what I have argued is 
neglected by all the above mentioned commentators. That is, they fail to take 
seriously the fact that for Climacus the problem of ‗freedom‘ applies equally on 
an ontological and epistemological level historically. At the very moment that 
Climacus removes any necessity from history, he generates uncertainty in 
historical cognition. As scholars, we therefore cannot analyse his argument in 
the Interlude from either merely the ontological level of the nature of history or 
merely from the epistemological level of historical knowledge. To do so would 
radically distort Climacus‘ newly-won perspective. 
 
The context to the Interlude 
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The conclusions Climacus reaches in the Interlude need to be placed in a 
broader context, for their purpose can only become fully clear if we consider 
their role in PF as a whole. The question that orients PF is the extent to which 
one is able to come theoretically to terms with the Incarnation of Jesus Christ. 
Climacus answers this question first by considering logical and scientific 
methods as a possible means of understanding the Incarnation, but, 
unsurprisingly, in the course of his argument, this approach is rejected 
wholesale. The Interlude in particular contributes two significant claims to this 
overall argument: a) historical facts, like the Incarnation, cannot be known 
beyond any possible doubt and b) doubt is not overruled by further knowledge 
but by an act of will. 
We have already thoroughly examined Climacus‘ argument concerning 
historical facts and the nature of their knowledge. Before I proceed on 
analysing the way Climacus approaches doubt, it would be beneficial to my 
analysis to offer the general context of the Interlude. 
The reason, that makes me to refer to the context of the Interlude after the 
Interlude and not before it, is that ‗context‘ here can be defined as a further 
conceptual justification of the statements we examined in the Interlude. That 
is, we need first to know what is argued in the Interlude, because we, in a 
way, need to start with the ‗facts‘. Here, as ‗facts‘ we take the Kierkegaardian 
statements concerning history and the historical. 
This section also is a useful introduction to the way Climacus argues about 
doubt, belief and freedom in the last section of the Interlude. It is so, because 
the problem of the exact nature of belief and doubt concerned Climacus 
through his three texts JC, PF and CUP and not only in the Interlude. Hence, 
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examining the way Climacus approaches the problem of belief and doubt in 
JC, PF and CUP can help us understand better his argument in the Interlude. 
Climacus‘ general view of the nature of freedom in these three texts can 
introduce us to the way he approaches freedom in the last part of the 
Interlude. It will become easier for us to fully grasp his final approach to 
freedom if we, first, examine the way freedom is approached through the 
whole oeuvre of Climacus.  
Climacus‘ argument in the Interlude over the nature of history and the nature 
of our historical knowledge is part of a more general attack aimed at those 
who argue that we can overcome our doubts about the Incarnation through 
historical knowledge or through scientific methods.72 It is in this vein that in 
CUP Climacus returns to a passage from PF: 
As is well known, Christianity is the only historical phenomenon that 
despite the historical—indeed, precisely by means of the 
historical—has wanted to be the single individual‘s point of 
departure for this eternal consciousness, has wanted to interest 
him otherwise than merely historically, has wanted to base his 
happiness on his relation to something historical.  (CUP, 15) 
The problem with a philosophical approach to the Incarnation is central to 
Kierkegaard‘s thought even prior to PF and CUP: ‗[C]hristianity‘s claim that it 
had come into the world by a beginning that was simultaneously historical and 
eternal had caused philosophy much difficulty;‘ (JC, 134-135). In each of 
these three texts, the same pseudonym, Climacus, is employed, and this 
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suggests to me that it is through this pseudonym of Climacus that Kierkegaard 
most fully explicates his position concerning the knowability of the Incarnation. 
Hence, the arguments in the Interlude to a large extent rest on and contribute 
to this broader context of Climacus‘ writings as a whole.73  
At the heart of Climacus‘ analysis in each of these three texts lies the problem 
‗of the confusion of historical and eternal categories‘ (i.e. freedom and 
necessity), the problem of the definition of actuality and the definition of doubt. 
We have already followed the fate of the first two problems in the Interlude. 
Before I turn to the third one it would be beneficiary for my analysis to 
consider their role more generally in Climacus‘ oeuvre.74 
In JC, for example, the problem of necessity is articulated as follows: 
Philosophy, however, wanted to do something even more difficult: it 
wanted to permeate everything with the thought of eternity and 
necessity, wanted to do this in the present moment, which would 
mean slaying the present with the thought of eternity and yet 
preserving its fresh life.   (JC, 142-143) 
Having stated the problem thus, Climacus continues to explore the possibility 
of a relation between necessity and actuality. This is a question to which he 
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will answer negatively in the Interlude. Indeed, in CUP Climacus underscores 
this position: 
Placing necessity together with the interpretation of world history, 
as has been done by modern speculative thought, has only caused 
great confusion, whereby possibility, actuality, and necessity are 
confused.  (CUP, 343) 
The nature of doubt and belief and their role regarding the problem of the 
historical knowledge finds, for Climacus, its final solution in the last section of 
the Interlude. In the second part of JC, however, Climacus gives us his first 
attempt to define them. One of the ways it is possible to discern that Climacus‘ 
definitive answer is in the Interlude is that Kierkegaard makes a very similar 
point (to the one he makes in the Interlude) in his Journals: 
It is claimed that arguments against Christianity arise out of doubt. 
This is a total misunderstanding. The arguments against 
Christianity arise out of insubordination, reluctance to obey, mutiny 
against all authority. Therefore, until now the battle against 
objections has been shadowboxing, because it has been 
intellectual combat with doubt instead of being ethical combat 
against mutiny.75 
Apparent in both PF and the Journals is Kierkegaard‘s insistence that 
knowledge is not appropriate means to battle against doubt. On this issue, 
Climacus represents Kierkegaard‘s view. The broader context makes this 
even more apparent. Already in JC one can detect a shift from an 
epistemological view of our existence to an ethical one. Faith, rather than 
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knowledge, is able to counter doubt. Such a development continues 
throughout PF and CUP. In the latter text Climacus points out that ethical 
knowledge is prior to any other knowledge.76 Acquiring ethical knowledge, 
however, means being able to decide about our lives. It is a matter of will. 
Kierkegaard, or Climacus, always defines actuality in terms of making 
decisions and thus, for him: ‗The individual‘s own ethical actuality is the only 
actuality.‘ (CUP, 327). 
Unsurprisingly given these points of convergence, all three texts are in 
agreement on the nature of historical cognition. As we have seen in the 
Interlude, knowledge of the historical cannot aspire to being ‗absolute‘ or 
complete; there will always be a ‗gap‘ in our knowledge constituted by the very 
moment of ‗coming into existence‘. Objective scientific laws have no 
application in the field of history. Similar views are promulgated in CUP and 
JC, as we shall now see. 
Indeed, it is in JC that Climacus first notices the ‗inappropriate‘ confusion of 
necessity and history which will be so important for the argument of the 
Interlude: 
…[I]t seemed strange to him that people talked so imprecisely, that 
they confused historical and eternal categories in such a way that 
when they seemed to be saying something historical they were 
saying something eternal.   (JC, 134) 
Historical knowledge is but a relative knowledge and as such cannot act as a 
remedy to our doubts. In JC, Climacus specifically refers to the problem of 
‗objective thinking‘ in relation to the problem of doubt in general: ‗Thus it would 
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be a misunderstanding for someone to think that doubt can be overcome by 
so-called objective thinking.‘ (JC, 170). Without delving into the problem of 
what exactly Kierkegaard means by the term ‗objective thinking‘ in any detail, 
it is surely correct to note that it includes some reference to objective scientific 
methods.77 In the Interlude, as we have seen, Climacus will argue that such 
‗objective thinking‘ is not applicable in the field of history. 
     Climacus‘ argument concerning the lack of necessity in history and the 
freedom that pertains in actuality is not restricted only at the Interlude. 
Instead, it is explored also in JC and CUP. Climacus in the last section of the 
Interlude will further define the exact nature of the relations between 
knowledge, belief, doubt and freedom in history. What we should know 
however, about the context of this last section, is that Climacus underlines the 
contingency of the historical. Such contingency refers both to the nature of 
history and it signifies the lack of necessary laws pertaining to freedom in the 
field of history and hence to the impossibility of complete historical knowledge. 
… [T]here lies here the entire misunderstanding that recurs time 
and again in modern philosophy: to make the eternal historical as a 
matter of course and to assume an ability to comprehend the 
necessity of the historical. Everything that becomes historical is 
contingent…     (CUP, 98) 
In the last section of the Interlude Climacus, as we are about to see, argues 
that doubt is not the result of ‗less‘ knowledge but, instead, it is a matter of 
will. Climacus will argue that the existence of freedom in history results at the 
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lack of ‗absolute‘ historical cognition. He will continue arguing that doubt and 
belief are responses to this freedom. That is, because we are free (in history), 
we can either choose to doubt or to believe (in history and the historical). 
Freedom and doubt and belief are absolutely interconnected. 
Doubt, belief, will and freedom in history 
Climacus has already argued that freedom and not necessity exists within 
history. From this ontological claim he has also argued that we cannot know 
history in an absolute manner. Climacus now will conclude his argument 
concerning both his ontological claim and his epistemological one by defining 
the exact nature of belief and doubt. He will argue against those who claim 
that doubt results from lack of knowledge and thus ‗more‘ knowledge can 
‗nullify‘ doubt.78  
Climacus will relate freedom in history with freedom of will and freedom of 
choice. He will explain doubt and belief as direct products of these two 
freedoms and in this way he will conclude his argument in the Interlude. 
    Climacus states twice that ‗immediate sensation and immediate cognition 
cannot deceive.‘ (PF, 81-82). The problem comes with ‗reflection‘ (PF, 81). 
Those who think that they can overcome doubt through certain and secure 
historical knowledge are mistaken. We have already seen that Climacus 
argues that there is no secure historical knowledge. Now he goes on to state 
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that, if we wish to overcome the kind of doubt that comes with reflection, we 
have to do so by means of our will instead of cognition. 
That is, Climacus here claims that belief and doubt are acts of freedom, 
expressions of the will, rather than products of cognition and theoretical 
understanding: ‗…belief is not knowledge but an act of freedom, an 
expression of will.‘ (PF, 82-83).    Thus, for Climacus, ‗The conclusion of belief 
is no conclusion but a resolution‘. The term ‗conclusion‘ here refers to a logical 
process, whereas ‗resolution‘ consists in an act of will. Hence, Climacus 
argues that belief and doubt are not modes of knowledge, but opposing 
passions. (PF, 84).79 We are free either to doubt or to believe. We are free to 
remain skeptical in the face of the possible interpretation of the historical facts 
or we can will to believe them. Precisely because every ‗coming into 
existence‘ occurs freely, one can never be fully certain about it: historical 
cognition can never be certain. This is why Climacus adds: ‗Belief is a sense 
for coming into existence…‘ (PF, 84).  
        It might be argued that there are historical facts known to us without any 
kind of act of will. When a car, for example, crashes into another car, this is an 
indisputable fact; we cannot choose either to believe it or to doubt it. Climacus 
though, does not consider this mere fact of the crash as ‗historical‘. Instead, 
for Climacus, a historical fact includes the ‗interpretation‘ of this fact as well. 
Questions such as ‗Whose fault is this accident? Is it really a car accident or it 
is a ‗fake‘ one for the shooting of a movie?‘ are inextricably involved here. 
Kierkegaard has already asserted, as we have seen, that only human beings 
can have history, because only human beings can be aware of the active 
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connection between their past, their present and their future. Immediate 
sensation of the bare fact does not constitute a historical fact for Kierkegaard. 
Historical agents need to mediate these mere occurrences through 
interpretation. Another objection is possible here, however: it might be argued 
that scientific facts of nature also need interpretation, so why can‘t one 
consider these as historical facts? Kierkegaard‘s answer is that belief and 
doubt are not modes of knowledge. Scientific facts need interpretation but 
such interpretation is epistemological. On the other hand, the interpretation of 
historical facts takes place through the will; it is therefore an existential 
characteristic of our historical existence. 
The raw immediacy of what happens does not constitute the historical fact. 
Interpretation is needed and yet, Climacus emphasises, such interpretation 
will never bring about the kind of knowledge involved in cognition of nature. 
What is more, precisely because history is always the history of human beings 
for Climacus, reflection on the intention, motivation and willing involved in 
history is absolutely necessary. This is the reason why for Climacus the 
ontological question cannot be separated from the epistemological one.80 
It follows that history requires the active participation of human beings, 
choosing actions, intending actions and willing actions. It is this activity 
Kierkegaard designates with the term ‗passion‘. 
In order to pinpoint this active participation in a more precise manner, it is 
worth turning to Roberts‘ analysis of the epistemology implicit in the Interlude. 
Roberts reconstructs Climacus‘ concepts of belief and doubt as follows: 
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No historical personage (or indeed any event at all) is a flat, 
straightforward, self-interpreting brute datum given to an 
unambiguous apprehension. Every historical judgment, whether 
made by an eyewitness of the personage in question or by 
someone in a subsequent generation dependent on testimony, is 
shaped ultimately by a set of beliefs held by the individual making 
the judgment, which beliefs form a kind of interpretive mold out of 
which the judgment emerges, and in virtue of which the judgment is 
certified.81 
While there is much to be applauded in this passage, what I dispute in 
Roberts‘ interpretation of the Interlude is his contention that it is such 
epistemological issues alone that are at stake. For Roberts, the epistemology 
laid out above is ‗the central insight of Climacus‘s Interlude.‘82  
I am claiming that these epistemological issues presuppose initial conclusions 
concerning the ontological nature of history. It is, to repeat, only by 
approaching Climacus‘ arguments in the Interlude through both questions that 
its meaning, purpose and function becomes completely clear. 
Epilogue 
      We must be very careful when approaching Kierkegaard‘s thinking. He 
uses different pseudonyms; he ‗plays games‘ with his readers in order to 
engage them personally; he uses different writing styles, sometimes writing as 
a poet, sometimes as a ‗humorist‘ and a novelist and sometimes as a 
‗philosopher‘. As George Pattison and Steven Shakespeare put it: 
                                                 
81
 Roberts, pp.126-127. 
82
 Ibid, p.126. 
 85 
‗Kierkegaard is not only a writer who demands extremely difficult 
interpretative judgments on the part of the reader, he also 
continues to provoke in equal measure an antipathetic sympathy 
and a sympathetic antipathy amongst his readers. He therefore 
continues, nearly 150 years after his death to be a controversial as 
well as a defining figure in the history of modern thought.‘83 
However, philosophers should not be intimidated by such difficulties, for they 
are able to provide additional motives for reflection. Kierkegaard is a 
provocation to philosophy: 
Out of love of humankind, out of despair over my awkward 
predicament of having achieved nothing and of being unable to 
make anything easier than it had already been made, out of 
genuine interest in those who make everything easy, I comprehend 
that it was my task: to make difficulties everywhere. 
                                                                                (CUP, 186-187) 
Hence, if we consider history to be known through the application of general 
and necessary laws, (the way nature can be known), our job as philosophers 
would be much easier. Historical existence would be more certain and secure. 
If, on the other hand, we subscribe to Climacus‘ concept of history, then 
everything suddenly becomes insecure and ‗scientific‘ accuracy is unavailable 
to us. Yet, we must still attempt on this view to become responsible for the 
making of our history. Of course, this might seem an impossible task; 
personally each one of us may feel too ‗small‘ to try to influence history or to 
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try to understand it. But then again, this too fulfils Climacus‘ promise: ‗to make 
difficulties everywhere‘. 
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Chapter Three 
 
The structure of the Kierkegaardian “Self” 
 
Introduction 
 
In PF Kierkegaard argues that necessity is irreconcilable with temporality. In 
fact, he argues for something more, that only freedom is reconcilable with 
temporality, and such freedom cannot coexist with necessity. What is more, 
just as with necessity and freedom, the finite and the infinite, the temporal and 
the eternal cannot coexist either. And yet, in The Concept of Anxiety 
(hereafter CA) and The Sickness Unto Death (hereafter SD), Kierkegaard 
argues that the human ‗Self‘ is an active union of all the above pairs.84 What is 
even more perplexing is the fact that Kierkegaard published PF on June 13, 
1844 and CA on June 17, 1844. This sharpens the tension between the two 
seemingly contradictory positions even further and the purpose of this chapter 
is to understand how Kierkegaard is able to understand the relation between 
necessity and freedom in such opposed ways. 
My thesis is that in PF Kierkegaard refers only to logical necessity whereas in 
CA and SD he refers to the ‗existential‘ necessity of our given limits (our given 
human nature, our body, our society, our established relationships, everything 
in general that it is already given to us). His point, then, is as follows: first, we 
cannot understand history through logical analysis (hence, there is no logical 
necessity in history) and secondly, even if we are free to create ourselves 
through our personal choices, we still have to accept our ‗objective‘ situation. 
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Even so, as Kierkegaard argues in CA and SD, we still must accept these 
necessities as our personal choices; hence, we cannot escape our personal 
responsibility for the creation of our life.  
Kierkegaard labels this kind of freedom, ‗entangled freedom‘ (CA, 49). It ‗rules‘ 
both in history and in the creation of the human self. I use the word ‗creation‘ 
because, for Kierkegaard (as I will contend in this chapter), the human self is 
a dynamic process grounded in freedom of will and freedom of choice. For 
Kierkegaard, choices necessarily involve passions. What does Kierkegaard 
mean by ‗passion‘? The term is related to ‗interest‘. We are ‗passionate‘ about 
something, only and only if we take personal interest in it. Passion thus, is not 
something arbitrary, it is not something opposed to reason. Passion does not 
refer to something irrational, but to personal engagement. 
The main argument in this chapter will be that the structure of the 
Kierkegaardian ‗Self‘ as it is depicted in CA and SD can be analysed as the 
task of becoming a Self through personal choices. This task can be 
accomplished only within history. In fact, this task is our personal history. If we 
understand history in this way we have: 
a) to understand as history only our (i.e. human) history; 
b) to put at the centre of this history individuals-persons-selves-agents 
(individuals, because for Kierkegaard only individuals really exist, 
everything else is nothing but a convenient abstraction; persons, 
because only through personal choices do we acquire a Self; agents, 
because we actively create both our selves and our history; selves 
because Kierkegaard stresses again and again the fact that we can 
have a ‗Self‘ only through our choices); and 
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c) to include in this concept of history, alongside the past, the future and 
the present as well. In this way, Kierkegaard shifts the crux (and the 
nature) of history from a theoretical understanding of the past (as in 
Hegelian philosophy of history) to an active union of personal choices 
that refer at the same time to the past, present and future. This 
Kierkegaardian concept of history is a non-deterministic process, which 
puts freedom of will and freedom of choice (along with personal 
responsibility) at the very core of history. 
I conclude that for Kierkegaard, human beings are the only historical agents. It 
is impossible for other beings to contribute to history because, for 
Kierkegaard, history can be made only by those beings who possess the 
requisite consciousness to realise their past and connect it to their present 
and future. This capacity can only be found among human beings. Even if one 
could assert, for example, that the weather plays an active role in the making 
of history, we still cannot, for Kierkegaard, attribute agency to the weather, 
because weather lacks the requisite consciousness. For the same reason, 
neither animals nor ‗destiny‘ count as historical agents. 
It follows that theoretical comprehension and logical analysis are not the 
appropriate means to examine history. However, this raises another problem: 
why, then, does Kierkegaard seemingly indulge in logical analysis in ‗the 
Interlude‘; indeed, how can I even attempt to write a PhD thesis to the 
Kierkegaardian approach to history, if history eludes theoretical 
comprehension? This seems to generate another paradox, much like the one 
Kierkegaard speaks of in PF. My answer is simple: Kierkegaard describes 
history as a future created by individual choice. In this context, theoretical 
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comprehension is not the primary ‗instrument‘ for understanding history and 
the historical. However, and this is key, the previous claim does not exclude 
the possibility of using theory in order to conceptually clarify the problems that 
arise when approaching history. Kierkegaard employs logical analysis in ‗the 
Interlude‘ precisely because he has to theoretically defend his non-theoretical 
definition of history in ‗the Interlude‘. It is, however, just an interlude, a 
theoretical clarification. Indeed, generally, one can claim that Kierkegaard 
does not entirely disregard logical argumentation, in fact, in CA and in SD he 
heavily relies on his own philosophical argumentation to persuade us of his 
own unique approach to the problems of anxiety and despair. 
As for the problem of trying to write a philosophical thesis on the 
Kierkegaardian approach to history, my arguments is that, as long as one 
does not consider theoretical argumentation and logical analysis as the 
primary and unique sources of historical analysis, they can still be used for 
theoretical clarification. 
What, however, cannot be forgotten, for Kierkegaard, is that personal 
experience is the primary means of approaching historical facts. For 
Kierkegaard, the creation of our selves signifies the creation of our history and 
vice versa. 
Freedom and necessity, temporality and eternity 
In their historical introduction to CA, the Hongs make the following claim: 
Kierkegaard dealt with the problem of freedom in three of his 
pseudonymous works: Philosophical Fragments defines the 
ontological ground of freedom and its realm, whereas The Concept 
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of Anxiety and The Sickness unto Death consider the 
anthropological aspects of freedom. (CA, p.viii) 
The Hongs thus argue that in PF Kierkegaard describes the nature of 
freedom, while in CA and SD he describes the way it manifests itself in human 
beings. The problem with this line of argument, however, is that the three 
works do not—at least at first blush—seem to stand in such a line of 
continuity. There are seeming problems of consistency between them. 
For example, in PF Kierkegaard states the following: ‗All coming into 
existence occurs in freedom, not by way of necessity.‘ (PF, 75). He continues: 
‗ [O]nly the eternal has absolutely no history.‘ (PF, 76). That is, Kierkegaard 
argues that existing human beings exist in freedom and so lack necessity and 
eternity. And yet, what Kierkegaard writes elsewhere seemingly contradicts 
this. So, in CA Kierkegaard states that: 
Man is a synthesis85 of the psychical and the physical; however, a 
synthesis is unthinkable if the two are not united in a third. This 
third is a spirit.  (CA, 43) 
The spirit is something that participates in the eternal.86 And if this is the case 
(i.e. if spirit has an eternal dimension), how can Kierkegaard claim at the 
same time that the eternal has no history? That is, if man (who exists in 
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 Kierkegaard speaks of a ‗synthesis‘ when he wants to describe the structure of human self. 
Synthesis in this context is neither a Hegelian mediation nor the necessary result of a logical 
negation. Kierkegaard is very careful to point out that synthesis within the human self is the 
product of freedom because synthesis is posited by the spirit in freedom. In this way, this 
Kierkegaardian synthesis cannot be either a product of logical necessity or a mediation which, 
according to Hegel, necessary grounds the opposites which mediates. Freedom lies at the 
core of this Kierkegaardian synthesis and not necessity. 
86
 I interpret Kierkegaard‘s ‗spirit‘ as follows: a) when it comes to human beings spirit signifies 
self-consciousness and b) when it comes to the relation between God and human beings 
spirit is the human ability to understand that God is our ultimate ontological ground. In other 
words, I interpret the Kierkegaardian spirit as the only human activity that can help human 
beings to really understand themselves as free beings who are grounded in God.  I will have 
the chance to expand, clarify and defend my interpretation in my further analysis in this 
chapter. 
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history, thus in time) is a spirit, surely eternity has some relation with time? 
Moreover, in SD Kierkegaard goes on to make the following claim: 
A human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But 
what is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is 
the relation‘s relating itself to itself in the relation;…A human being 
is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the 
eternal, of freedom and necessity… (SD, 13) 
In light of this, how can Kierkegaard‘s claim in PF that the eternal (and so 
necessity) cannot be found in existence be understood? Kierkegaard claims 
that human beings are (partly at least) eternal, does this not imply that 
necessity can be located within the realm of existence? Moreover, how can 
Kierkegaard argue in PF that necessity does not coexist with freedom, if in SD 
he clearly states from the very beginning that human beings are a synthesis of 
necessity and freedom? 
The only possible answer to such a paradox is to respond that in these works 
Kierkegaard is talking about different kinds of ‗freedom‘ and ‗necessity‘. This is 
my answer: ‗freedom‘ in CA means something quite different from ‗freedom‘ in 
PF. That is, in PF freedom refers to temporality in general (which of course 
includes free will and freedom of choice as well). In PF freedom pertains to 
every aspect of existence and so has a wider field of reference than freedom 
of will and freedom of choice. In CA and SD freedom is always freedom of will 
and freedom of choice. That is, in CA and SD freedom is no more the 
‗general‘ freedom that lacks any logical necessity, as freedom in PF does. In 
CA and SD freedom is ‗existential‘, that is, freedom is purely a matter of 
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human will and choice. An individual, however, may have freedom of will and 
freedom of choice, while he is not able to avoid other necessities.  
One legitimate solution to the above paradox is, therefore, to explain freedom 
in PF as the opposite of logical necessity, and freedom in CA as freedom of 
will and freedom of choice. This is the means of solving the problem: 
Kierkegaard argues in PF that freedom and necessity cannot coexist, because 
necessity in this text refers to logical necessity and freedom characterises the 
whole spectrum of existence. On the other hand, in SD Kierkegaard argues 
that each human being is an active union of freedom and necessity, because 
necessity here is not abstract logical necessity, but is the given conditions in 
any specific human life.87 
In PF Kierkegaard thus attempts to avoid the problems inherent to a form of 
‗idealism‘ which identifies reason (i.e. logical necessity) and existence (i.e. 
reality).88 It is for this reason he insists on separating existence (reality) from 
necessity (necessary logical sequences). 
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 Anthony Rudd stresses the fact that for Kierkegaard: ‗Abstract thinking is perfectly 
legitimate, so long as it does not forget that it is abstract and mistake its abstractions for 
realities.‘ Anthony Rudd, ‗Speculation and Despair: Metaphysical and Existential Perspectives 
on Kierkegaard‘, Kierkegaard and Freedom, edited by James Giles, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2000), p. 32. The problem (in my opinion) with Rudd‘s analysis is that he does not 
make the necessary connection between PF, CA and SD. In this way Rudd cannot fully 
disclose the Kierkegaardian approach to the problem of freedom.  
Poul Lubcke closely examines the problem of the possible meanings of freedom in 
Kierkegaard‘s PF, CA and SD. He argues that the word ‗necessity‘ has another sense in PF 
from the sense that has in SD. Poul Lubcke, ‗Freedom and Modality‘, Kierkegaard and 
Freedom, 2000, p. 98. Lubcke however seems unable to point out the exact relation of 
freedom and necessity in PF and thus he cannot fully disclose the exact way in which 
Kierkegaard uses freedom and necessity in PF. 
James Giles claims that freedom in CA ‗…has the special possibility of being able to bring our 
free will into clear relief.‘ James Giles, ‗Kierkegaard‘s Leap: Anxiety and Freedom‘, 
Kierkegaard and Freedom, p. 80. Giles however does not try to directly connect freedom in 
CA with freedom in SD and thus he fails to capture the exact historical role that freedom plays 
for human beings. 
88
 See for example Kierkegaard‘s extended note in PF, p. 41, where he follows Kant‘s 
argument that ‗there is a distinction between factual being and ideal being.‘ 
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Hence, we are now in a position to accept Kierkegaard‘s approach of freedom 
and necessity both in PF and in CA and SD. In PF necessity is independent of 
temporality (it ‗is and only is‘) because it is logical abstracted necessity, and 
freedom refers to the lack of this specific necessity. Hence, in PF what defines 
necessity is the lack of freedom, and what defines freedom is the lack of 
necessity. These two, by definition, cannot co-exist. In CA and SD, however, 
necessity is a very different beast and so is freedom. The kind of necessity at 
play here is ‗existential‘ necessity as opposed to the ‗logical‘ necessity of PF. 
Existential necessity is not irreconcilable with the (existential) freedoms of will 
and choice. Existential necessity refers to: a) the necessary and 
unchangeable structure of every single existing human being and b) the 
necessary given conditions of every single (existing) human being‘s life.89  
While logical necessity directly conflicts with freedom, existential necessity 
can be harmoniously united with freedom of will. In CA Kierkegaard examines 
anxiety as a positive indication of freedom of choice and freedom of will (I will 
examine how Kierkegaard deploys his arguments further on in my analysis), 
and in SD he analyses the nature and the structure of human Self as the 
active union of (existential) necessity and (existential) freedom.  
Graham M. Smith identifies three distinctive aspects of selfhood ‗which help to 
differentiate Kierkegaard‘s account from that of other thinkers.‘ The first is 
that: ‗selfhood is not simply a matter for philosophical speculation. For 
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 John Milbank also stresses Kierkegaard‘s opposition to the ‗reality‘ of logical necessity. He 
thus states that: …[N]ecessary logical sequences and determinate sets of categories are but 
formalized and arbitrary abstractions (respectively), from an endless fictioning of possibilities 
which renders any attempted self-critique of reason, any attempt to know how we know, and 
thereby to acquire a standard to measure authentic knowledge—genuinely grasped 
objectivity—coterminously infinite. John Milbank, ‗The Sublime in Kierkegaard‘, HeyJ XXXVII 
(1996), p. 302. The problem with Milbank‘s approach is that he cannot (or he does not wish 
to) offer us any positive definition of Kierkegaard‘s use of freedom in PF, CA and SD and thus 
he fails to disclose the exact way Kierkegaard connects freedom and necessity in these texts. 
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Kierkegaard, selfhood must be understood (or more correctly apprehended) 
existentially.‘ Smith goes on to argue that for Kierkegaard selfhood is not 
something passive but, on the contrary, is an active process, a task.90 What 
Smith fails to point out is the historical aspect of this distinct Kierkegaardian 
‗selfhood‘. 
For the time being it is enough to define this selfhood as ‗existential‘ in the 
sense that the active union of freedom and necessity it presupposes does not 
refer to logical necessity and absolute freedom. Nevertheless, the problem of 
how to understand the union of temporal and eternal in SD remains. And yet 
this obstacle is surmountable, if one understands that the paradox is dissolved 
once one sees temporal Self of SD as grounded in God. Only by so doing can 
temporality and eternity be distinct but compatible in an active union. 
The human Self 
Kierkegaard argues in SD that the human Self is grounded in God: 
Such a relation that relates itself to itself, a self, must either have 
established itself or have been established by another…The human 
self is such a derived, established relation, a relation that relates 
itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates itself to another.  
(SD, 13-14). 
This ‗another‘ that grounds the human self is God. Before analysing this 
relation further, we need to consider how Kierkegaard defines the human self 
and why this is so important for our understanding of the Kierkegaardian 
concept of history. Being a self is not something pre-established or fixed for 
Kierkegaard in SD. On the contrary, being a self is: a) a task, b) this task is to 
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 G.M. Smith, ‗Kierkegaard from the point of view of the political‘, History of European Ideas 
31 (2005), p.39. 
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accept responsibility for our choices (and the anxiety and the despair that 
follow) and c) this task can be accomplished only in time. 
The more consciousness the more self; the more consciousness 
the more will; the more will, the more self. A person who has no will 
at all is not a self; but the more will he has, the more self-
consciousness he has also…The self is the conscious synthesis of 
infinitude and finitude that relates itself to itself, whose task is to 
become itself,…to become oneself is to become concrete. (SD, 29-
30). 
 This ‗concreteness‘ of the self refers directly: a) to specific choices and b) to 
choices that can be made only within time. These choices can be made only 
because human beings have freedom of choice. Human beings can actualise 
this freedom of choice through their will. They can will because they have the 
freedom to do so. In addition, this freedom can be actualised only in time. 
Becoming a self thus, refers directly to a task that involves freedom of will and 
freedom of choice, and this task happens in time, thus happens within history. 
     In this way, understanding the Kierkegaardian self can give us a better and 
deeper understanding of what history is for Kierkegaard. If in PF and 
specifically in the ‗Interlude‘, general, theoretical depiction of the nature of 
history is given, in CA there is to be found a further definition of the 
significance of freedom for human subjects, and additionally in SD the 
‗becoming‘  of the human self is added to the mix. 
Freedom is the crucial factor for history and human selves. To put it bluntly, 
becoming a self cannot occur without freedom or history, because becoming a 
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self is a task that can be accomplished solely through freedom of will and 
choice in history and only in history.91 
If in PF the theoretical union of history and freedom becomes clear, in SD the 
exact way human selves are history and freedom is revealed. My thesis is that 
history, freedom and human self are directly related to each other in this way: 
history is the temporal context within which human subjects can become 
human subjects through their freedom of will and freedom of choice. Because 
(as I have already argued in my previous chapter) history is only human 
history, in order to fully understand the Kierkegaardian concept of history, we 
must first fully understand how the human self becomes a self. The will is the 
active historical agent here. Nature, animals, destiny, lack a conscious will 
and so lack the ability of being active historical agents. 
Eternity, God and despair 
The problem of the eternal, however, still remains. If human beings can create 
themselves and their history purely by using their freedom of will and their 
freedom of choice, how can we understand Kierkegaard‘s statement that 
every human self is grounded in God? I argue that Kierkegaard‘s latter claim 
does not contradict his previous one regarding humans‘ free will and free 
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 C. Stephen Evans also argues in favour of the above mentioned connection between the 
becoming of the self and history: ‗There is no question that the emphasis of Kierkegaard‘s 
writings is on selfhood as an achievement, something I must strive to become…[T]hrough 
choice the ethical individual can acquire an identity, can become someone who is capable of 
enduring and having a history.‘ C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self, (Waco, 
Texas: Baylor University Press, 2006), p. 265. (The italics in this quotation belong to the 
original text). 
 What separates my approach from that of Evans is that I believe that the stress should be on 
the historical nature of the Kierkegaardian Self and not on its ethical aspect. Although I do 
also recognise the ethical orientation of Kierkegaard‘s writings on selfhood, I argue that the 
creation of our-selves point primarily to history and then point to an ethical creation of a 
certain identity. In other words, I argue that the self as an ethical identity is grounded in the 
historical self. Even when we make choices based on our aesthetic evaluation for example, 
we still create our historical self, without needing to create a specific ethical identity. 
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choice.92 Kierkegaard starts from something that he considers an 
undisputable fact of life, i.e. the existence of despair in the sphere of human 
existence. For Kierkegaard every human being despairs (at some point in her 
life or continuously). Kierkegaard starts from this fact of human despair and 
argues that this despair is a direct (or indirect) indication of the denial of 
human beings to freely ground their selves in God. I need to point out here the 
two most important elements of this Kierkegaardian claim: a) human beings 
have the absolute freedom to ground or not ground themselves in God and b) 
the necessary existential implication of the denial by human beings to ground 
themselves in God is despair. 
In this way the necessity of completing ourselves as human beings by 
grounding our selves in God is not an absolute one. We can turn our backs on 
God, we do have this freedom. What makes this grounding necessary is the 
fact that we cannot avoid despair if we freely choose to deny grounding 
ourselves in God.  
 God then plays no active role in our decision, for human beings have the 
absolute initiative to create ourselves. The necessity of grounding ourselves in 
God is part of the task of completing ourselves. Such necessity is once again 
existential, not logical. Human beings in history remain nevertheless entirely 
free to create themselves through their free will and their free choice without 
needing to obey any kind of necessity. In fact, Kierkegaard can also point out 
that we are free human subjects because we can deny even God. It is not 
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 As I intend to fully analyse Kierkegaard‘s approach to despair further on, I will have the 
opportunity to fully explain there Kierkegaard‘s statements regarding God‘s role in the 
creation of human self. I will try to simply define here the main characteristics of the 
Kierkegaardian analysis of despair. 
 
 99 
God that chooses us, it is individual human beings who choose (or do not 
choose) their completion by choosing God. 
For a matter of philosophical justice I must cite here Harry S. Broudy‘s claim 
that: ‗It is not the Absolute which chooses through the individual, but rather, 
the individual becomes absolute through his own choice.‘93 Broudy also points 
out the individual freedom for grounding or not grounding our selves in God 
(the Absolute). Broudy however does not make the philosophical connection 
between human historical primacy and the choice of the ‗Absolute‘. I argue 
that Kierkegaard can define human historical activity as absolutely free and at 
the same time can claim that we cannot complete our historical existences 
unless we freely choose God. There is no contradiction here between human 
historical primacy and the ‗Absolute‘. Despair is the existential proof for 
Kierkegaard for: a) our need, if we want to complete our historical selves, to 
ground ourselves in God and b) our absolute freedom of going against this 
need. 
Kierkegaard regards human beings as (partly at least) spirits and thus he 
considers men to posses an eternal or spiritual dimension. Humans are, 
however, free historical agents who have the absolute power to choose to 
create our selves in any given way. The fact that for Kierkegaard we are not 
complete selves unless we ground ourselves in God does not contradict our 
historical freedom, on the contrary, this fact absolutely testifies for our power 
to defy even this ‗ultimate‘ necessity. 
For Kierkegaard we, human beings, cannot escape the specific structure of 
our selves, which is necessarily and always a union of necessity and freedom, 
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 Harry S. Broudy, ‗Kierkegaard‘s Levels of Existence‘, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 1, No. 3, (March, 1941), p. 302.  
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the temporal and the eternal, necessarily and always grounded in God. 
Kierkegaard states quite clearly in SD that we have one and only one way 
(necessarily) to become genuine selves without despair: 
The formula that describes the state of the self when despair is 
completely rooted out is this: in relating itself to itself and in willing 
to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established 
it.  (SD, 14). 
We have the freedom to live either with or without despair. We do not 
possess, however, the freedom to avoid despair, if we (freely) choose not to 
‗rest transparently‘ in God. The existence of despair is the proof of our spiritual 
dimension, in the same way as the existence of anxiety is the proof of our 
freedom of will and our freedom of choice. Kierkegaard asserts the meaning 
and the significance of anxiety from the very beginning of CA: ‗[A]nxiety is 
freedom‘s actuality as the possibility of possibility.‘ (CA, 42).  
This anxiety is the only possible sign of the existence within us of any kind of 
personal freedom. This ‗freedom‘ can be given only through personal choices, 
because, for Kierkegaard, our life is our choices (even if we choose not to 
make choices). But this freedom to choose or even the ability to make such 
choices is always presented to us with anxiety.94 
In conclusion, the problem of Kierkegaard‘s conflicting statements on the 
nature of freedom and necessity in PF, CA and SD can be solved only if we 
consider these statements to refer to different kinds of freedom and necessity. 
If, also, we can understand the relation between temporality and eternity in PF 
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 Paul L. Holmer gives us a quite lucid picture of Kierkegaard‘s philosophical approach to the 
matter of the (free) choices a human being must take if she wants to be a complete person in 
his article: ‗Kierkegaard and Ethical Theory‘, Ethics, Vol. 63, No. 3, Part 1 (Apr., 1953), PP. 
157-170. Holmer however does not follow at all the philosophical implications of 
Kierkegaard‘s approach to the problem of free choice regarding history and the historical. 
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and CA and SD the way I propose, then Kierkegaard is coherent. More than 
this, if we decide to understand Kierkegaard‘s claims about freedom, 
necessity, the eternal and the temporal in CA and SD the way I propose to 
understand them, then we can also acquire a deeper understanding of 
Kierkegaard‘s concept of history.  
Anxiety 
Having argued why I believe CA and SD to be crucial texts for the 
understanding of the Kierkegaardian concept of history, I will continue my 
analysis by focusing specifically, first, on the way in which Kierkegaard depicts 
anxiety in CA and, second, in the way in which Kierkegaard structures human 
self in SD. In this way we can unfold in its full exposition the historical 
dimension of freedom and the human self. 
 Anxiety, for Kierkegaard, is the only sign of freedom humans can have. 
Hence, for Kierkegaard, only the existential analysis of anxiety can disclose 
the full historical role of freedom in people‘s lives. Under these terms, the 
analysis of anxiety is crucial for the analysis of the Kierkegaardian Self and 
consequently for the analysis of the Kierkegaardian approach to history. 
In their introduction to CA, the Hongs emphasise the significance of the 
experience of anxiety for the existence of individual freedom: ‗If the individual 
did not have some measure of freedom, there could be no experience of 
anxiety.‘ (CA, xvii). My aim will be to define further the nature of this ‗individual 
freedom‘ and to give my reasons for connecting it directly to the 
Kierkegaardian concept of history. 
In his own introduction to CA, Kierkegaard restates one of the most 
fundamental assertions from the ‗Interlude‘: ‗In logic, no movement must come 
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about, for logic is, and whatever is logical only is.‘ (CA, 13). Logical necessity 
cannot (by definition) apply to time (historical existence), because logic lacks 
temporality. In the footnote that expands on his argument, Kierkegaard refers 
to Eleatics: ‗The eternal expression for the logical is what the Eleatics through 
a misunderstanding transferred to existence: nothing comes into being, 
everything is.‘ (CA, 13).95  
From the beginning of CA, Kierkegaard makes clear the kind of ‗eternity‘ that 
cannot be found within the realm of temporality (i.e. existence): logical 
eternity. Specifically, he is referring to Hegel and his followers, who believe 
that through logical analysis, can one understand everything, even existence. 
Kierkegaard refers directly to Hegel96 and argues that: ‗neither logic nor 
actuality is served by placing actuality in the Logic. Actuality is not served 
thereby, for contingency, which is an essential part of the actual, cannot be 
admitted within the realm of logic.‘ (CA, 10). Such ‗contingency‘, as 
Kierkegaard argues in the ‗Interlude‘, provides the necessary background for 
the existence of freedom. 
The Hongs argue that Kierkegaard maintains that: ‗actuality comprises the 
accidental…Kierkegaard‘s position allows for freedom, which belongs in the 
realm of actuality.‘ (CA, 224). Yet, the problem remains unsolved: what 
exactly is the nature of this freedom? Is it simply the undetermined factor of 
arbitrary historical facts? 
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 Kierkegaard here alludes to the Hegelian logic. I will explain Kierkegaard‘s opposition to the 
Hegelian notion of logic in my next chapter. Here it is enough for me to refer to my previous 
chapter and to what I explained there regarding Kierkegaard‘s position on the nature of logic. 
Kierkegaard continues in CA to argue that logic and theoretical understanding is not part of 
existence and at the same time he continues arguing that within the sphere of human 
existence will is what matters and not knowledge.  
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 He refers to ‗an author [who] entitles the last section of the Logic ―Actuality‖.‘ (CA, 9). 
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Kierkegaard provides a helpful way to get to grips with this ‗freedom‘ in CA. 
He begins his analysis of anxiety by referring to sin. The connection is quite 
obvious but at the same time indicative of the possible nature of freedom: we 
can sin only because we have the freedom (of will and choice) to do so. We 
are free to commit sinful acts thus we can freely sin. Without the actual 
individual ability of free will and free choice there could be no sin. The 
presupposition of such a capacity to sin is the existence of personal 
responsibility. We need to be able to be held responsible for our choices in 
order to sin. 
Freedom is the necessary precondition of sin. And as sin is human, freedom 
here refers to human freedom of will and choice. I keep referring to freedom of 
choice along with freedom of will. The reason is simple: we can be free to will 
without being free to make a choice. The latter is not a necessary implication 
of the first, neither vice versa. I can will as long as I want to have wings but I 
cannot make such choice, because such choice is not among my existing 
choices. I can have freedom to choose between multiple choices without 
necessarily willing to do so.  
Whereas freedom of will and freedom of choice are usually interconnected, 
they are two different and distinct freedoms. Kierkegaard does not bother 
himself to distinguish them. That is, Kierkegaard usually labels as ‗freedom‘ 
both freedom of will and freedom of choice. The fact, however, remains, that 
the first one does not necessitate the latter, neither vice versa.  
What, however, is crucial for our analysis, is that anxiety is a sign of both 
freedom of will and freedom of choice. Kierkegaard points out that, for him, 
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whenever one needs to will something or one needs to make a choice, anxiety 
appears.  
Hence, Kierkegaard goes on to argue that sin can only occur if we personally 
make a ‗bad‘ use of our freedom, because human nature has two specific 
attributes: freedom of will and freedom of choice.97  
Kierkegaard thus argues against all those who either consider human race in 
its entirety to be in a state of sin (without leaving any possibility of personal 
responsibility) owing to Adam‘s first sin or believe that sin can be determined 
by general and abstract thought, this is the case for those who believe that sin 
is simply lack of knowledge of good.98  
‗If ethics is to include sin, its ideality comes to an end.‘ (CA, 17-18). 
‗Hereditary sin makes everything still more desperate…‘ (CA, 19).99 ‗As all 
ancient knowledge and speculation was based on the presupposition that 
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 Libuse Lukas Miller makes an interesting remark regarding sin and freedom in human 
beings: ‗The task Kierkegaard set himself, then, was to define and describe that property or 
attribute of human nature, of the human psychological structure, out of which sin could appear 
as the ―qualitative leap‖, that is to say, not by a casual necessity, as if the sin were already 
inherent or immanent in the antecedent condition, but by a sort of ―bad‖ freedom, or free ―fall‖, 
so that the sin appears as the new or emergent quality, not predictable and not determined in 
terms of the antecedent condition alone.‘ Libuse Lucas Miller, In search of the Self, 
(Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1962), p. 230.  
Miller then also points out the basic human freedom to act freely. What he lacks is the stress 
on the historical aspects of this freedom. For Kierkegaard (as I intend to depict in this 
chapter), history‘s nature is the actualisation in spatio-temporal conditions of this basic 
freedom of will and choice.  
98
 Michelle Kosch also points out that Kierkegaard wants to argue against the necessity or 
universality of sin: ‗The central claim of the introduction [to CA]…looks like a claim to the 
effect that the necessity or universality of sin undermines the validity of ethical 
standpoint…Ethic points to ideality as a task and assumes that every man possesses the 
requisite conditions. Thus ethic develops a contradiction…‘ Michelle Kosch, Freedom and 
Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 160.  
I do agree with Kosch in that Kierkegaard here wants to undermine the universality of sin, but 
I claim that Kosch fails short in understanding the whole Kierkegaardian argument here, 
which is not directed solely against ethics but is opposing any possibility of not recognising 
the individual responsibility for the relevant individual choices. Kierkegaard claims here that 
we cannot hold responsible Adam for our sins and we cannot also try to relate sin with 
knowledge or the lack of it. Sin, freedom of will and choice and responsibility refer not to 
theoretical contemplations or to an inherited choice of Adam, they create instead an 
inseparable nexus of individual historical human existence. 
99
 The italics belong to the original text. 
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thought has reality, so all ancient ethics was based on the presupposition that 
virtue can be realized.‘ (CA, 19).  
Kierkegaard argues that, while ethics is a theoretical system of normative 
maxims concerning what people should do and what people should not do, 
sin is an existential individual responsibility. Hence, if ethics want to include 
sin, then ethics cannot any more remain a purely theoretical system. Sin 
directly opposes any theoretical and normative abstraction. 
Kierkegaard also, points out that Socrates, who claims that sin is lack of 
knowledge, or Aristotle, who claims that virtue can be taught, ground their 
ethics in the presupposition that ‗thought has reality‘. That is, they make the 
mistake that Kierkegaard has already pointed out in JC, in PF and in CUP: 
they put logical necessity within actuality. In this way, however, they also 
make the mistake of bringing the necessity of theoretical knowledge in the 
actuality of sin. 
Kierkegaard then, wants to distinguish sin from: a) Adam‘s sin and b) sin as 
lack of knowledge. Anxiety for him can give us a different understanding of 
sin, which moves away from both ancient ethics and traditional Christian 
dogmatics.  
From his introduction onwards, Kierkegaard is clear: ‗The present work has 
set as its task the psychological treatment of the concept of 
―anxiety‖…Accordingly, it must also…deal with the concept of sin.‘ (CA, 14). 
Kierkegaard also states that: ‗The mood of psychology is that of discovering 
anxiety, and in its anxiety psychology portraits sin, while again and again it is 
in anxiety over the portrayal that it itself brings forth.‘ (CA, 15).  
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Sin and anxiety correspond to each other. Anxiety signifies sin and sin can be 
signified psychologically only through the ‗persistent observation‘ of anxiety. 
Both of them are a positive sign of freedom. This freedom is personal and a 
matter of will and responsibility. Kierkegaard creates a single existential 
‗nexus‘ that is constituted by anxiety, sin, freedom, will and responsibility. 
The concept of history appears early in Kierkegaard‘s CA: 
Every individual is essentially interested in the history of all other 
individuals, and just as essentially as in his own. Perfection in 
oneself is therefore the perfect participation in the whole. (CA, 29). 
What is important here is not just simply the mention of the word ‗history‘. 
Rather, it is Kierkegaard‘s focus, on the one hand, on an individual‘s history, 
and, on the other, on the relation between individuals. The historical agent is 
not the race, the nation nor the state but the ‗individual‘. Even when 
Kierkegaard refers to the ‗whole‘, it is a whole made up of ‗individuals‘. At the 
same time however, Kierkegaard is insistent that history is not only the history 
of one individual. On the contrary, he argues that ‗individual‘ perfection can be 
reached only through ‗perfect participation‘ in the whole. The ‗whole‘ here 
signifies simply the totality of human historical subjects without (like Hegel) 
prioritising this totality over individual historical existence. Humanity (not as an 
empty conceptual abstraction, but as the concrete sum of existing human 
beings) and individuals exist together in history: 
No individual is indifferent to the history of the race any more than 
the race is indifferent to the history of the individual. As the history 
of the race moves on, the individual begins constantly anew, 
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because he is both himself and the race, and by this, in turn, the 
history of the race. (CA, 29). 
This ‗race‘ cannot be understood as something that surpasses individuality. 
The history of the race is comprised of every single individual. Kierkegaard 
stresses the historical importance of every single individual in contrast to the 
Hegelian stress on the state or the nation. What is more, Kierkegaard here 
alludes to a key aspect of my analysis: central historical agent is not a totality 
(like state or nation or societies); rather, individuals are the ‗bricks‘ of history. 
Does ‗individual‘ refer to the human self? And if so, what is this ‗historicality‘ of 
human selves? Kierkegaard will give us the answer in SD (and I will return to 
this at length), but at this point it is useful to focus on the way an individual 
can be a historical self. Personal development through history and capacity for 
transformation are the main historical characteristics of every individual who 
wants to acquire a self. As Kierkegaard will argue, to be a self is a task that 
can be accomplished only in history.100  
Possibility as anxiety 
‗Anxiety is freedom‘s actuality as the possibility of possibility.‘ (CA, 42). 
Kierkegaard writes, (and in so doing he brings us back to the concept of 
freedom). To be anxious is to have in front of us all of our future possible 
options. And what actualises this freedom of choice of ours is simply our will 
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 Edward F. Mooney also points out how Kierkegaard understands the ‗transformation‘ of an 
individual to a human self: ‗If persons are selves, then perhaps self is something that 
develops through stages—a common thread, winding through, and thereby linking 
transformations.‘ Edward F. Mooney, Selves in Discord and Resolve, (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1996), p. 91. I agree with Mooney‘s point here that for Kierkegaard every 
individual is not de facto a self. What however Mooney defines as ‗stages‘ I argue they are 
wholly ‗historical‘ ones and not simply ‗psychological‘. Kierkegaard‘s transformation of an 
individual to a ‗self‘ is always a historical task, an existential effort through time and space to 
create a self. The selves in ‗discord and resolve‘ are always historical selves and their effort to 
transform themselves is always a (free) historical activity. 
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to choose one of them. Anxiety then denotes our freedom to have many 
different options in front of us and the ‗qualitative leap [that] stands outside of 
all ambiguity‘ is our actualised freedom of will and freedom of choice that 
brings into actuality (and thus into history) one and only one option. Ambiguity 
refers to the free and still undefined future, and the leap refers to the present 
decision. This leap can take place only within history. In fact, this is the history 
we make through the actualisation of our freedom of will and our freedom of 
choice. 
Jean-Paul Sartre offers the following helpful characterization of anxiety: 
‗Kierkegaard describing anguish [anxiety] before the sin characterizes it as 
anguish [anxiety] in the face of freedom.‘101 Sartre continues his analysis by 
arguing that this freedom is freedom of choice between many different 
options.102  
Anxiety as the result of a synthesis 
Kierkegaard defines man as a ‗synthesis‘ of two different dimensions 
(psychical and physical). The two members of this synthesis are united in a 
third dimension, i.e. spirit. Psychical refers to our emotions. Physical refers to 
our body. Spirit is our self-consciousness. The first sign of this ‗glue‘ between 
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 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, translated by Hazel E. Barnes, (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 53. 
102
 Ibid, 53-55, where Sartre compares the Kierkegaardian concept of anxiety to the 
Heideggerian concept of anxiety and he takes the side of Kierkegaard. 
Edward Harris refers to this ‗freedom‘ as ‗Freedom [that] can be interpreted as an expression 
for ―self-activation‖. Harris abstracts three theses, in Kierkegaard‘s view of the potentials for 
self-disclosing. The second and the third one are the most important for my argument: ‗Thesis 
(ii): self-activation is a potential for self-disclosing….Thesis (iii):self-creation is a potential for 
self-disclosing. What is important to clarify is exactly that human self is created (thus can be 
created) through this freedom to act. Self-activation is the actualisation of our freedom of will 
and self-creation is the choices we make. ‗Self-disclosing‘ then can be understood in this 
context as the possibility human beings have to freely actualise part of their potentiality. When 
we make choices that we will to make, we freely ‗disclose‘ our potentiality by making it 
historical actuality. Edward Harris, Man’s Ontological Predicament, (Uppsala, Stockholm, 
Sweden: LiberTryck, 1984), p. 32. 
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physical and psychical is anxiety. ‗How does spirit relate itself to itself and to 
its conditionality? It relates itself as anxiety.‘ (CA, 44). The first sign then of 
self-consciousness is anxiety. But in order for someone to acquire self-
consciousness, he has to first have a self. Spirit is then the (necessary) 
beginning (in time, thus in history) of selfhood. This (necessarily) means that 
anxiety is the (historical) first sign of selfhood.  
To have history means to have self-consciousness. The actualisation of spirit 
is the beginning of history for human beings. When Kierkegaard states that: 
‗…without sin there is no sexuality, and without sexuality, no history.‘ (CA, 49), 
he makes a direct and clear connection between self-consciousness (spirit) 
and history. And this is because Kierkegaard argues that what makes a man a 
man is his sexuality, which launches his self-consciousness. Without sexuality 
man lacks self-consciousness and thus ‗neither is he really man.‘ (CA, 49). 
Angels are not sexualised, but angels also have no history. (CA, 49).  
It is out of this passage that emerges the first definition of freedom in terms of 
anxiety: ‗anxiety…is entangled freedom.‘ (CA, 49). This ‗entangled‘ freedom 
has nothing to do with logical presuppositions or arbitrary actions. This 
freedom refers to the ‗possibility of being able‘. Kierkegaard states quite 
emphatically that: ‗The possibility is to be able.‘ (CA, 49). This ability is 
freedom of will and freedom of choice and can only be experienced 
personally. 
Each individual can understand on her own terms how this freedom occurs: 
‗How sin came into the world, each man understands solely by himself.‘ (CA, 
51). As we have already argued, sin, for Kierkegaard, can be brought out only 
by anxiety. Anxiety is the beginning of selfhood and history through the 
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actualisation of desire (sexuality) and spirit (self-consciousness). This 
actualisation can take place (in history) only through an ‗entangled freedom‘, 
which is neither a logical category nor an arbitrary action.  
Such a personal experience of entangled freedom cannot be explained by 
science (logic). As Kierkegaard puts it: ‗…sin is no scientific problem…‘ (CA, 
51). This is the beginnings of a Kierkegaardian theory of history.103  
Sin and anxiety become more intertwined as Kierkegaard continues his 
analysis in CA: ‗Sin entered in anxiety, but sin in turn brought anxiety along 
with it.‘ (CA, 53). While one might expect anxiety to be broader than sin 
because anxiety is the general feeling of freedom and sin a particular 
actualisation of this freedom, here Kierkegaard points out that sin can also 
bring about anxiety.  
Kierkegaard defines anxiety in two ways. What is crucial is the temporal 
aspect of both definitions:  
Consequently, anxiety means two things: the anxiety in which the 
individual posits sin by the qualitative leap, and the anxiety that 
entered in and enters in with sin, and that also, accordingly, enters 
quantitatively into the world every time an individual posits sin.  
(CA, 54).  
In both instances, anxiety occurs in the temporal world and is brought about 
by a ‗leap‘, i.e. by personal freedom. Anxiety, therefore, is a form of personal 
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 Herman Diem refers not to ‗historical self‘ but to the ‗individual ego‘: ‗For Kierkegaard its 
object is the individual ego, which must be set free for effective action based on its own 
private existence.‘ Herman Diem, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Existence, translated by Harold 
Knight, (Connecticut, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1959), p. 41.  
Diem‘s however ‗individual ego‘ refers more to a ‗psychological‘ ego and less to a historical 
self. Kierkegaard however refers again and again to ‗self‘ and ‗ego‘ after Freud is a rather 
psychological unit. Besides that, Diem seems to understand human freedom more as a 
psychological aspect of human beings and less as an existential foundation of human selves. 
 111 
freedom: ‗anxiety is the dizziness of freedom…In anxiety there is the selfish 
infinity of possibility…‘ (CA, 61). Personal responsibility is the immediate effect 
of the actualisation of human capacity within time.104  
Although this ‗creation‘ of our selves in history and the simultaneous ‗creation‘ 
of personal history seem to be directed always to our present and to our 
future, our past plays an equal role, even for our future choices. As we will see 
in more details in my analysis of SD, our past choices along with our past 
given conditions of our life, generate the necessary context within which we 
make our present and future choices. To choose, we need first to understand 
that there is only one way to have a self without despair, that is, to accept the 
responsibility of our given conditions. To posses a history means possessing 
the freedom to make one. Personal responsibility is the burden we have to 
bear if we want to freely create our selves and our history. Not to have this 
responsibility would mean that we were not yet complete human beings.  
The spiritual dimension of the historical (temporal) human subject can be 
actualised only through freedom and responsibility. This freedom is 
‗entangled‘ freedom. The necessity of this freedom (in contrast with the total 
contradiction of freedom to necessity in PF), is that: ‗Man is determined in his 
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 George J. Stack holds a similar position when he states that: ‗By coming to know the actual 
self as far as this is possible, one accepts responsibility for what one has been.‘ George J. 
Stack, ‗Kierkegaard: The Self and Ethical Existence‘, Ethics, Vol. 83, No. 2, (Jan., 1973), 
p.109. My difference from Stack‘s claim is that I consider this responsibility to be first a 
historical activity (in terms not only of happening in history but in terms of creating history) and 
then an ethical one. For Kierkegaard ethics can mean only a personal willful and responsible 
attitude which characterizes first the historical task of becoming a self and then an ethical 
behaviour. This is why Kierkegaard in CUP speaks again and again about the need for 
individuals to acquire a more personally engaged behaviour. Ethics as a system and the 
‗ethical self‘ are for Kierkegaard vague abstractions. Personal choices signify for him our will 
to become something that we will and thus we are responsible for.  
Stack in fact seems to recognise the historical nature of this ‗ethical self‘ when in the same 
page claims that: ‗The self is consolidated in and through resolute choice and a repeated 
attempt to achieve as much consistency in one‘s life as is possible to gain a history.‘ 
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being, but determining in his becoming.‘105 The ‗determined‘ being of man is 
his ‗existential‘ necessity. As Kierkegaard argues: ‗Each individual begins in 
an historical nexus, and the consequences of nature still hold true.‘ (CA, 73).  
 Despite such necessity, science (logical analysis) can never help us explain 
our historical selfhood: 
Although in the newer science sin has so often been explained as 
selfishness, it is incomprehensible that it has not been recognized 
that precisely here lies the difficulty of finding a place for its 
explanation in any science. For selfishness is precisely the 
particular, and what this signifies only the single individual can 
know as the single individual, because when it is viewed under 
universal categories it may signify everything in such a way that it 
signifies nothing at all…If a person does not first make clear to 
himself the meaning of ―self,‖ it is of no use to say of sin that it is 
selfishness.  (CA, pp.77-78). 
There are two very important Kierkegaardian theses contained in the above 
quotation: a) Logic cannot explain the self and b) only we can understand 
ourselves. Kierkegaard argues that when it comes to personal experience, 
general or abstract or ‗universal‘ categories explain nothing. They are too 
vague and too general to grasp personal experience. In PF Kierkegaard 
argues that the same happens in relation to the existent (temporal) world, 
because freedom disrupts logical analysis. Becoming someone, which means 
acquiring a self in history, cannot be explained by logical categories or 
scientific causal prediction. The only necessities we can find in ‗becoming‘ are 
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 George J. Stack, (1973), p. 116. 
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the given natural and social conditions. But even these conditions can be 
transcended through our personal freedom of will and choice.  
‗Becoming‘ always refers to the actuality (or reality, because Kierkegaard uses 
both terms synonymously). In the Interlude he argues that logic is inapplicable 
to transition. The same point is made in CA: 
Transition belongs in the sphere of historical freedom, for transition 
is a state and it is actual…Therefore, when Aristotle says that the 
transition from possibility to actuality is a κίνησις [movement], it is 
not to be understood logically but with reference to historical 
freedom. (CA, 82). 
Freedom of will and freedom of choice enable man to acquire a self by 
‗becoming‘ a self within history.  
Eternity and moment 
This returns us to a central problem in this chapter: how is the dimension of 
the eternal to be incorporated into the self and thus into history? We must 
begin with the ‗moment‘. As Kierkegaard states: 
In the individual life, anxiety is the moment—to use a new 
expression that says the same as was said in the previous 
discussion, but that also points toward that which follows. (CA, 81). 
What exactly is this moment and why is important for our analysis of the 
Kierkegaardian concept of history? Here is, Kierkegaard‘s definition: 
Only with the moment does history begin…The moment is that 
ambiguity in which time and eternity touch each other, and with this 
the concept of temporality posited, whereby time constantly 
intersects eternity and eternity constantly pervades time.  (CA, 89). 
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Without the moment, there is no history for Kierkegaard. Without the moment, 
there is no time. At the same time, through the moment, time incorporates 
eternity. The analysis of the moment, then, is central to the understanding of 
the Kierkegaardian concept of history. 
In order to bring out his own understanding of the moment, Kierkegaard first 
presents Plato‘s interpretation. He argues that Plato ‗…conceives of the 
moment as purely abstract.‘ (CA, 82). He further states that: ‗Greek 
philosophy and the modern alike maintain that everything turns on bringing 
non-being into being…‘ (CA, 83). The Christian view is similar : ‗Christian view 
takes the position that non-being is present everywhere…as the temporal 
forgotten by the eternal.‘ (CA, 83). In this way eternity and time are ineluctably 
separated. Kierkegaard‘s position however is the converse: man is ‗a 
synthesis of the temporal and the eternal.‘ (CA, 85).  
The moment can therefore provide some guidance to the reasons why in PF 
Kierkegaard speaks of a separation of the temporal (historical) from the 
eternal, while in CA he defines the historical human subject as the active 
union of the eternal and the temporal. Let me reconstruct Kierkegaard‘s 
argument on the nature of the moment: 
a) Man can be described as a synthesis of psyche and body but also as 
a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. (CA, 85). 
b) In the first description, spirit is the third factor which unifies body and 
psyche. In the second however there appears to be no third factor. If 
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there is no third factor, we cannot speak of a synthesis but only of a 
contradiction. (CA, 85).106 
c) We can speak of a synthesis only if we understand time ‗mixing‘ 
together with the eternal in the ‗moment‘. In this case, time is not an 
infinite succession, but is something that includes the moment as its 
unifying factor with eternity. (CA, 85-86). 
d) In this way, time and eternity ‗touch each other‘ in the moment. (CA, 
87). 
e) The moment then, is not an atom of time but an atom of eternity; (CA, 
88). 
f) ‗The synthesis of the temporal and the eternal is not another 
synthesis but it is the expression for the first synthesis, according to 
which man is a synthesis of psyche and body that is sustained by 
spirit. (CA, 88). And so 
g) ‗As soon as the spirit is posited, the moment is present‘. (CA, 88). 
Let me begin with the conclusion to this argument: Kierkegaard regards spirit 
as related to the moment. Spirit (human self-consciousness) posits itself and 
by this position the moment is made present. History then cannot begin 
without the positing of spirit and the presence of the moment. In other words, 
whenever we make a decision, spirit is posited, the moment is present and 
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 Kierkegaard here with these specific terms refers to ‗body‘ as the material body we have, 
to ‗psyche‘ as the totality of our emotions (including our desires and our natural appetites). 
‗Spirit‘ (as I have argued and I will continue arguing) is self-consciousness, ‗temporal‘ is our 
temporal actuality (our existence within time) and ‗eternal‘ is the exact opposition to temporal, 
that which lacks completely temporality. Kierkegaard introduces these terms without a further 
clarification, but (as I try to depict and analyse in this chapter) through his analysis in SD he 
gives us his own definitions. ‗Body‘, ‗psyche‘, and ‗temporal‘ present us with no problems 
regarding their definitions. Kierkegaard tries to define in his own way ‗eternal‘ and ‗spirit‘ but 
he does not want to stay in definitions. He wants instead, to explain to his readers the specific 
characteristics of these terms through a laborious argumentation. 
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history is made. The moment then signifies the ‗leap‘ which creates history 
through personal freedom of will and choice.107 
If: a) time is defined as an infinite succession and 
     b) the moment is another conceptual abstraction, then 
     c) the eternal and the temporal cannot exist together and 
     d) the present has no existence at all, which means the only means of 
grasping history is as time passing by (the Hegelian view of history). 
If, on the contrary: 
a) time can be ‗pervaded‘ by eternal 
b) in the moment, then 
c) time comprises present time, past time and future time. 
The ‗moment‘ is another expression for the ‗leap‘, which in turn signifies the 
actualisation in temporality of our freedom of will and choice. This ‗moment‘ 
differs from Plato‘s, Hegel‘s and even the traditional Christian‘s moment in 
that it is interpreted as the incision in time (as passing by) of eternity which 
creates temporality and thus creates history. 
This moment is an atom of eternity as long as it is grounded in our eternal 
(and thus necessary) structure of selfhood. We, human beings, have only one 
way to fully actualise our selves, and this is when we self-consciously and 
freely relate ourselves to God. This is what Kierkegaard argues for in SD. It 
also forms part of Kierkegaard‘s argument in CA. 
The great advantage, for Kierkegaard, of his own definition of the moment, is 
that it really makes room for the past, present and future; and so allows us to 
relate as selves with a past, present and future. As Kierkegaard puts it: ‗the 
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 As we shall see during the analysis of SD, Kierkegaard directly defines spirit (self-
consciousness) and the moment (the ‗leap‘ of decision) as the crucial factors of the creation 
of the historical self. 
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future is the whole of which the past is a part…The moment and the future in 
turn posit the past…the future in turn is the eternal‘s (freedom‘s) possibility in 
the individuality expressed as anxiety.‘ (CA, 89-91). 
If time is understood as mere ‗passing by‘, there is no room for a separate 
past, present and future. In the moment (i.e. every time we freely make a 
decision), there is, however. We relate ourselves to our past experience; we 
use our historical knowledge to take a present decision, which will shape our 
future. 
In this Kierkegaardian time, the future is the most important dimension: 
The possible corresponds exactly to the future. For freedom, the 
possible is the future, and the future is for time the possible. To 
both of these corresponds anxiety in the individual life. An accurate 
and correct linguistic usage therefore associates anxiety and the 
future. (CA, 91). 
Only by understanding ourselves in terms of our future decisions can we really 
grasp ourselves as historical subjects. To grasp ourselves thus is to grasp 
ourselves as free historical agents, as free human selves: 
In turning inward, he discovers freedom. He does not fear fate, for 
he lays hold of no outward task, and freedom is for him his bliss, 
not freedom to do this or that in the world, to become king and 
emperor or an abusive street corner orator, but freedom to know of 
himself that he is freedom.  (CA, 108). 
To make a choice is a leap. This is something that Kierkegaard continually 
stresses: ‗The history of the individual life proceeds in a movement from state 
to state. Every state is posited by a leap.‘ (CA, 113). And what is more, the 
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moment can be understood only through individual, personal introspection. As 
Kierkegaard argues: 
If any observer will only pay attention to himself, he will have 
enough with five men, five women, and ten children for the 
discovery of all possible states of the human soul… [T]ruth is for 
the particular individual only as he himself produces it in action.  
(CA, 126, 138). 
It is action that gives rise to an actual understanding of experiencing ourselves 
as free human subjects. Only when we act can we experience ourselves as 
the particular synthesis we are. The anxiety we experience in the face of 
every single decision we make, is the only verification of our (free) nature as 
human beings. ‗If a human being were a beast or an angel, he could not be in 
anxiety. Because he is a synthesis, he can be in anxiety; and the more 
profoundly he is in anxiety, the greater is the man…‘ (CA, 155). 
What really makes us human beings is our free (historical) action. Our self-
consciousness as free historical agents is something totally concrete, with no 
relation at all to any kind of theoretical contemplation.108 
The most concrete content that consciousness can have is 
consciousness of itself, of the individual himself—not the pure self-
consciousness, but the self consciousness that is so concrete that 
no author, not even the one with the greatest power of description, 
has ever been able to describe such self-consciousness, although 
every single human being is such one. This self-consciousness is 
not contemplation, for he who believes this has not understood 
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 Theoretical contemplation can be an ‗actual‘ thus historical activity. We cannot however, 
for Kierkegaard, consider abstracted logical explanation, as the proper ‗instrument‘ of creating 
or understanding history. 
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himself, because he sees that meanwhile he himself is in the 
process of becoming and consequently cannot be something 
completed for contemplation. This self-consciousness, therefore, is 
action, and this action is in turn inwardness…  (CA, 143).109 
Eternity presents itself as the ‗ought to be‘ that nevertheless leaves every 
human being with the responsibility of actualising her own freedom. As James 
Collins argues, the human being ‗is a temporal being whose spiritual center 
impels him toward eternity.‘110 This ‗ought to be‘ however, that has the form of 
a necessary structure of human self, must be personally and willingly 
actualised. ‗It requires a leap, a free intervention of the will, a practical 
insertion into existence at the point of its intersection with eternity.‘111  
Despair 
‗[T]here is not one single living human being who does not despair a little…‘ 
(SD, 22). Kierkegaard considers despair to be a general characteristic of 
being human, a fundamental feature of the human self: ‗…despairing lies in 
man himself…And because the relation is spirit, is the self, upon it rests the 
responsibility for all despair at every moment of its existence…‘ (SD, 16). 
Despair, moreover, is proof that we are spirits and we relate to the eternal. 
‗[T]o despair is a qualification of spirit and relates to the eternal in man.‘ (SD, 
17). Just as anxiety is proof of the existence of our personal freedom of will 
and choice, so despair is proof that we are (partly) spirits participating in the 
eternal. The despair to which participation in eternity gives rise forms a task, 
                                                 
109
 I have made such extended quotation only because here we can clearly view 
Kierkegaard‘s very definition of the connection between concrete individual action and self-
consciousness. 
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 James Collins, ‗Faith and Reflection in Kierkegaard‘, The Journal of Religion, Vol. 37, No. 1 
(Jan., 1957), p. 13. 
111
 Ibid, p. 17. 
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to complete ourselves as free human subjects (selves) who ground our 
selfhood in God. 
If there were nothing eternal in a man, he could not despair at 
all;…[E]ternity nevertheless will make it manifest that his condition 
was despair and will nail him to himself so that his torment will still 
be that he cannot rid himself of his self, and it will become obvious 
that he was just imagining that he had succeeded in doing so. 
Eternity is obliged to do this, because to have a self, to be a self, is 
the greatest concession, an infinite concession, given to man, but it 
is also eternity‘s claim upon him.   (SD, 21).  
Anxiety refers to possibility; so does despair. ‗Every actual moment of despair 
is traceable to possibility;‘ (SD, 17). This possibility is our freedom. The fact 
that our selfhood can only take one form constitutes necessity. ‗A person 
cannot rid himself of the relation to himself any more than he can rid himself of 
his self, which after all, is one and the same thing, since the self is the relation 
to oneself.‘ (SD, 17). 
Within time, thus within the realm of existence and history, human beings both 
actualise their freedom and understand themselves as something ‗composite‘. 
History then is to be made out of the task of choosing ourselves. Necessity 
and freedom, the temporal and the eternal are, as I have made clear in this 
chapter, essential elements of our historical selfhood. 
If we, as human existing beings, had solely temporal characteristics, despair 
would never occur as such ‗persistent companion‘ to our lives. Our actuality 
would be defined through a permanent present within which past and future 
would have no reality. Our temporal actuality thus would be dimensionless. 
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Kierkegaard starts from the fact that we do not experience time in this way. He 
explains the reason why by focusing on the ‗moment‘ of decision which 
continuously assimilates what lies beyond time, i.e. the eternal.112 
This ‗continuous assimilation of what lies beyond it‘ is spirit, which at every 
moment, and with every decision we make creates our individuality, creates 
our historical selves. Actuality therefore constituted through the participation of 
our self-consciousness (our spirituality) in eternity. This self-consciousness is 
spirit because, for Kierkegaard, we have a self only if we relate it to God, who 
sustains our ‗synthesis‘. We cannot be temporal beings without being at the 
same time eternal beings. That is, whenever we find ourselves living in the 
historical (actual) present, we realise (or we should realise) our eternal 
dimension, through our spiritual (self-conscious) development.  
There is an ongoing interplay here between necessity and freedom. To be a 
self is defined simultaneously by the necessity of our need to freely ground 
ourselves in God (if we want to live without despair) and by the freedom that 
renders us able to make decisions in the ‗moment‘. In SD such interplay 
provides the basis for a full interpretation of the Kierkegaardian concept of 
history. In PF Kierkegaard had proposed the basis of this concept, in CA he 
goes on to name its key features, but it is in SD that Kierkegaard finally 
describes his concept of history fully, i.e. history as the active unification of 
freedom and necessity, the temporal and the eternal, the finite and the infinite. 
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 For a similar approach see: Harvie Ferguson, Melancholy and the critique of modernity, 
Soren Kierkegaard’s religious psychology, (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 123: 
‗Actuality, that is to say, in becoming itself, in establishing itself as actual, draws into itself the 
elements of non-existence which lie on either side of its specific ‗range‘, while simultaneously 
resisting the temptation to empty itself into either of its component elements. And the task of 
existence is to develop, through the continuous assimilation of what lies beyond it, the specific 
characteristics of individuality.‘ 
My only problem with Ferguson‘s approach is that I argue that this specific way to exist and 
being selves is not a matter of a ‗religious psychology‘ but a direct ontological—existential 
characteristic of being selves in history. 
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We must not however understand Kierkegaard‘s structure of the self as a 
‗platonic‘ construction. Harvey Albert Smit is right to underline that: 
In this first anthropological conception, man is not seen as a being 
who combines within himself two worlds in both of which he is a 
member (as in Platonism). Rather man is the real, concrete 
existence between abstract and unreal poles. Man must become 
spirit, and spirit is the third factor which unites the ―soulish and the 
bodily‖. Spirit is essentially human activity, human freedom, self-
creative choice….Spirit is thus what man becomes when he truly 
exists in the freedom of self-choice and self-determination.113 
History is the concrete product of the individual‘s self-creation. At stake in this 
self-creation are, as we have seen, the interplay of freedom and necessity and 
in SD, Kierkegaard is at his most lucid concerning the nature of freedom and 
the nature of necessity. 
The formula that describes the state of the self when despair is 
completely rooted out is this: in relating itself to itself and in willing 
to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established 
it.  (SD, 14).114 
The following key conclusions can be reconstructed from the above 
statement: 
a) The self is not something that stands still; on the contrary, the self is 
completed through transition and continuous change. 
                                                 
113
 Harvey Albert Smit, Kierkegaard’s pilgrimage of Man, (Netherlands: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Co, 1965), p. 165. 
114
 I do not argue that Kierkegaard is right when he claims this. I do argue however, that his 
words can give us a positive indication about the specific natures of freedom and necessity as 
dimensions of our (historical) existence. The reason that I quote for a second time this 
fragment, is because I strongly believe that here we can clear up the roles and the natures of 
freedom and necessity in CA and SD. 
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b) Despair is something that can be ‗rooted out‘. Despair then, signifies a 
‗wrong‘ self-function. 
c) We can live without despair in only one way. This way is therefore 
necessary to the extent we wish to escape despair. 
d) The necessary way of escaping despair requires self-activation, i.e. an 
intention to ‗rest transparently in the power that established‘ us (as 
human beings). 
e) This necessity then, ‗demands‘ our freedom of will and our freedom of 
choice.  
Existential freedom 
With such conclusions in mind freedom is to be seen not as an absolute 
freedom, for we cannot escape despair simply by using our freedom. Rather, 
freedom must be utilized in a specific manner in order to escape despair. Yet, 
at the same time, necessity is not to be seen as absolute necessity, for we are 
not logically obligated to live our lives without despair. Rather, necessity here 
refers to something that is pre-given to us that must nevertheless be freely 
actualised. Again, the distinction between the meaning of freedom and 
necessity in PF and the meaning they bear in CA and in SD is crucial. 
The process of actualisation occurs only within history, and, in fact, creates 
history. Kierkegaard‘s concept of history is only to be grasped, therefore, if we 
take into account Kierkegaard‘s statements on necessity, freedom and the self 
in the Interlude, in CA and in SD. 
Despair and faith 
Finally, in this section, it is worth flagging up in more detail the opposite of 
despair: faith. Milbank argues that for Kierkegaard: 
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The only way out of this condition is to travel to the end of despair, 
to discover that despair does indeed lurk beneath the indeterminate 
series of finite projects – and then paradoxically to invest our hope 
and love in infinite indeterminacy itself. A leap into the void by 
which faith heals anxiety.115 
‗What is decisive is that with God everything is possible.‘ (SD, 38). That is, 
Kierkegaard argues that, if we want to believe that we have the freedom of 
freely willing and choosing, then we have to believe first that ‗with God 
everything is possible.‘ Kierkegaard continues, ‗Then the question is whether 
he will believe that for God everything is possible, that is, whether he will 
believe.‘ (SD, 38). This faith is both faith in God (that God can give us this 
possibility of ‗everything is possible‘) and faith in us (that we have the will and 
the freedom to make choices).  
Nevertheless, pace Milbank, anxiety cannot be healed, at least not once-and-
for-all. We have to learn to live with anxiety, because, in the end, anxiety can 
ultimately provide a helpful perspective on our freedom. We cannot heal 
despair with faith either, we have to try to ‗destroy‘ the possibility of despair 
with every decision we make regarding ourselves. Thus, faith provides a mere 
indication of the need of self-completion that must be perpetually put into 
practice. Kierkegaard is not optimistic as Milbank contends about the 
possibility of living without despair. The full extent of his optimism is limited to 
the statement that ‗with God everything is possible.‘ 
Kierkegaard argues that, besides a human self there is a ‗self directly before 
God.‘ (SD, 79). Kierkegaard calls the latter self a ‗theological self‘. (SD, 79). 
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 John Milbank, ‗The Sublime in Kierkegaard‘, p. 310. 
 125 
The pagan and the natural man have the ‗human self‘ as their criterion. 
Kierkegaard goes on to define sin as: ‗before God in despair not to will to be 
oneself or before God in despair to will to be oneself.‘ (SD, 81). Kierkegaard 
then argues that it does not matter if we will or not to be ourselves before 
God, if we do so with despair, i.e. if we do not believe that ‗with God 
everything is possible.‘116  
Sin is ‗specifically a qualification of spirit.‘ (SD, 81). In other words, we can sin, 
because we can be selves: 
In fact, the greater the conception of God, the more self there is; 
the more self, the greater the conception of God. Not until a self as 
this specific single individual is conscious of existing before God, 
not until then is it the infinite self, and this self sins before God.   
(SD, 80). 
Even sin then, can be something positive, because only when we have the 
ability to sin (before God), do we possess this ‗theological‘ self (the ‗greater‘ 
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 Kierkegaard argues that we, human beings, do not possess the power to forgive our sins 
with our will. What we can do however is to freely choose to believe that God can. Simon D. 
Podmore argues that we can freely choose to believe and thus to accept the ‗gift of 
forgiveness‘. See: Simon D. Podmore, ‗The Holy and Wholly Other: Kierkegaard on the 
alterity of God‘, HeyJ LII (2012), pp. 9-23. What is important for my approach is the fact that 
even when we choose to understand ourselves as being totally grounded in God, we are still 
responsible for this choice. Ultimately, God as the only ground for a completed historical 
human self does not take away either our freedom or our responsibility.  
Being in despair can lead us to recognise our absolute responsibility for being ourselves. The 
act of faith in God‘s grace starts from our free will and ends at our self-conscious 
understanding of what it means to possess such free will. Simon D. Podmore analyses in an 
interesting way the inner relation of sin and forgiveness, and of human impossibility and 
divine possibility. See: Simon D. Podmore, ‗Kierkegaard as Physician of the Soul: On Self-
Forgiveness and Despair‘, Journal of Psychology and Theology, 2009, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 
174-185. 
My point however is not to depict the theological dimensions of the phenomenon of despair 
but to explain why this phenomenon along with the phenomenon of anxiety can be used by 
Kierkegaard as the actual indicators of the structure of our historical self. Podmore‘s intention 
is to analyse the relation of the human self and God in terms of sin and forgiveness. My 
intention is to analyse the relation of human self and God in terms of human historical free 
and responsible will. For further details in Podmore‘s approach see: Simon D. Podmore, 
Kierkegaard and the Self before God, Anatomy of the Abyss, (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2011). 
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self as Kierkegaard calls it). God signifies the solid ground of the existence of 
our possibilities and thus signifies our freedom, but at the same time God 
signifies our personal responsibility because we ‗are before God‘. God then, 
for Kierkegaard, becomes the transcendent foundation of our historical 
existence. This is something to be expected, for Kierkegaard argues 
continuously in favour of a ‗paradox‘, which lies at the very heart of our 
‗historicality‘. In PF paradox is related to the Incarnation, in CUP it is about the 
paradox of the ‗truth of subjectivity‘. In CA and SD the paradox takes the form 
of the ‗moment‘ and the synthesis of the human self. 
This does not mean that the Kierkegaardian structure of the human self 
pushes anthropology to ‗absurdity‘. Rather, at stake here is Kierkegaard‘s 
stress on the inability of reason and logic to explain individual existence (and, 
in fact, any kind of human existence), because reason and logic are too 
abstract to comprehend the manner in which subjects exist.117 
For Kierkegaard, faith constitutes the only possible attitude that can lead us 
away from despair and away from sin. ‗Faith is: that the self in being itself and 
in willing to be itself rests transparently in God.‘ ‗[T]he opposite of sin is faith.‘ 
(SD, 82). It is so because sin has nothing to do with knowledge or lack of 
knowledge; sin is a matter of will. (SD, 95). Here Kierkegaard continues his 
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 Ussher argues that: ‗It is evident that we cannot live with the Existentialist universe: for it 
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argumentation from PF, where he states that the opposite of doubt is not 
knowledge and theoretical understanding but will and faith. 
Indeed, in conclusion, let me repeat: the creation of our selves (in history and 
as historical selves), is something difficult and demanding. As Kierkegaard 
puts it: 
As a rule, men are conscious only momentarily, conscious in the 
midst of big decisions, but they do not take the daily everyday into 
account at all; they are spirit of sorts for an hour one day a week—
which, of course, is a rather crude way to be spirit. But eternity is 
the essential continuity and demands this of a person or that he be 
conscious as spirit and have faith.   (SD, 105). 
Becoming a self, continuously making self-conscious decisions and having 
faith that this can be is tremendously difficult. Kierkegaard however, argues 
that there is no other way. 
Human/Political Self 
My analysis has so far focused on analysing the structure of the self as a 
historical self. Such an analysis, however, runs the risk of isolating the 
Kierkegaardian self, separating it off in a solipsistic universe. In order to avoid 
such a conclusion, as a coda to this chapter, I draw attention to Kierkegaard‘s 
Two Ages (hereafter TA). Here, it becomes evident that the Kierkegaardian 
historical self is always also a political self, existing in society.118 
If we, as free historical subjects, have the freedom and the responsibility to 
create our historical selves through our decisions, then we also take sole 
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 Kierkegaard does not refuse the historical role of structured communities of human beings 
as societies, nations or armies. What he refuses however, is the historical primacy of these 
institutions. Totalities depend and ground themselves in their parts, thus, in the individual 
human beings who constitute them, instead of the opposite. 
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responsibility for living in the societies in which we find ourselves. Kierkegaard 
privileges the inner struggle to create ourselves, but that does not mean that 
he believes that we can be selves without reference to the external world. If 
he stresses personal responsibility repeatedly, one of the reasons for so 
doing, I contend, is in order to re-evaluate social existence, not neglect it. 
Personal responsibility is reconfigured socially into political responsibility. 
In Two Ages and more specifically in the third section of this text titled 
‗Conclusions from a Consideration of the Two Ages‘, Kierkegaard sketches 
the position of the individual in modern politics. Kierkegaard characterises his 
(present) age as something shallow and as an age which is totally lost in 
trivialities. 
In contrast to the age of revolution, which took action, the present 
age is an age of publicity, the age of miscellaneous 
announcements: nothing happens but still there is instant 
publicity…The age of great and good actions is past; the present 
age is the age of anticipation.  (TA, 70-71). 
I have already argued that at the centre of Kierkegaard‘s conception of history 
is personal decision. Actuality becomes actuality only through personal 
decisions in history. It is no surprise, therefore, to find Kierkegaard underlining 
the importance of decisions and actions in society: 
Action and decision are just as scarce these days as is the fun of 
swimming dangerously for those who swim in shallow water. Just 
as an adult, himself reveling in the tossing waves, calls to those 
younger: ―Come on out, just jump in quickly‖—just so does decision 
lie in existence, so to speak (although, of course, it is in the 
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individual), and shouts to the youth who is not yet enervated by too 
much reflection and overwhelmed by the delusions of reflection: 
―Come on out, jump in boldly.‖ Even if it is a rash leap, if only it is 
decisive, and if you have the makings of a man, the danger and 
life‘s severe judgment upon your recklessness will help you to 
become one.    (TA, 71). 
The above is central to any interpretation of Kierkegaard‘s theory of ‗decision‘. 
‗[D]ecision lies in existence.‘ ‗[I]t is in the individual.‘ And this individual 
decision is a ‗leap‘.119 Here we have the three elementary Kierkegaardian 
claims about the making of history:  
a) A decision always refers to actuality i.e. it is always the concrete 
actualisation of one possibility. 
b) This decision can be made only by an individual human being. And 
c) This decision is a free (thus undetermined) product of man‘s personal free 
will. 
Kierkegaard‘s stress on the need for individual actions has of course been the 
overriding theme of this chapter. Theoretical contemplation does not create 
history, will does. 
That a person stands or falls on his actions is becoming obsolete; 
instead everybody sits around and does a brilliant job of bungling 
through with the aid of some reflection and also by declaring that 
they all know very well what has to be done.  (TA, 73-74). 
Relations between individuals and thus political and social relations lack 
inwardness and thus ‗the relation does not exist or the relation is an inert 
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everything is possible‘, but also refers to our freedom of will. 
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cohesion.‘ (TA, 78). Inwardness does not therefore bring about social 
isolation, according to Kierkegaard; it is, in fact, the crucial factor in any 
genuine communication and relation between individuals. Kierkegaard insists 
on the need for personal decisions in response to the dangers of ‗social 
leveling‘. Individuality cannot really exist while ‗generation‘ (another abstract 
generalisation) is the prevailing social ‗fashion‘. (TA, 84). 
Whenever an individual human being submits herself and her freedom of will 
to the ‗state‘ or to the ‗generation‘, she ‗belongs to an abstraction in which 
reflection subordinates‘ her. (TA, 85). ‗Leveling is not the action of one 
individual but a reflection-game in the hand of an abstract power.‘ (TA, 86). 
Reflection necessarily generates abstractions. History, however, is a matter of 
concreteness; the historical is always a concrete action. 
It is important to stress that Kierkegaard is not hostile to communities of 
human beings. Instead, he argues, that individual human beings cannot 
submit themselves to abstractions. This is the reason that Kierkegaard is 
hostile even to ‗Christendom‘. For him, the latter is just another ‗empty‘ 
abstraction. ‗The abstraction that individuals paralogistically form alienates 
individuals instead of helping them.‘ (TA, 91).  
If, however, an individual is ready to take responsibility for freely creating 
herself through her own decisions, then an authentic community can appear; 
a community of free and responsible human selves. ‗Contemporaneity with 
actual persons, each of whom is someone, in the actuality of the moment and 
the actual situation gives support to the single individual.‘ (TA, 91).  
Ultimately, the real danger, for Kierkegaard, lies in the perspective of social 
groups that incorporate their members, without leaving them enough ‗air‘ to 
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breath and complete themselves. In this context, individuality does not refer to 
social solipsism, but, on the contrary, to an authentic social condition for 
healthy communities. 
Being a ‗political‘ or a ‗social‘ self is in no way opposed to being a 
(historical/existential) self. At stake in both is our personal engagement with 
given social conditions. Kierkegaard‘s belief that only ‗subjectivity‘ is true does 
not mean that he renders his ‗subject‘ a socially secluded entity.120 
Conclusion 
Having closely studied Kierkegaard‘s arguments in the ‗Interlude‘, in CA, SD 
and TA, I claim that ‗Kierkegaard‘s concept of history‘ can give us an 
alternative approach to the problem of the nature of history and the historical. 
Hegel and his pupils (Marx being included here) monopolise the field of the 
philosophy of history. Kierkegaard‘s stress on the existence of freedom in 
history and his focus on active personal engagement in creating the historical 
can present us with a fresh ‗glance‘. Even if we disagree with his arguments 
we have, at least, to accept that his approach can restore the passion and the 
dignity of our personal participation to history. Becoming a self in Hegel‘s 
philosophy of history simply means being an instrument for the historical 
completion of reason. Historical selfhood is thereby lost. Becoming a self, in 
Kierkegaard‘s concept of history, is the central struggle for the free creation of 
history.121  
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 More on this matter in my next chapter. 
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 I will say more about the differences of Hegel and Kierkegaard regarding their views in 
history in my fourth chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Hegel’s philosophy of history and Kierkegaard’s concept of 
history: a synthesis instead of a confrontation 
 
Introduction 
 
 My aim in this chapter will be threefold: a) to give a more elaborate synopsis 
of Hegel‘s claims on the nature of history and a similar more elaborate 
analysis of the Kierkegaardian concept of history drawing on my conclusions 
from the previous three chapters, b) to argue in favour of a synthesis of their 
points of view rather than view them only as direct philosophical opponents or 
treating their philosophies on history as totally and utterly incompatible, and c) 
to explain and analyse the reasons that make me believe that all the past 
positions regarding their relations are either partly or totally flawed. 
While I have focused in my previous chapters on Hegel‘s philosophy of history 
(chapter one) and on Kierkegaard‘s concept of history (chapters two and 
three), I intend in this chapter to deepen and enrich my analysis of both of 
them by a) presenting further argumentation in regard with their approach to 
history and the historical and b) by comparing their views on history.122 
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As the title of this chapter indicates, I will not simply try to compare their views 
to each other. I will proceed rather at a synthesis of their approaches. I will 
argue that this synthesis can give us a better understanding of their views on 
history while at the same time it can provide us with a deeper and fuller grasp 
of the nature of history and the historical. 
The most usual views on the relations between Hegel and Kierkegaard 
consider their philosophies as either directly opposite to each other or as 
incompatible. Niels Thulstrup in his Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel is the 
main adherent of the first view and Jon Stewart in his Kierkegaard’s Relations 
to Hegel Reconsidered of the latter view.  
I will analyse their theories regarding the relation between Hegel and 
Kierkegaard and I will argue that both of these views fail to fully capture the 
complex relations of Hegel and Kierkegaard.123 
I will conclude this chapter by giving two specific quotations from Hegel and 
Kierkegaard. I will do so because in these quotations both Hegel and 
Kierkegaard reveal to us their ambivalent and ambiguous relation to 
philosophy and faith.  
I will start by giving a (deeper and richer) synopsis of Hegel‘s philosophy of 
history. I will continue by giving a (deeper and richer) synopsis of 
Kierkegaard‘s approach to history. I will go on first to a comparison of their 
views and then to a synthesis of their approaches. I will then proceed to 
examine Thulstrup‘s and Stewart‘s view on the relations between Hegel and 
Kierkegaard, and I will also examine similar approaches.  
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 My comparison however will stay only in Hegel‘s and Kierkegaard‘s approaches to history 
and the historical while both Thulstrup and Stewart examine Hegel‘s and Kierkegaard‘s 
overall philosophical views. 
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A quotation from Hegel‘s Early Theological Writings and one quotation from 
Kierkegaard‘s Prefaces will conclude my chapter by giving us a clear example 
of why we cannot view either Hegel or Kierkegaard as absolutely ‗one-
dimensional‘ thinkers, devoted either to pure speculation or to absolute faith. 
Hegelian claims on history 
In the first chapter Hegel‘s philosophy of history was synoptically examined. It 
was argued there that we can detect two main Hegelian claims about history: 
a) a metaphysical claim that in history we can find in work reason‘s necessity 
and b) an epistemological claim that we can fully understand and know our 
past history. 
Reason 
Reason‘s nature was defined as a holistic and purposeful activity of the spirit. 
The nature of the spirit was depicted as an equivalent to the nature of ‗God‘; it 
was further stated however, that this ‗spirit‘ exists within history in both nature 
and human beings. In this way Hegel appears to put ‗God‘ within this spatio-
temporal world of ours. Reason refers directly to an activity that has as its 
purpose to enable universal spirit to understand fully its nature through 
history.124 
Reason‘s necessity is something different from logical necessity. Hegelian 
necessity refers directly to the (necessary) actualisation of universal spirit‘s 
self-understanding. Hegel also declares that this actualisation can lead history 
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 Hegel‘s ‗Reason‘ is not a static logical activity. As Arthur Berndtson argues: ‗…reason for 
Hegel is not fixed and detached; it is an immanent process, which creates the logic, nature 
and mind.‘ Arthur Berndtson, ‗Hegel, Reason and Reality‘, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 20, No. 1) Sep., 1959), p.44. 
My disagreement with Berndtson however is that Hegel‘s Reason in the way Berndston 
describes it is so general and abstract that it ends being vague. In my view Reason in Hegel 
is above everything else a teleological (purposeful) activity of the Spirit. 
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to one and only one (and thus necessary) conclusion: that all human beings 
are free.125  
Reason thus is par excellence a historical activity which operates within 
spatio-temporal actuality. Hegel distinguishes understanding (Verstand) from 
his logic which he calls reason (Vernunft). He further states that we, human 
beings, can fully know and understand the nature of our history. He grounds 
this statement in the historical fact of the Incarnation. History then becomes 
for Hegel the only actual field for his reason. Hegel even more, is interested in 
thoroughly examining our past history with the philosophical certainty that he 
can detect and prove reason‘s necessity.126 
Hegel‘s metaphysical claim has as its direct philosophical implication the claim 
that reason, and not human beings, is the ultimate historical agent. Hegel 
furthermore argues that single human beings cannot really create history. 
History can be made only by structured communities which can objectify 
human passions by transcending their individual parts‘ will into objective state 
laws.127 
                                                 
125
 Reason then must fulfill this historical task: to direct human communities into a specific 
political state that will provide the necessary conditions for the members of these communities 
to become free. Hegel‘s PR shows emphatically Hegel‘s view on how people can be ‗free‘ and 
what the exact meaning of their ‗freedom‘ is.  As J. A. Leighton states: ‗Freedom is the Idea of 
Spirit… All the struggles of nations and individuals are stepping-stones by which men rise to 
freedom. J.A. Leighton, ‗Hegel‘s Conception of God‘, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 5, No. 6 
(Nov., 1896), p.611. 
Leighton however cannot point out the exact Hegelian use of the word ‗freedom‘. He gives to 
Hegel‘s freedom a metaphysical dimension which does not accord with Hegel‘s political use 
of freedom. Hegel in PR again is quite clear about the specific context and the specific 
meaning of this freedom. 
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 As Gareth Stedman Jones argues, in Hegel‘s thought: ‗God and the processes of the world 
were merged in human history in ascending stages of relation and recognition, until Spirit 
came to see that reason and reality were identical. The Christian story was thus seen as a 
symbolic enactment of this process of recognition and merging.‘ Gareth Stedman Jones, 
‗Faith in History‘, History Workshop, No. 30 (Autumn, 1990), p. 64. 
I disagree with Jones however in that I argue that Hegel uses the Incarnation as the very 
basis of his philosophy of history. 
127
 Hegel believes that, if we try to view history purely as an activity of single human beings, 
we will eventually end in a totally chaotic and meaningless historical universe. Social and 
ethical institutions and mainly organised states can guarantee us (in Hegel‘s view) the 
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Knowledge of the past 
Hegel‘s epistemological claim has as its direct philosophical implication the 
claim that we, human beings, should focus our interest upon the knowledge 
and the understanding of our historical past, because only in this way can we 
fully comprehend the nature of our history. 
The teaching of the concept, which is also history‘s inescapable 
lesson, is that only when actuality is mature that the ideal first 
appears over against the real and that the ideal apprehends this 
same real world in its substance and builds it up for itself into the 
shape of an intellectual realm…The owl of Minerva spreads its 
wings only with the falling of the dusk.128 
Hegel here clearly states that: a) the ideal (spirit in the form of human mind) 
can apprehend the real world (the world of historical existence) and b) this 
apprehension can refer only to an understanding of what has already past. 
Hegel thus considers history only as the past which can be apprehended 
through human mind. In this way, Hegel can be viewed as a proponent of 
history which is mainly an object of our epistemological concern. History is for 
human beings only a past that we can know and understand.  
Order and meaning in history 
Hegel tries to establish an order within historical process. He claims that if we 
take history to consist only of human actions and individual desires we will find 
                                                                                                                                            
necessary ‗objectivity‘. S. W. Dyde in ‗Hegel‘s Conception of Freedom‘, The Philosophical 
Review, Vol. 3, No. 6, (Nov., 1894), p. 664 and Donald J. Maletz in ‗History in Hegel‘s 
Philosophy of Right‘, The Review of Politics, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), p. 222, point out the 
historical primacy of states and nations over single human beings. Both of them however fail 
to explicitly underline Hegel‘s absolute disregard of the historical importance of single human 
beings. 
128
 Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, translated by T. M. Knox, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1953), p.13. 
 137 
ourselves lost in the abyss of fortuity. Hegel takes individual‘s historical 
actions to be without consistency. Hegel however cannot take historical 
contingency to be the real nature of history. He wants two things: a) to find 
coherence and purposeful agency within history and b) to claim that human 
beings can totally apprehend this historical coherence. 
‗… [W]e have to discover the causes and reasons behind the events.‘ (IPH, 
25). ‗… [W]orld history is a rational process.‘ (IPH, 27).  
In history, we must look for a general design, the ultimate end of 
the world, and not a particular end of the subjective spirit or mind; 
and we must comprehend it by means of reason, which cannot 
concern itself with particular and finite ends, but only with the 
absolute…That world history is governed by an ultimate design, 
that it is a rational process—whose rationality is not that of a 
particular subject, but a divine and absolute reason…Reason is 
self-sufficient and contains its end within itself; it brings itself into 
existence and carries itself into effect.   (IPH, 28). 
If we have to find reason within history we have to be able to find something 
stable and necessary within historical process, which is impossible if we 
continue understanding history as something utterly contingent: ‗Everywhere 
we see a motley confusion which draws us into its interests, and when one 
thing disappears, another at once takes its place.‘ (IPH, 32).  
God’s providence 
But how can we prove that in the heart of history lie necessity, purpose and 
coherence? We can do it only if we believe that God‘s providence is the 
ultimate agent in history. 
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The concrete events are the ways of providence, the means it 
uses, the phenomena in which it manifests itself in history; they are 
open to our inspection, and we only have to relate them to the 
general principle referred to above. (IPH, 36).  
But we cannot really be sure that this ‗providence‘ can be apprehended by 
human (and thus finite) beings. In any case God can work in mysterious ways. 
Hegel then cannot secure the ‗government‘ of reason in history. He has then 
to take his argumentation even further; he has to claim that God‘s providence: 
a) is always at work within history without confining itself only in sporadic 
appearances (miracles); and b) that God works in ways that can be reached 
by human minds. 
If God is placed beyond the reach of our rational consciousness, 
we are no longer obliged to trouble ourselves about his nature, or 
indeed to look for reason in world history; the way is then open for 
any arbitrary hypotheses.  (IPH, 37). 
In this way, Hegel can continue to argue about the existence of reason within 
history only if he bases his arguments on two (absolutely) necessary 
preconditions: a) God‘s providence exists and it is always at work within 
historical process and b) human beings can rationally know this. ‗When God 
reveals himself to man, he reveals himself essentially through man‘s rational 
faculties;‘  (IPH, 39). Hegel argues that Christianity gave us the possibility to 
be sure about both of his above mentioned preconditions: 
Christianity is the religion which has revealed the nature and being 
of God to man. Thus we know as Christians that God is; God is no 
longer an unknown quantity: and if we continue to say that he is, 
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we are not Christians. Christianity demands that humility to which 
we have already referred, a humility which makes us seek to know 
God not through our own unaided efforts but with the help of divine 
knowledge and wisdom. Christians, then, are initiated into the 
mysteries of God, and this also supplies us with the key to world 
history. For we have a definite knowledge of providence and its 
plan. It is one of the central doctrines of Christianity that providence 
has ruled and continues to rule the world, and that everything which 
happens in the world is determined by and commensurate with the 
divine government.  (IPH, 41). 
Hegel cannot claim that we can have a ‗definite knowledge‘ of history without 
first taking as an absolute secure fact the existence of God‘s providence. This 
‗supplies us with the key to world history.‘ 
Incarnation and history 
 Christianity cannot exist without the historical fact of Jesus as the God who 
lived among us, as the God who lived within history. Incarnation thus 
becomes the corner-stone of Hegel‘s argumentation on the nature of history. 
Even Hegel‘s notorious statement that: ‗What is rational is actual and what is 
actual is rational.‘ (PR, 10), is explained by Knox in this way:  
Hegel‘s philosophy as a whole might be regarded as an attempt to 
justify his identification of rationality with actuality and vice versa, 
but his doctrine depends ultimately on his faith in God‘s 
Providence, his conviction that history is the working out of His 
rational purpose. That purpose, as the purpose of the Almighty, is 
not so impotent as to remain a mere ideal or aspiration, and 
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conversely, what is genuinely actual or effective in the world is 
simply the working of that purpose.‘  (PR, 302). 
In my first chapter I argued that Hegel‘s view on the hidden necessity of 
history is based on his interpretation of Incarnation. His argument is based on 
his belief that Incarnation is a historical fact that has brought God within 
temporality. From there Hegel goes on arguing that we (human beings) can 
understand this historical fact precisely because it is something that occurred 
within temporality. The natural outcome of my interpretation is that Hegel here 
makes two specific claims: a) a metaphysical one that there is a necessity 
within the progress of history and b) an epistemological claim that we can 
know this necessity.129 
Hegel‘s metaphysical claim first brings God within our spatio-temporal world, 
and then makes God fully accessible through reason. His epistemological 
claim is wholly based on his metaphysical claim. If there is a hidden necessity 
of reason (God‘s Providence) within historical progress, then human beings 
(because they participate in Spirit) can and should know this necessity. But 
they can know it only if the historical fact has already occurred. We can have 
knowledge only of our historical past, not of our historical present or of our 
historical future. As Hegel underlines in PS: ‗But recollection, the inwardizing, 
of that experience, has preserved it…‘ (PS, 492). 
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 As Richard Kroner states it in his introduction to Hegel‘s Early Theological Writings: 
It is true that Hegel believed in the historical process as divinely ordained…History is shaped 
by Providence, and Providence is Reason and can therefore be understood by the 
speculative dialectic of the philosopher. From this conviction a certain quietism resulted, 
satisfaction with actual conditions, and submissiveness to the universal will—not of the state 
but of the world…Not party politics nor class prejudice, but metaphysical fervor determines his 
views. G. W. F. Hegel, Early Theological Writings, translated by T. M. Knox, with an 
Introduction, and Fragments translated by Richard Kroner, (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1985), p. 65. 
I disagree however with Kroner in that I argue that Hegel‘s arguments about the Incarnation 
are not ‗metaphysical‘ but historical. For Hegel, the Incarnation is a historical event that 
ontologically grounds humans‘ capacity to know their past history.  
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This ‗recollection‘ is nothing but the knowledge of the past. This ‗inwardizing‘ 
is nothing but human capacity to fully know, understand and explain this 
historical past. ‗The teaching of the concept…is also history‘s inescapable 
lesson…‘ (PR, 13). History‘s ‗inescapability‘ is also history‘s ‗necessity‘ and 
this necessity can and should be apprehended by human beings. 
Hegelian freedom and necessity 
History cannot be the field of a ‗blind destiny‘.130 Mind is ‗reason‘, reason also 
governs history, so world history is the ‗necessary development‘ of mind‘s 
(and thus of reason‘s) freedom:  
Further, world history is not the verdict of mere might, i.e. the 
abstract and non-rational inevitability of a blind destiny. On the 
contrary, since mind is implicitly and actually reason, and reason is 
explicit to itself in mind as knowledge, world history is the 
necessary development, out of the concept of mind's freedom 
alone, of the moments of reason and so of the self-consciousness 
and freedom of mind.     (PR, 216). 
This necessary development of mind‘s freedom is also mind‘s knowledge. 
Spirit‘s freedom is the active force of history and spirit‘s knowledge the actual 
historical outcome. ‗History is mind clothing itself with the form of events…‘ 
(PR, 217). The active agent in history is reason: ‗…reason governs the 
world…‘ (IPH, 27). 
Individuals in history 
 Hegel is quite clear in his view of individuals‘ role in history: they serve 
reason‘s aim. Individual human beings can act as they believe they should 
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 I have already mentioned Hegel‘s ‗theodicy‘. That is, Hegel cannot tolerate the idea of pure 
historical contingency. There has to be a final pattern in history and Hegel‘s aim is to discover 
and disclose it.  
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act, but, no matter what, at the end, individuals are simple instruments of 
world mind: 
All actions, including world-historical actions, culminate with 
individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial…They are 
the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world 
mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed though it 
is concealed from them and is not their aim and object.  (PR, 218). 
Individuals cannot have the last word in making history. Individuals simply are 
serving the world-spirit. Individuals (when they act) cannot even understand 
the concealed aim of the world-spirit. Individuals are not the real historical 
agents. Individuals can only try (through reason) to understand and know 
history when history has already happened. 
If there is something that can free history from the burden of chaos, if there is 
something that can give to history a meaning, it is reason. Its freedom 
consists in having within it the cause of its actions. Its freedom exists only 
because reason has its goals within it. Human beings can act freely within 
history, which means that human individuals can purposefully try to actualise 
their desires. This however is not what makes history; this is only means to a 
different cause: the self-understanding of world-spirit. 
Individuals do exist within history but ‗The state is the actuality of concrete 
freedom.‘ (PR, 160). The state can ground individuals and not the other way 
around: ‗In the state, self-consciousness finds in an organic development the 
actuality of its substantive knowing and willing;‘. (PR, 222-223). The state is 
the genuine historical subject (besides of course reason, which is the absolute 
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historical subject). Not even heroes can claim historical importance: ‗Once the 
state has been founded, there can no longer be any heroes.‘ (PR, 245).  
Conclusion 
Hegel‘s conceptualisation of the historical process, his ‗absolute notion‘, is 
founded on a religious (and thus metaphysical) belief. His philosophy of 
history has been constructed on the (absolute and thus metaphysical again) 
ground of the existence within history of God‘s providence. His claims about 
the necessity and the knowledge of history can be validated philosophically 
only if we accept this providence. 
His claim however about the primacy of states over their members is 
grounded on another need (an epistemological one), the need to avoid the 
chaos and the inconsistency of individual wills. Hegel argues that, if there is 
any possibility of transcending individual wills without resorting to 
metaphysics, this possibility refers directly to the existence of structured 
communities as a (unique) historical subject. In this way, for Hegel, we cannot 
be real selves without first being parts of a structured community. This 
participation in the whole is what makes individual beings selves. The whole 
grounds its members. History thus becomes: a) Spirit‘s actualisation through 
reason‘s activity and b) a play whose sole players are the structured 
communities of human beings.  
Kierkegaardian claims 
In the second and the third chapter Kierkegaard‘s concept of history was 
depicted. It was argued that although Kierkegaard never tries to give us a 
systematic approach to the nature of history (as Hegel did), he nevertheless 
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gives us a coherent and unique philosophical approach to the problems of the 
nature of history and the historical. 
In the second chapter the focus was upon the close analysis of the ‗Interlude‘ 
from PF. It was argued that Kierkegaard there makes two philosophical 
claims: a) a metaphysical claim that freedom and not necessity exists within 
history, and b) an epistemological claim that we cannot fully know our 
historical past. It was further argued in the third chapter that Kierkegaard‘s 
necessity in the ‗Interlude‘ refers to logical necessity and freedom‘s nature (in 
the ‗Interlude‘) is freedom as the direct opposite of logical necessity. The 
relation between necessity and freedom is ‗either/or‘ with Kierkegaard 
underlining that we cannot ‗mediate‘ or synthesise them because necessity is 
a logical category (and thus out of temporality) and freedom is an existential 
condition (and thus within temporality). 
In the third chapter the focus was upon the way Kierkegaard constructs the 
human ‗Self‘. Through a close reading and extensive analysis of 
Kierkegaard‘s texts: CA, SUD, and TA it was argued that Kierkegaard: a) 
recognises human beings as the only historical agents (a metaphysical claim) 
and b) that we should not focus our efforts upon knowing our historical past 
and we should focus instead upon shaping (with our personal decisions) our 
present and our future (an existential claim). A direct philosophical implication 
of the latter claim is the shift from knowing our (historical) past to shaping our 
(historical) present and future. In this way, the historical subject becomes 
historical through creating (her) present and future history instead of trying to 
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understand and apprehend (her) historical past. Temporality and personal 
decision is what makes both (personal) history and the (historical) ‗Self‘.131 
Kierkegaardian concept of history 
Kierkegaard places at the very centre of history human individuals, who, 
through their conscious actions and decisions, freely create (their) history. The 
crucial elements of the Kierkegaardian concept of history are: 
1) Denial of the existence of (logical) necessity within history. We cannot 
rely on logic to understand and explain our history. Historical actuality 
cannot be approached and analysed by logical (and thus necessary) 
categories. 
2) The crucial forces behind the making of history are (personal) freedom 
of will and freedom of choice. Human beings create history through 
their free historical activity. 
3) Anxiety is the indication (in reality) of these two kinds of freedom in 
every single human being.  
4) The ‗moment‘ is the moment of decision, the moment of (willful) action. 
This moment creates temporality in terms of past, present and future 
and thus also creates history.  
5) Despair is the indication (in reality) of the need for every single human                
being to ground her own existence in something that lies outside 
herself: God. 
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 As Stephen Crites points out: ‗The ―existing individual‖, an irreducibly temporal being, 
confronts an open future which he must determine by his own decision about himself.‘ 
Stephen Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom’ Hegel vs Kierkegaard on Faith and History, 
(Pensylvania: American Academy of Religion, 1972), p.24. 
 Crites however fails to acknowledge the full importance of this Kierkegaardian approach for 
the nature of history and the historical. Crites seems to believe that only Hegel gives us a 
philosophical view on history while Kierkegaard is purely focused on matters of faith. 
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6) Kierkegaard directly associates the creation of the human self and 
history. We create our selves in history through our free actions and at 
the same time we create (our) history by the very same actions. 
Temporality is the very core of both history and the human self.  
7) Living in a structured community is something which gives to human   
beings the possibility of making their history, but it is not that human 
individuals are constituted in virtue of belonging to the communities 
they belong. For Kierkegaard it is the other way around, societies and 
communities cannot exist without the individuals. These social ‗wholes‘ 
are grounded in the individuals who constituted them.   
Kierkegaard and the Incarnation 
Kierkegaard is before everything else a Christian thinker. He is mainly 
concerned to invigorate what he believes to be a more authentic Christian way 
of living. He does not consider himself to be a philosopher of history. Starting 
however with an effort to understand the Incarnation he offers us his own 
arguments regarding history. He further elaborates his thoughts on history 
with an effort to define existentially the human self. ‗Existentially‘ means that 
Kierkegaard does not try to produce another theoretical system. He begins 
with certain facts of life (anxiety and despair) and then he argues in favour of 
possible explanations and implications. The Kierkegaardian human self is the 
only historical agent and at the same time cannot exist outside (human) 
history. This self is par excellence the only historical agent. Through personal 
will and personal engagement this self produces history. 
In JC Kierkegaard states that ‗Christianity‘s claim that it had come into the 
world by a beginning that was simultaneously historical and eternal had 
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caused philosophy much difficulty;‘. (JC, 134-135). This, ‗Christianity‘s claim‘, 
is the Incarnation. How can we claim that God, who is eternal, lived and died 
among us like a finite human being? How can we really understand God‘s 
presence as a simple historical fact? Can we really claim that Incarnation is 
just another historical fact, i.e. something that occurred in time and can be 
approached by human understanding, the way human understanding tries to 
approach every other historical fact?  
 Kierkegaard does not give any answer in JC. In PF however he specifically 
refers to these questions. On the very front cover-page of PF he asks: 
Can a historical point of departure be given for an eternal 
consciousness; how can such a point of departure be of more than 
historical interest; can an eternal happiness be built on historical 
knowledge?   (PF, 1). 
Incarnation is the core of Kierkegaard‘s thought through the whole text of the 
Philosophical Fragments. If, however we want to find some possible answers 
regarding the questions that are posed at the very beginning of this text, we 
must read the ‗Interlude‘. Freedom and necessity in the ‗Interlude‘ are 
mutually exclusionary to each other as qualities. 
Kierkegaard is interested in overcoming the problem of doubt regarding the 
truthfulness of Incarnation. Can we really overcome our doubt with ‗objective 
thinking‘? Can we really override doubt with ‗better‘ or ‗more‘ knowledge? 
Kierkegaard has already given an answer in JC:  
Thus it would be a misunderstanding for someone to think that 
doubt can be overcome by so-called objective thinking. Doubt is a 
higher form than any objective thinking, for it presupposes the latter 
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but has something more, a third, which is interest or 
consciousness.   (JC, 170). 
In the ‗Interlude‘ Kierkegaard deepens and expands the above statement. 
Although his aim is to persuade us that we cannot believe in the Incarnation 
by means of knowledge but by means of faith, he nevertheless examines both 
the nature of history and the nature of the historical. Kierkegaard wants to 
prove that regarding any possible historical fact, i.e. regarding any possible 
occurrence within temporality: a) nothing happens necessarily (which means 
nothing is predestined by any kind of necessary law), on the contrary every 
single historical becoming is free and b) we, human beings, cannot be totally 
secure about the cause (the why) that made it (the historical occurrence) 
happen.  
Freedom as opposite to logical necessity 
In order to argue in favour of the first claim (about freedom within temporality) 
Kierkegaard follows Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg‘s arguments about the 
notion of movement (κίνησις).132  
Kierkegaard starts from Trendelenburg‘s arguments regarding the differences 
between the Aristotelian and the Hegelian concept of becoming.133 
Kierkegaard is interested in Trendelenburg‘s analysis of the general ‗doctrine 
of categories‘ of Aristotle. Kierkegaard wants to define the relationship 
between logic and ontology, i.e. the relationship between thought and being. 
Gonzalez refers to an excerpt of Kierkegaard‘s notes: 
                                                 
132
 Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1802-1872) was a critic of Hegelianism. He was mainly 
interested in Aristotle‘s work in Logic (De Aristotelis categoriis). See Dario Gonzalez‘s 
analysis in: ‗Trendelenburg: An Ally against Speculation‘, from Kierkegaard and his German 
Contemporaries, Tome I: Philosophy, edited by Jon Stewart, (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), 
pp.309-334. 
133
 Dario Gonzalez, ‗Trendelenburg: An Ally against Speculation‘, p.314. 
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Very likely what our age needs most to illuminate the relationship 
between logic and ontology is an examination of the concepts: 
possibility, actuality, and necessity…Good comments are to be 
found in Trendelenburg‘s Logische Untersuchungen;134 
Kierkegaard in the ‗Interlude‘ argues that becoming as such (as a historical 
becoming into actuality) cannot be approached or explained by logic. ‗The 
problem of becoming is simply excluded from the domain of logic.‘135 It could 
be useful to have a synopsis of Kierkegaard‘s argument regarding the nature 
of becoming: 
1) Kierkegaard following Trendelenburg refutes movement (κίνησις) within 
logic. Logical necessity cannot change, if something is necessarily 
logical, it is so in every possible world without changing. This is why 
Kierkegaard states that the ‗necessary cannot be changed at all.‘ (PF, 
74).  
2) Kierkegaard defines becoming as a change, a movement from 
possibility to actuality. This ‗becoming‘ is ‗coming into existence‘.  
3) Becoming is movement, thus becoming cannot be necessary (logically 
necessary). 
4) Kierkegaard states that freedom characterises becoming. He does not 
define further the nature of this freedom. He simply states that: ‗All 
coming into existence occurs in freedom, not by way of necessity.‘ (PF, 
75). In this way, Kierkegaard sets a gap between logic and historical 
becoming.  
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 Ibid, p. 315, the extract is from Pap. VI B 54.19, p. 150/ JP 1, 199. 
135
 Ibid, p. 325. 
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Kierkegaard, so far, makes a metaphysical claim regarding the nature of 
history. If every historical becoming occurs in freedom, then in history (which 
is consisted by historical becomings, i.e. historical facts) we can find only 
freedom and no (logical) necessity. He goes even further stating that, because 
every cause that operates within actuality (the laws of physics for example) 
ends in a freely acting cause (God), we cannot explain history by using our 
scientific knowledge of laws. ‗Every cause ends in a freely acting cause.‘ (PF, 
75). Kierkegaard so far tries to dissociate history from logical necessity and 
also he tries to argue that even causality has in its very beginning freedom 
and thus we cannot ultimately explain history through causality. 
Causality can describe how something happens in actuality, but causality 
cannot explain why something happens instead of something else. We can try 
to understand history as a series or a chain of causes and effects, but we will 
never be able to understand why this possibility has been actualised instead 
of another possibility. When something changes from being possible to being 
actual, (in the very beginning of any historical event), freedom rules and not 
necessity.  
Human consciousness and history 
For Kierkegaard ‗only the eternal has no history‘. (PF, 76). He continues 
arguing that the historical is ‗dialectical with respect to time.‘ (PF, 76). In the 
third chapter this is explained as human consciousness, as human experience 
of ‗being in actuality‘. Kierkegaard states (and that helps us understand why 
only human consciousness is truly historical) that ‗Nature‘s imperfection is that 
it does not have a history…‘ (PF, 76). Kierkegaard thus claims that only 
human beings can have history, because only human beings can think about 
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their past while living their present and planning their future. In the third 
chapter this Kierkegaardian notion about human ‗historicality‘ is explained 
further, as a purposeful and willful activity to create a historical self through 
taking (freely) decisions. Kierkegaard however states that: ‗The more special 
historical coming into existence [human conscious reflection on its own past, 
present and future] comes into existence by way of a relatively freely acting 
cause, which in turn definitively points to an absolute freely acting cause.‘ (PF, 
76). Human beings are ‗relatively free‘ because they have to act within certain 
natural and social facts. God is the absolutely freely acting cause. 
Kierkegaard explains further this in the Sickness unto Death, where he 
grounds human selfhood in God.  
Necessity in (past) history 
Kierkegaard uses his definition of ‗becoming‘ in order to exclude any 
possibility of explaining history with logical categories. Kierkegaard defines as 
truly historical subjects only human beings who possess consciousness. 
Kierkegaard attacks the notion of the necessity of the past in two ways:  
1) He argues that although the past happened the way it happened and 
thus cannot be changed, the past however could be some other past, 
i.e. the past is not necessary because the past was first a present that 
occurred in freedom. Kierkegaard thus underlines that we can 
understand how something happened but not why this thing happened 
rather than something else.  
2) He denies that any human apprehension of the past could make it 
necessary. (PF, 79).  
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Kierkegaard rejects both the argument that the past is necessary because it 
cannot be changed and the argument that because we can know it, our 
knowing it renders it necessary. Kierkegaard wants to underline the possibility 
of repentance. In repentance we can change our past because we can repent 
about a specific past fact of our life and by doing so we can nullify the 
consequences of this fact. ‗…the change of repentance which wants to nullify 
an actuality.‘ (PF, 77).  
The most important philosophical consequences however of the above 
mentioned Kierkegaardian argument against the necessity of the past are 
that: a) we can describe how a specific past happened in this way but we 
cannot explain why this specific past has been actualised rather than another 
and 
b) our knowledge of the past cannot create or reveal any necessity within it. 
We have then already stepped into the second Kierkegaardian claim about 
the nature of our historical knowledge. If we cannot be sure about the ‗why‘ 
something happened, we cannot claim that we have or we can possibly have 
a full knowledge of a historical fact. 
Doubt 
Kierkegaard is now ready to proceed with the reasons that make him believe 
that we cannot overcome doubt with knowledge. The first reason has already 
been stated: we cannot have full knowledge of the historical facts; there is no 
way of understanding completely why something happens the way it happens 
and thus we must always necessarily be insecure regarding our historical 
knowledge. Kierkegaard draws on the Skeptics to expand his argument.   
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Immediate sensation and cognition cannot deceive. It is important 
to understand this in order to understand doubt and in order 
through it to assign belief its place. However strange it may seem, 
this thought underlies Greek skepticism…Greek skepticism was a 
withdrawing skepticism (εποχή [suspension of judgment]); they 
doubted not by virtue of knowledge but by virtue of will (deny 
assent—μετριοπαθειν [moderate feeling]). This implies that doubt 
can be terminated only in freedom, by an act of will, something 
every Greek skeptic would understand, inasmuch as he understood 
himself, but he would not terminate his skepticism precisely 
because he willed to doubt.    (PF, 82, italics are not mine).136 
When something occurs (when something happens within temporality and 
thus when something is changed from possibility to actuality), we can perceive 
it through our senses exactly the way has occurred. Kierkegaard however, 
following the Skeptics, argues that when we want to explain to our selves 
exactly what happened and why, we cannot be totally secure in our 
interpretation. If we cannot be totally sure then we must doubt. This doubt of 
ours cannot be overruled by our knowledge; it can be overruled only by our 
will. Greek Skeptics willed to deny assent because they did not want to be in 
error. Their reaction then was a negative one, i.e. they refused themselves 
even the possibility of an interpretation because they believed they could 
never be fully sure about their own judgment. Kierkegaard underlines the fact 
(for him) that doubt in the Skeptics is not a conclusion of knowledge or the 
lack of knowledge; doubt in the Skeptics is an act of (free) will. I cannot be 
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 For an analytical display on the matter of the relations between Kierkegaard and the 
Skeptics see: A. J Rudd, ‗Kierkegaard and the Skeptics‘, British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy 6 (1): 71-88.  
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one hundred percent sure about the truthfulness of my interpretation of the 
mere fact and thus I refuse (I will so) to come to a conclusion. The necessary 
consequence of this argument is that doubt is not coming from the mere fact; 
doubt is born from the human interpretation of this fact. Doubt is not a product 
of less knowledge so that it could be removed by ‗more‘ or ‗better‘ knowledge; 
doubt is a direct product of human (free) will. 
The problem of doubt lies in the nature of our (human) consciousness: ‗The 
possibility of doubt, then, lies in consciousness…‘ (JC, 168). Kierkegaard 
associates doubt and the historical. If every historical fact is, first of all, a 
becoming into actuality, then whenever we want to explain the reason (the 
‗why‘) of this historical becoming we must doubt because we cannot be totally 
sure about our judgment. This doubt about why something happened can be 
removed not if we try to know as many details as possible about this historical 
becoming but if we (freely) will to stop doubting about it: 
In contrast, it is now readily apparent that belief is not a knowledge 
but an act of freedom, an expression of will…Insofar as that which 
by belief becomes the historical, and as the historical becomes the 
object of belief (the one corresponds to the other), does exist 
immediately and is apprehended immediately, it does not deceive.  
(PF, 83). 
Belief 
The crucial statement by Kierkegaard here is that the historical and the object 
of belief ‗correspond to each other‘. In order for the mere fact to become 
‗historical‘, it needs first to be an ‗object of belief‘ and in order for a mere fact 
to be an ‗object of belief‘ it needs first to become historical. Kierkegaard thus 
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here recognises as ‗the historical‘ only what can be perceived by human 
beings and at the same time underlines that historical fact is never only the 
mere occurrence but the active unification in human beings‘ mind of this mere 
occurrence and its interpretation by human consciousness. 
The historical 
Now we have all the necessary details to unravel Kierkegaard‘s notion of the 
historical: 
1) Every historical becoming happens in freedom, i.e. it could happen 
otherwise. 
2) History is only human beings‘ history as this is perceived by their 
minds. 
3) Historical fact is the union in human consciousness of the mere 
historical occurrence as this is perceived by human senses and the 
interpretation of this occurrence. 
4) Every interpretation is always a relative interpretation and thus brings 
doubt. 
5) We cannot overrule this doubt by means of knowledge but by means of 
our free will. 
6) Every historical fact then is always (partly) an act of free human will to 
believe that something happened because of this reason instead of 
that reason. 
This is why Kierkegaard claims that: 
The conclusion of belief is no conclusion [Slutnig] but a resolution 
[Beslutning], and thus doubt is excluded…Belief is the opposite of 
doubt. Belief and doubt are not two kinds of knowledge that can be 
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defined in continuity with each other, for neither of them is a 
cognitive act, and they are opposite passions. Belief is a sense for 
coming into existence, and doubt is a protest against any 
conclusion that wants to go beyond immediate sensation and 
immediate knowledge. The doubter, for example, does not deny his 
own existence, but he draws no conclusions, for he does not want 
to be deceived.   (PF, 84). 
Historical knowledge 
Kierkegaard here completes his epistemological claim: we cannot (ever) know 
(in an absolutely sure and secure manner) any historical fact, because every 
historical fact is partly a product of free (and always relative) interpretation of 
the mere occurrence. In history then, we can have only interpretations and not 
knowledge. Our historical knowledge applies always to the way things happen 
and it can never explain the reason that made this particular possibility to be 
actualised instead of any other possibility.  
Whenever thus we are searching for laws in history, we search to describe 
and to explain the ‗how‘. The ‗why‘ remains a problem of our will. We can 
thus, give the reasons that gave Hitler the opportunity to be the leader of 
Germany in 1933, (poverty, disappointment with previous governments, et 
cetera), but we will never be able to know for sure why Hitler took power. That 
will always remain open to different interpretations no matter how many 
historical details we know. 
That does not mean that we can arbitrarily interpret the historical data in any 
way we want. Kierkegaard says that we cannot obtain an ‗absolute‘ (and thus 
necessary) historical knowledge. We cannot, however, impose our free will 
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upon the historical data in a way that could disregard them. Even if we are 
unable to be totally sure about why Hitler came to power in 1933, that does 
not mean that we can interpret the historical data in a way that could explain 
Hitler‘s rise to power, for example, as a direct effect of his lack of height.137 
My arguments 
I argue that Kierkegaard‘s metaphysical claim aims to ensure the existence of 
individual free will and individual freedom of choice. I also argue that 
Kierkegaard‘s epistemological claim aims to shift the focus from ‗knowing the 
history‘ to ‗creating the history‘. If we can find necessities in history, 
Kierkegaard believes that we will eventually find ourselves without freedom of 
will and freedom of choice. Kierkegaard however wants to argue in favour of 
the existence of personal responsibility and in favour of an open future. 
Understanding history in terms of logical categories deprives human beings of 
their historical spontaneity. Understanding history in terms of knowledge 
defines as the proper historical action only the examination of the past, which, 
for Kierkegaard is catastrophic because it does not care about creating the 
future. 
 Kierkegaard wants to underline the moral ‗understanding‘ of history (which 
means the moral understanding of human history) against the stress upon the 
epistemological understanding of history. Kierkegaard in CA and SUD argues 
in favour of a free and personally responsible human ‗historical‘ self. If we 
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 I guess that even that could be an interpretation. Hitler had an inferiority complex because 
of his height and that made him able to struggle for power so passionately. This is also the 
reason that Alexander became ‗Great‘ and Napoleon the emperor of Europe. In fact this 
example is a perfect one to understand Kierkegaard‘s notion of the historical. Even nowadays 
that we know so many details about what happened in the times of Hitler, Napoleon and 
Alexander the Great, even now that we have so effective historical methods regarding the 
gathering of the historical data, we cannot arrive to an exclusive explanation of the ‗why‘ 
these three men: a) wanted to become what they became and b) they succeeded. 
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believe that we can explain everything in history with logic and the obtainment 
of historical knowledge we pass over individual historical agency in terms of 
taking decisions. We tend to see human beings as objects of an attainable 
knowledge instead of seeing them as active historical subjects who create 
(freely and willfully) their history. 
Freedom of will and freedom of choice 
Before we proceed to examine how Kierkegaard argues in favour of human 
individuals as (being) the only active historical agents, we must try to further 
clarify the issue of ‗freedom of will‘ and ‗freedom of choice‘ as Kierkegaard 
understands them.138 
We can argue that even in a wholly deterministic universe, human beings can 
have (a kind of) freedom of will and (a kind of) freedom of choice. We can 
argue for example, that we have always to will between three different ways of 
willing something, without however, being ever able to will whatever we want. 
We can will to sit, walk or run (these are the necessary options our 
deterministic universe allows us to will), but we cannot will to grovel because it 
is not in our (predetermined) nature. Kierkegaard (as we will see) accepts the 
so called ‗objective‘ (and thus necessary) human conditions. We can will what 
our nature allows us to will. Furthermore, we have to choose between given 
possible options. Kierkegaard however argues in favour of historical agency in 
regard to human beings. We, at the end, will in a certain way (being totally 
responsible for what we will) and we make the final choice. 
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 If we do not do so, there is always the danger of misunderstanding Kierkegaard‘s 
arguments about history and the historical, because in our ‗post-modern‘ world, determinism, 
causality, freedom of will and freedom of choice have acquired a more complex nature than in 
Kierkegaard‘s era. 
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In fact we can give two examples that override even these ‗objective‘ (and 
thus predetermined) conditions. We are aware of human beings that were 
born men and willfully and freely became women, overcoming even the given 
conditions of their natural sex. We also know that nowadays human beings 
can walk in space. It does not matter that they can do so only with the aid of 
technical support, at the end, human beings willed and chose something that 
was ‗outside‘ their ‗necessary‘ conditions.  
Kierkegaard however is not interested in saying the final word on the 
theoretical matters of freedom of will and freedom of choice. In fact, we will 
misunderstand him if we choose to interpret him in this way. Kierkegaard‘s 
concern on the matters of freedom of will and freedom of choice is purely 
practical: in CA and SUD he constructs his ‗historical subject‘ as an active and 
responsible historical agent. Freedom of will and freedom of choice can be 
explained not through theoretical reasoning but through the de facto existence 
within every human individual of anxiety and despair.  
Kierkegaard‘s argument is not a theoretical (and so ideal) construction of the 
existence of freedom of will and freedom of choice. He begins with the given 
facts of the existence of anxiety and the existence of despair in human 
existence and having them as his starting points he tries to give possible 
reasons for why human beings always live in a state of anxiety and in a state 
of despair. 
General remarks on anxiety and despair 
 His answers are that: a) anxiety denotes the fear of taking the responsibility 
for our decisions and our actions, which always refers to our fear of being free 
to decide and act. Anxiety thus becomes the practical and actual proof of our 
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freedom of will and freedom of choice; and b) despair denotes that the ground 
of our existence lies outside of us, and specifically the ground of our self is 
God. We are free not to let ourselves open to the love of God, because we do 
possess freedom of will and freedom of choice; we cannot however escape 
being in despair whenever we do not let ourselves open to the love of God. In 
this way, the objective existence of despair within every single human being 
becomes a proof of God as the ground of our self. 
Kierkegaard tries to be coherent in his exposition of the phenomena of anxiety 
and despair. If we take as granted that anxiety and despair are general and 
universal characteristics of human existence, Kierkegaard can offer us a quite 
plausible explanation. The problem lies in his absolute conviction about their 
generality and their universality. In fact, Kierkegaard argues that we can be in 
despair or in anxiety without ever noticing it. He cannot however prove to us 
beyond any possible doubt the truthfulness of his claims. Even here however, 
he earns an extra point for his epistemological claim: at the end, we cannot be 
totally secure regarding our historical knowledge, which means that it is quite 
consistent for him not to be able to provide us with an absolute theoretical or 
historical proof of the existence of anxiety and despair.  
Kierkegaard then, cannot be totally judged for failing to provide us with 
absolute knowledge of anxiety and despair, as he has already argued against 
such knowledge. Kierkegaard tries to make us ‗experience‘ our selves as 
historical subjects who live within history and who create history through our 
actions. The verb ‗experience‘ refers directly to being able to avoid seeing 
ourselves as objects of theoretical understanding. To ‗experience‘ in this 
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context signifies the way we should approach our history and our (historical) 
selves. 
If Kierkegaard had written only the Philosophical Fragments we could never 
be able to argue that he had an original approach to history. Kierkegaard 
however in the Concept of Anxiety and in The Sickness Unto Death defines 
further the human Self in a way that makes it explicitly historical: becoming a 
‗Self‘ is a duty every human being ought to accept in order to create (willfully 
and freely) in temporality his ‗selfishness‘ through personal decisions. In fact, 
Kierkegaard argues that it is actually our natural capacity to freely take 
decisions and actions that creates temporality itself. 
Anxiety 
In The Concept of Anxiety Kierkegaard acknowledges and tries to define in 
detail the existence of the ‗anxiety over nothing‘. My argument is that 
Kierkegaard‘s analysis of the phenomenon of anxiety is crucial for his ‗concept 
of history‘ in that he creates (having as his starting point and his ground the 
actual existence of ‗anxiety‘ in every single human being) a ‗human historical 
agent‘ who is agent because she is free to decide, act and choose, and she is 
historical because this freedom that lies in the very heart of her existence can 
be actualised and further developed only within existing actuality (which is 
always historical for Kierkegaard following his arguments in the ‗Interlude‘).  
In the ‗Interlude‘ freedom is defined simply as the opposite of logical 
necessity. In CA freedom becomes the most crucial element of existing 
human beings. His analysis, however, must not be taken as a theoretical effort 
to define a ‗concept‘. Although Kierkegaard speaks of ‗the concept‘ of anxiety, 
we do not have here another epistemological construction. Freedom can 
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really be apparent only when we, as living (and thus existing) human beings 
try to experience our selves in times of action and decision: ‗…truth is for the 
particular individual only as he himself produces it in action.‘ (CA, 138). This 
freedom has two sides; it is ‗sweet‘ and ‗dizzy‘: 
…[A]nxiety is the dizziness of freedom…Freedom succumbs in this 
dizziness…In anxiety there is the selfish infinity of possibility, which 
does not tempt like a choice but ensnaringly disquiets with its sweet  
anxiousness.  (CA, 61). 
Anxiety is freedom, this freedom is presented to us as dizziness whenever we 
experience the ‗selfish infinity of possibility‘. ‗Freedom‘s possibility announces 
itself in anxiety.‘ (CA, 74). But what is the ‗selfishness‘ of anxiety? Why does 
Kierkegaard relate freedom to selfishness? Is this an indication of 
Kierkegaard‘s belief in a pure voluntarism that takes as real and predominant 
in history only human volition? Is then Kierkegaard‘s freedom another effort to 
argue in favour of an arbitrary subjective volition as the only possible 
freedom? The answer must be totally negative. First of all, Kierkegaard does 
not argue in favour of the absolute predominance of a ‗free‘ subjective will. 
Kierkegaard accepts the objective existence of the given natural, social and 
historical conditions: ‗Each individual begins in an historical nexus, and the 
consequences of nature still hold true.‘ (PF, 73). Secondly, Kierkegaard‘s 
claim is against the idea that we can have an objective, general and 
theoretical knowledge of our freedom. Thus he states that: ‗For selfishness is 
precisely the particular, and what this signifies only the single individual can 
know as the single individual, because when it is viewed under universal 
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categories it may signify everything in such a way that it signifies nothing at 
all.‘ (CA, 77).  
Logical, universal and general categories are inappropriate to define freedom 
within history. This much we already know from the ‗Interlude‘. Here however 
we have the further definition of this freedom as something that ‗belongs‘ to 
single individuals. Kierkegaard goes on to define this ‗selfishness‘: ‗... ―self‖ 
signifies precisely the contradiction of positing the universal as the particular.‘ 
(CA, 78).  
This contradiction is a real one and not a theoretical one.139 This contradiction 
however is what makes human beings historical selves, because this 
contradiction, when it is experienced by human beings in times of (free) 
decision becomes the ‗moment‘. The Kierkegaardian ‗moment‘, as this is 
analysed in CA, is the creator of history and the necessary creating element of 
temporality. ‗Only with the moment does history begin…and with this [the 
moment] the concept of temporality posited…‘ (CA, 89). This moment 
however is anxiety, as this is experienced by the individuals: ‗In the individual 
life, anxiety is the moment…‘ (CA, 81).  
Time, the moment and history 
Now we can have an even more detailed picture of the ‗Kierkegaardian 
concept of history‘. Temporality refers to the specific human experience of 
time as past, present and future. If time is defined as an infinite succession 
and the ‗moment‘ is another conceptual abstraction, then the present has no 
existence at all. That means that all that is there for us (human beings) to 
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 It goes without saying that this is an ‗actual‘ or ‗existing‘ and not a logical contradiction. 
Kierkegaard has already established in PF that logic is incompatible with history. Here he 
continues in the same motif. Being a self is a historical experience and as such is always 
experienced by human beings as a ‗tension‘ , an anxiety. 
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grasp from our history is the time passing by, without being able to know 
anything about our present and our future.  
Kierkegaard‘s aim here is to approach the problem of the coexistence of 
eternal and temporal in actuality. He does not try to prove it directly. He points 
out instead that, if we want to be able to distinguish between our past, our 
present, and our future, we need to find another definition of time besides 
‗time as an infinite succession‘. ‗Spirit‘ signifies for him self-consciousness and 
the ‗moment‘ signifies for him something that can actively unify eternal and 
temporal and can distinguish past from present and from future. 
Here we have a further evolution of the Kierkegaardian concept of history. The 
‗moment‘ signifies the actualisation in temporality of our freedom of will and 
freedom of choice. At the same time, temporality and history can exist only 
through this ‗moment‘. Kierkegaard believes that he can give a more accurate 
account of the nature of historical time. He makes a distinction between an 
abstract concept of time that ‗passes by‘ and the human experience of time. 
Human beings, exactly because they are spirits, can be conscious of their 
personal existence in time and so they can refer to their past, their present, 
and their future. They can do so because they can intersect time in ‗the 
moment‘, which means they can step outside of the flux of time and they can 
make decisions about their present and their future. 
Ultimately, Kierkegaard argues that if our common human experience of 
temporality (with past, present, and future being strictly distinct) truly exists, 
then we need a different definition of time than that of temporal flow. History 
begins with the ‗moment‘ because the moment is a free personal decision. 
These decisions create our present and our future, but also become our 
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personal past. This moment then is the Kierkegaardian core of history and the 
historical. 
One further philosophical implication of the Kierkegaardian moment is that the 
future becomes the most significant part of historical time instead of the past. 
As Kierkegaard states it: ‗…the future is the whole of which the past is a 
part…The moment and the future in turn posit the past…‘ (CA, 89-91). Only 
when we understand ourselves in terms of our future goals can we really 
grasp ourselves as historical subjects who take decisions. We relate 
ourselves with our past experience; we use this experience to take a present 
decision; this present decision will shape our future. 
Kierkegaard here continues his argument about the individual‘s historical 
agency. We are free to will and we are free to choose. The moment becomes 
the active and concrete actualisation of these freedoms, while at the same 
time temporality and history are constituted by this moment. This freedom is 
not another theoretical construction which can be approached through logic. 
This freedom is the very core of human self and as such can be only realised 
and not understood:  
In turning inward, he discovers freedom…not freedom to do this or 
that in the world…but freedom to know of himself that he is 
freedom.   (CA, 108). 
History is made with our eyes looking towards the future and not with our 
minds looking towards the past. Furthermore, the past can be always 
reactivated. This is another very important philosophical implication of the 
Kierkegaardian analysis of historical time. Kierkegaard tries to explain the 
possibility of repentance by this possible ‗reactivation‘ of the past. Whenever 
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we repent we can change the consequences of our past actions and thus we 
can change our past. It is more than this though. I will try to explain why.  
We can choose to relate ourselves in different ways with our past, thus we 
can continuously reactivate our past. If, for example, I had a car accident ten 
years ago, I can choose during the next nine years to quit driving because of 
the fear this accident caused me. I can choose however, at some point after 
these nine years to try to drive again in a way that would make me avoid 
having such an accident again, which means I can choose to become a more 
careful driver. In this way the same fact from my past can make me first quit 
driving and then become a better driver. From that it follows that even if we 
cannot change our past, we can change our point of view towards it and by 
doing so we can change our present and future history. 
So far I have argued that Kierkegaard takes as a historical fact the mere 
occurrence along with our interpretation of it. Now I argue that Kierkegaard 
takes as a historical fact the mere occurrence along with our interpretation 
and our degree of engagement towards it. 
A last example probably will help us understand better the nature of this 
statement. Let us say for example, that twenty years ago I tried to be a 
professional football player. Every single team rejected me. I was so frustrated 
by this fact that I stopped even watching football. In fact I was so frustrated 
that I stopped doing any kind of physical exercise because I believed that this 
fact (my rejection) signified and proved my total incapacity for being an 
athlete. At that time I considered this particular fact a very traumatic 
experience. Ten years ago while I was continuing my studies I decided to 
evaluate this historical fact differently. Instead of being frustrated by this 
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failure I considered myself lucky because I continued with my studies and I 
found out that this was my real inclination (besides the fact that I was quite 
happy and satisfied). After my reevaluation of this particular past event I even 
started running again.  
Somebody might argue that this is not a ‗different‘ past event. If we take as a 
historical event only the mere occurrence, then yes, this is not different. The 
rejection is the same before and after my second thought about it. If, however 
we argue (following Kierkegaard) that the historical fact always comprises the 
unification of the mere occurrence along with our interpretation and our 
evaluation, then we can continuously change our past by changing either our 
interpretation or our evaluation. The most important feature of this approach to 
the past is that it enables us to understand our present differently and create a 
different future. But we have to have as our necessary preconditions the 
acceptance of the existence of our individual freedom of will and freedom of 
choice. 
Kierkegaard’s historical agent 
What Kierkegaard‘s concept of history allows us to have is the advantage and 
the responsibility of being the sole historical agents. What it means to be such 
a historical agent is depicted and analysed by Kierkegaard in The Sickness 
unto Death. Kierkegaard here completes his analysis of the nature of the 
human self. Kierkegaard‘s aim in SUD is (in my opinion) twofold: a) to give an 
explanation for the existence of despair within the human self and b) to give 
us the limits (and the horizon or the context) of the experience of being a 
human self in actuality (in contrast with a theoretical and purely descriptive 
definition of human self). 
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 The existence of despair, for Kierkegaard, signifies the loss of the ‗ground‘ of 
our existence. We are free to will and choose, but there is only one way to 
have a grounded and well-balanced existence and this way is to (freely and 
willfully) open ourselves to God. The crucial philosophical advantage of 
Kierkegaard‘s argument regarding the existence of despair is that it offers us 
an ‗existential‘ analysis of the human self. It is existential because it refers to 
existing human ‗moods‘ instead of giving us a cognitive analysis of the human 
self. Kierkegaard‘s point is not a definite knowledge of the human self or a 
theoretical analysis of its features. Kierkegaard argues about what it is to be 
(in actuality) a human self.  
Even if we do not believe in God we can profit by Kierkegaard‘s approach 
because he describes ways of being a self instead of giving us theoretical 
models about the possible structure of the human self. His approach can give 
us the opportunity to ‗experience‘ the ways we are instead of giving us 
lessons on what we could be in theory. 
As for the ‗limits‘ or the ‗horizon‘ or the ‗context‘ of the experience of being a 
human self, which I argue is his second aim, they are not theoretical limits, 
they are the existing and actual horizons of our (actual) life. Which means 
that, in my point of view, Kierkegaard in SUD gives us the actual necessities 
of our existence. We have to will and choose our selves within certain social 
and natural preconditions and at the same time we have to try to create the 
(historical) meaning of our lives. And the most important horizon or limit or 
context of our lives is that, if we want to live a life free from the feeling of 
despair, we have to ground our (free) lives in God. 
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We are not complete selves when we are born. We are becoming selves 
through our self-conscious actions. In this way, being a self and having (or 
creating) a history is one and the same thing. Becoming a self is a duty we 
have to take freely within history. Having a history is a duty we have to freely 
take if we want to become ourselves.140 
History thus, can be made only when we experience our (natural) capacity for 
self-creation. At the same time, this capacity is a duty we have to undertake if 
we want to actualise the possibility of being selves. What enables human 
beings to become selves (freedom of will, freedom of choice and continuous 
self-conscious action) also creates history. Kierkegaard here gives us the last 
detail (a very important one) of his ‗concept of history‘: to be a self is to create 
a (personal) history. An unbroken bond unifies history and human selves. 
Temporality is both the heart of history and the core of human existence. 
Freedom of will and freedom of choice are the existing forces behind both 
self-becoming and history.  
Kierkegaard thus argues in favour of individual human historical agency. This 
agency is constituted by the permanent self-conscious effort to create 
ourselves as meaningful and concrete selves: ‗…if a person is truly not to be 
in despair, he must at every moment destroy the possibility [of being in 
despair].‘ (SUD, 15). To (freely) will and to be conscious of this is what 
characterises the way of being a human (historical) self: ‗A person who has no 
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 Mark C. Taylor says something similar when he argues that: ‗…it can be said that for 
Kierkegaard temporality is the form of human existence.‘ Mark C. Taylor, ‗Time‘s Struggle 
with Space: Kierkegaard‘s Understanding of Temporality‘, The Harvard Theological Review, 
Vol. 66, No. 3 (Jul., 1973), p. 329. I argue however that Taylor fails to fully understand the 
connection between temporality and human existence. Kierkegaard completely interweaves 
human self and temporality. Temporality thus is not just the form of the self; temporality is the 
very blood of the (historical) self. 
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will at all is not a self; but the more will he has, the more self-consciousness 
he has also.‘ (SUD, 29). This ‗self‘ has to be ‗concrete‘, which means that this 
self must be actualised in a certain (historical) way: ‗To become oneself is to 
become concrete.‘ (SUD, 30).  
If we choose to interpret Kierkegaard‘s claims as claims about the absolute 
(and utterly arbitrary) subjective way to create history (and to have a self), we 
neglect two crucial Kierkegaardian statements: a) we have to ground our very 
existence in something that lies outside ourselves, and b) we have to live in a 
certain society, in a certain historical period, and we have a certain (biological) 
nature. 
Kierkegaard carefully points out that the limits of our (free) historical existence 
lie outside ourselves. In this way, to become a self means also to be aware of 
these (objective) limits. The danger of which Kierkegaard wants us to be 
aware is that of losing our ‗uniqueness‘ in the crowd: ‗…by becoming a 
number instead of a self, just one more man, just one more repetition of this 
everlasting Einerlei [one and the same]‘ (SUD, 33).  
It is not that Kierkegaard wants us to live ‗away‘ and ‗apart‘ from the society. It 
is that he stresses the danger of submitting to the power of the crowd. 
Kierkegaard is not the prophet of social seclusion. He wants, however, to 
make us aware of the difficulty of becoming a self. In his text Two Ages, in the 
section with the title ‗The Present Age‘ he states that what is crucial for our 
selves and our history is to act on our own: 
That a person stands or falls on his actions is becoming obsolete; 
instead, everybody sits around and does a brilliant job of bungling 
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through with the aid of some reflection and also by declaring that 
they all know very well what has to be done.  (TA, 73-74). 
We stand and fall on our actions. Knowledge (theoretical) can offer us 
nothing. Reflection and the effort to ‗understand‘ cannot create (our) history. 
Kierkegaard wants to get us away from abstracted (theoretical) categories. 
Being a (historical) self is something totally concrete which cannot be defined 
by any kind of theoretical categories. Knowledge, as much as it means the 
application of theoretical categories of thinking, cannot explain what 
‗becoming a self‘ means.  
Conclusion 
Kierkegaard starts from the need to find an authentic Christian way of existing. 
His arguments however can be used outside theology. He gives us an 
alternative point of view of the nature of history and the historical. He argues 
in favour of the direct relation of (freely) becoming a self and (freely) creating 
history with our own self-willed actions. He shifts the focus from ‗knowing the 
historical past‘ to ‗creating the historical future‘. His stress in ‗individuality‘ is 
not a refutation of society. Kierkegaard simply chooses to give historical 
primacy to individuals over their communities. His arguments are not being 
directed against societies. His arguments underline the danger of abstraction. 
Concreteness is a sine qua non quality for being a historical self. Before 
considering ourselves members of any given society  (‗society‘ is another 
general and theoretical abstraction for Kierkegaard), we need to become 
ourselves. Otherwise, we will find ourselves being numbers and members of 
the ‗public‘: 
 172 
But the existence of a public creates no situation and no 
community…The public may take a year and a day to assemble, 
and when it is assembled it still does not exist. The abstraction that 
individuals paralogistically form alienates individuals instead of 
helping them.   (TA, 91). 
Hegel and Kierkegaard: a possible synthesis 
The first question regarding the relations of Hegel and Kierkegaard is whether 
we really need to examine their thought together. Regarding their arguments 
on history, my answer is yes, we do. They represent the extreme opposite 
analyses of history and thus their approaches denote the limits of any given 
understanding of history. Hegel argues for theoretical apprehension of the 
past and Kierkegaard for the active creation of the future. Hegel believes that 
reason governs history and Kierkegaard argues in favour of a free and 
undetermined history. States and structured communities have historical 
primacy over individuals for Hegel and for Kierkegaard it is exactly the 
opposite. Hegel places God within this actual universe, Kierkegaard considers 
God as the absolute that grounds that universe.  
If, thus, we want to have a complete picture of history, we need first to be 
aware of the limits of this picture. Hegel and Kierkegaard can give us these 
limits by their differing views about history. This is why it is useful to examine 
these together. 
The second question is whether we can really relate one to another, because, 
thus far, it looks as if their claims on history are incompatible. And if this is the 
case, we cannot possibly examine them together. My answer is no, their 
views on history are not incompatible, they are complementary. Hegel 
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provides a holistic view and Kierkegaard provides us with an analysis of the 
basic elements of history. We need both views to arrive at a more complete 
picture. 
A further reason to examine their views on history together is that in this way 
we can test their views by using the arguments of the one against the other. In 
order to test the philosophical strength of Hegel‘s claim that reason governs 
history, we can use Kierkegaard‘s arguments about the predominance of 
freedom within history. In order to test Hegel‘s claim that we can acquire 
knowledge of the past, we can use Kierkegaard‘s arguments for the opposite. 
In order to examine more deeply Kierkegaard‘s claim about individuals being 
the only historical agents, we can use Hegel‘s arguments that history can be 
created only by wholes such as states and structured societies. 
 Even however if we accept the need to examine them together, do we have 
to come up with a synthesis of their views? What if they simply represent two 
views on history that are ultimately and necessarily contradictory? My answer 
is that it is ‗fruitless‘ to describe and understand their views in this way. It is so 
because we can proceed with a synthesis of their views. This will allow us to 
take advantage of both of the views. Only if we can absolutely prove that 
either Hegel‘s view or Kierkegaard‘s view is totally and uniquely correct, must 
we accept only one of these views. Otherwise, we can attempt to synthesise 
and combine their views, because this is a productive and legitimate 
philosophical way of using their thoughts. 
Synthesis of their metaphysical claims 
We will start with their metaphysical claims. Can we synthesise Hegel‘s 
necessity with Kierkegaard‘s freedom? Can we combine reason as the 
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absolute historical agent with the Kierkegaardian historical human self as the 
only historical agent? 
Starting with the first question, yes we can. Hegel‘s necessity can be 
understood as a ‗teleological‘ necessity. This means that what is historically 
necessary is not a history predetermined by either logical or physical 
necessities. What is historically necessary is a purposeful and meaningful 
history. We can have such a history even without logical or natural laws. We 
can thus, have such a history with freedom existing within it.141  
Now, someone might argue that if this is the case, then Hegel is absolutely 
right because his views incorporate Kierkegaard‘s view. My answer is that 
Hegel argues that we do know what history‘s purpose is, but I argue that we 
cannot know that for sure and Kierkegaard provides us with the relevant 
arguments in the ‗Interlude‘. What we can claim is that even without knowing 
the specific necessary end of history we can argue in favour of a history that, 
at the end, will have a meaning. Hegel argues that history necessarily must 
have a certain end. Kierkegaard argues that the future is uncertain and we 
cannot possibly know its end. I argue that a possible synthesis of their views 
can give us a better alternative. We can expect that the history we will make 
through our actions and decisions will have the shape (and thus the meaning) 
of our conscious effort. History then can be seen as something free that has 
as its core the necessity of free self-creation. 
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 In fact, our modern and ‗scientific‘ way to understand nature is quite similar. We accept that 
‗nature‘ evolves by trying to create more complicated forms of life without having to believe 
that nature follows any strictly predetermined patterns. Freedom in nature coexists 
comfortably with natural ends (or natural evolution). History then can be seen as something 
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for the human beings who are experiencing historical evolution. These historical meanings 
while they are the direct product of human (historical) freedom, create a history which is 
meaningful without being predetermined.  
 175 
Hegel in the end provides us with a view on history that makes human beings 
simply an instrument to reason. Kierkegaard on the other hand limits history to 
subjective will. We can proceed on a further synthesis that will accept both a 
necessary historical function and individual human freedom. 
To explain: Which is the original, authentic and ultimate historical agent, 
reason or individual? My answer is neither of them but at the same time both 
of them. Hegel‘s reason in the end is something that arises out of the active 
participation of individuals. In this way the most crucial question to be asked is 
if this Hegelian reason exists or is it only a convenient theoretical abstraction. 
In Hegel‘s view the parts of a whole are grounded on the existence of this 
whole. We need first the existence of the whole to be able to grant existence 
to its parts. In Kierkegaard‘s point of view it is exactly the opposite.  
What if, however, we cannot really understand one apart from the other? This 
is exactly my proposal. It is not the whole that grounds the parts; it is not the 
parts that ground the whole; both of them exist simultaneously.  
If we insist to play the game ‗who came first, the chicken or the egg‘ we are in 
danger of never arriving at an absolutely certain answer. Hegel‘s view 
underlines the importance of social relations in the construction of an 
individual human being. This is true. From the beginning of our conception we 
are a product of a bigger whole. First is our parents‘ uniting, then is our 
society‘s language and culture and so on. On the other hand, Kierkegaard 
also has his points. We can become authentic selves if and only if we self-
consciously decide on our own. Yes we do need our parents and our society 
to start to exist, but what makes us individuals is our will to shape our unique 
entity through our unique decisions. 
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We cannot thus arrive at an exclusive result. Which is first, ‗we‘ or ‗I‘? My 
proposed synthesis is that only if we decide to understand both of them as 
directly connected to each other can we have a better philosophical result. If 
we cannot, philosophically, prove the absolute truth of either of these claims, 
we can choose, philosophically, to consider them united and indivisible 
through and through. 
It might be argued that, when the whole is constructed, then its function 
surpasses the individual functions. The human body has millions of cells but 
when it functions normally as a whole, its function is something else and 
something ‗bigger‘  than the mere sum of its cells, and thus the human body 
transcends the individual functions of its cells. This is true but partly irrelevant 
to Kierkegaard‘s argument. One part of Kierkegaard‘s argument is indeed that 
every community (as a separate entity from its parts) is nothing but a 
convenient theoretical abstraction and so we cannot claim that these 
communities exist separately from their parts. This however, does not mean 
that Kierkegaard rejects even the existence of these communities. His point is 
simply to stress that these communities cannot exist without depending on 
their parts. Besides that, Kierkegaard‘s argument does not deny the 
importance of these communities. What he vigorously denies is that these 
communities can in fact have historical primacy over their individual parts.  
Hegel stresses that structured communities can rationalise the ‗irrational‘ 
individual passions through their laws. Hegel thus believes that if history has 
to have any rationality, this rationality can be found only within the laws of 
structured communities. Kierkegaard on the other side seeks to find 
authenticity within each and every single one human being. This authenticity 
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is in danger whenever individuals ‗unload‘ their personal responsibilities to be 
authentic human selves through being simply parts of the ‗crowd‘.  
If the above mentioned argument in favour of the indivisibility of the whole and 
its parts is purely theoretical, there is another (actual and historical) reason for 
trying to make a synthesis of the Hegelian primacy of the community and the 
respective Kierkegaardian primacy of the individual. The practical 
consequences of either Hegel‘s view or Kierkegaard‘s can lead us 
respectively either to totalitarian regimes or to the dissolution of social bonds. 
Hegel would argue that the former could never happened because he 
stresses specifically that states must have as their necessary aim the 
protection of individual rights. In fact, he states that history‘s own end is that 
all men are free. The problem is (and here Kierkegaard‘s arguments do help 
us to spot it) that whenever we believe that states have historical primacy over 
their citizens we find ourselves ending in states like Hitler‘s and Stalin‘s. 
Kierkegaard on the other side would argue that the dissolution of the social 
bonds could never happen because individuals do find themselves in the 
(objective and thus necessary) general social context of their time and so a 
(necessary) part of their selves is living with other individuals in structured 
communities. 
Kierkegaard‘s approach nevertheless leaves us with two very important 
problems: either a) we try to become selves grounding our existence only in 
God and therefore the ultimate individual interest always lies in something 
outside our world, or b) we see our communities as something that exists only 
to serve our individual needs. 
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Starting with the latter, the problem is quite obvious. We will eventually find 
our societies being totally divided into separate individual wills without having 
any possibility of establishing a dynamic social bond between these 
individuals. If the danger of the crowd is a real one, equally real is the danger 
of social decomposition. As for the first side of the problem, whenever we 
ultimately turn to something totally different from us (and Kierkegaard‘s God is 
the ultimately different) in order to ground ourselves, we have to face the 
possibility of having no ground at all. Even worse, we face the possibility of 
turning our back on our actual (social and historical) needs. God‘s 
transcendence in Kierkegaard‘s thought constitutes the absolute centre of our 
(historical) existence. Can we however have a normal and functional social 
existence, if we believe that we cannot ground this social existence only in 
ourselves who constitute it? 
For all the above mentioned reasons I argue that we cannot follow either 
Hegel or Kierkegaard. We need both of them. We need to be able to create 
bigger wholes than ourselves and we need also to permanently fight against 
any kind of oppression of our individual human rights by the state. Human 
history in fact has proved to be a permanent struggle between these two 
needs.  
Hegel can turn us into obedient puppets of his reason and Kierkegaard can 
lock us at the deepest cells of our individuality. We cannot do, however, 
without both our social dimension and our individuality. At the end, their 
metaphysical claims are useful as long as we can synthesise them, otherwise 
we are doomed to live a one-dimensional historical existence. 
Synthesis of their epistemological claims 
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Hegel and Kierkegaard appear to make contradictory epistemological claims. 
Hegel argues that we can understand our historical past (in fact he calls that 
understanding ‗absolute notion‘ in PS) and Kierkegaard argues that we can 
never acquire this kind of historical knowledge. Furthermore, Hegel in his 
introduction to Philosophy of Right says emphatically that all we can have 
from history is this knowledge of the past, while Kierkegaard claims that we 
should be interested in deciding about our future instead of trying to acquire 
historical knowledge. 
Is it really possible to create a legitimate (philosophically) synthesis of their 
views, while it looks as if their claims are utterly contradictory? My answer is 
yes, we can. My point is that we can use Kierkegaard to ‗amend‘ Hegel and 
we can, at the end, accomplish a synthesis of their epistemological claims.  
Hegel‘s claim about our historical knowledge refers always to the past without 
arguing that we can possibly know what will happen in the future. In fact Hegel 
argues that we cannot even use our previous historical knowledge in order to 
change our future: 
Rulers, statesmen and nations are often advised to learn the lesson 
of historical experience. But what experience and history teach is 
this—that nations and governments have never learned anything 
from history or acted upon any lessons they might have drawn from 
it. Each age and each nation finds itself in such peculiar 
circumstances, in such a unique situation, that it can and must 
make decisions with reference to itself alone…Amid the pressure of 
great events, a general principle is of no help, and it is not enough 
to look back on similar situations [in the past]; for pale recollections 
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are powerless before the stress of the moment, and impotent 
before the life and freedom of the present. (The instruction to be 
gained from history is not to be found in any reflections we may 
base on it. No two instances are exactly alike; they are never 
sufficiently identical for us to say that what was best on one 
occasion will also be best on another. Each nation has its own 
problems, and there is no need to look to history to discover the 
correct course.        (IPH, 21).142  
What follows from the above mentioned statement is that Hegel‘s idea of 
knowledge refers only to the past and that this knowledge is totally a 
philosophical knowledge of the purpose and the meaning of the historical 
past. Even with this (necessary) explication, Hegel still claims that we can 
know and understand the ‗why‘ of history. By interrogating the rational 
dialectical process of our past we can arrive at a secure knowledge of 
history‘s purpose. But I am afraid that in the end this is ‗wishful thinking‘ by 
itself. His presupposition that freedom is the ultimate end of history remains 
purely a presupposition. He has no way of proving that his interpretation is 
anything else but an interpretation and nothing more. 
Kierkegaard‘s arguments against finding any hidden necessities within history 
can help us understand better where Hegel‘s fault lies. We do not have only to 
deal with mere historical occurrences; we have to interpret them also. In this 
(necessary) interpretation lies the very problem of acquiring knowledge of the 
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 I quote such a long extract from Hegel‘s IPH because I believe that here Hegel 
emphatically defines his opinion on the use of historical knowledge. We do not try to know our 
past in order to use this knowledge in dealing with future events. Hegel‘s knowledge is purely 
the philosophical knowledge of the meaning and the purpose of the historical past. The 
present and the future are open and they will not allow us to use our historical knowledge 
upon them. 
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‗why‘ in history. Kierkegaard argues (very effectively in my opinion) that we 
cannot come to a unique and totally necessary conclusion regarding the ‗why‘ 
of history. Hegel cannot prove that he absolutely knows any ‗why‘. 
Kierkegaard‘s view, on the other hand, that if we want to overcome doubt we 
have to use our will, does not imply that we can arbitrarily create our historical 
knowledge. Kierkegaard simply stresses the fact that we will always have to 
will in order to overcome the doubt that relative historical knowledge brings. If 
historical knowledge cannot provide beyond any possible doubt the reason 
why something happened in one way rather than another, we must exercise 
our will to believe that something happened in a particular way. 
Every actuality is one actualised possibility among infinite numbers of 
possibilities. Kierkegaard then is right (in my opinion) to argue that we can 
never explain through knowledge the reason that a historical fact occurred 
rather than another. In this way, Kierkegaard stresses the need for us to 
decide about our present and our future. This claim is an existential and not 
an epistemological claim, but it is grounded in Kierkegaard‘s former 
epistemological argument. 
Do we have then to stop trying to acquire historical knowledge? Do we have 
to abandon our epistemological interest in knowing our past? My answer is 
no, we can continue our epistemological effort, while understanding the limits 
of our epistemological knowledge. Kierkegaard here can be used to ‗amend‘ 
Hegel‘s view, i.e. Kierkegaard can help us look at our history with our eyes on 
the future. Our interest in history must lie in deciding about our future goals. 
For Kierkegaard, history is something that is always connected to our care 
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and our interests. History cannot be defined only as the effort to bring to light 
hidden purposes of the past. 
We need Hegel‘s view in order to be able to understand better and more 
deeply the forces that shaped our past. We need Hegel‘s view in order to 
relate more deeply to our historical past. Searching for meanings and 
purposes is a crucial part of our history. We need Kierkegaard‘s view also, 
because otherwise we will find ourselves having a future empty of our own 
interests. Hegel makes human individuals look quite unimportant in the 
making of history. States and reason always have the last word. In this way, 
we face the danger of not even trying to create our personal history. 
Kierkegaard gives us the most important role in history. Even if we are small 
and insignificant in the general course of history and do not belong to the 
‗elite‘ of the ‗world-leaders‘, we still have to make our own personal historical 
decisions. 
Hegel‘s view of history translates everything into a ‗reflective‘ game. We 
reflect on our past, this is the best that we can do. Kierkegaard‘s view 
neglects the general historical forces and concentrates purely on human 
individuals. It seems then that, if we do not try to synthesise their views, we 
cannot find a middle ground where we can combine every single active 
historical force so as to have a more complete historical knowledge.  
I argue that we need to try always to realise that history begins with personal 
actions and decisions but history is ultimately shaped by other powers. We 
must then have simultaneously two dimensions in our historical research: a) 
the dimension of personal active involvement and b) the dimension of the 
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existence of general currents that are shaping our history under the surface of 
personal aspirations.  
Hegel and Kierkegaard underline different aspects of our existence. Hegel‘s 
stress is on the social dimension of our lives. Kierkegaard‘s stress is on the 
personal dimension of our existences. We need both of them in order to have 
a complete existence. Ultimately, if we put them against each other we 
mutilate our historical existence. If we consider them irrelevant to each other 
we remove the possibility of them giving us a deeper understanding of our 
selves. 
Kierkegaard‘s relations to Hegel re-reconsidered 
 
My thesis regarding the relations of Hegel‘s philosophy of history to 
Kierkegaard‘s approach to history is that: a) they do represent opposite 
approaches to history and the historical without however being incompatible 
or incomparable and irrelevant to each other and b) both thinkers are equally 
needed for a more complete picture of history and the historical and a 
synthesis of their views on history is philosophically both legitimate and 
profitable. 
 In order however to defend my thesis in the best possible way, I have to 
closely examine these theses that contradict my two claims. Thulstrup argues 
that Hegel and Kierkegaard are totally opposite to each other and thus utterly 
incompatible. I do not agree with him. Stewart on the other hand claims that 
Hegel does philosophy while Kierkegaard is interested in theology and thus 
we cannot compare them. For Stewart these two thinkers are utterly irrelevant 
to each other and thus I do not agree with Stewart either.  
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Sartre recognises the need to arrive at a synthesis of Hegel‘s and 
Kierkegaard‘s views on history but he never proceeds to any possible one and 
thus he (partly) opposes the second part of my thesis. 
Taylor talks about the possibility of a synthesis but he nevertheless argues 
that Hegel is the one who can give us a better grasp on history and the 
historical and thus he opposes my claim that both Hegel and Kierkegaard are 
equally needed for a more complete picture of the nature of history and the 
historical. 
James Bogen, Peter J. Mehl, Merold Westphal, and P. Christopher Smith also 
deal with the problem of the nature of the relations between Hegel‘s view on 
history and Kierkegaard‘s approach to history. Their claims also differ (partly 
or totally) from mine and thus I have also to defend my thesis against their 
arguments.143 
Niels Thulstrup 
Both Thulstrup and Stewart examine the general philosophical relations 
between the overall philosophies of Hegel and Kierkegaard. The object of the 
current research however is about their thoughts on history. This means that I 
will limit my own discussion of their arguments insofar as they relate to the 
nature of history and the historical.  
Thulstrup argues that Hegel and Kierkegaard are utterly incompatible.  
He stresses that: 
We must not, then, let ourselves be distracted by the many purely 
verbal (terminological) similarities between Kierkegaard and Hegel, 
                                                 
143
 I choose to cite the claims of the above mentioned thinkers here in a separate section 
because I want to strongly point out their oppositions to my claims. In this way I believe that: 
a) I will do justice to their theses by presenting them separately from my own thesis and b) I 
will be able to defend better my claims by opposing them directly with every different claim 
from the relevant bibliography. 
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any more than, as for example, by his tripartite anthropological 
definitions in The Concept of Dread and in other writings, which to 
a cursory view could bring to mind the famous Hegelian triads.144 
Even if Thulstrup is right in his claim that Kierkegaard merely uses similar 
verbal (terminological) schemes to Hegel, this merely verbal similarity, could 
be an indication of a kind of relation of Kierkegaard to Hegel. Thulstrup carries 
the burden to prove his claims but he neglects to give us his proofs. He 
merely states that: ‗The complete disharmony is evident in every point…‘145 
Further on Thulstrup mentions that Hegel believes that history ‗advances in 
―quantitative determinations‖, which for Kierkegaard means that there can be 
no talk of responsibility in this history…‘146  
I agree with Thulstrup that Kierkegaard‘s claim about the historical agency of 
individuals contradicts Hegel‘s claim about the historical primacy of reason. 
Kierkegaard indeed underlines the individual‘s historical participation which 
brings also the individual‘s historical responsibility. That does not prove 
however that Hegel and Kierkegaard have ‗incompatible‘ views on that matter. 
We can have a synthesis of both views if we can understand that Hegel on the 
one hand focuses on the matter of the general historical outcome of a past 
period while Kierkegaard underlines the individual‘s responsibility in the 
creation of future history. More than that, their views are compatible because: 
a) both of them examine the same object, i.e. history, b) they represent 
different but not contradictory views on the historical phenomenon (Hegel 
examines history as macrocosm and Kierkegaard focuses on history as 
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microcosm) and c) although it is true that they disagree on the matter of who 
has historical agency (reason or individuals), both of them believe that ‗people 
are free‘ (Hegel argues that this is history‘s end and Kierkegaard claims that 
history is made freely by  individuals). 
Thulstrup rightly emphasises that Kierkegaard in the ‗Interlude‘ gives us his 
thoughts on the nature of history without however constructing a philosophy of 
history as Hegel does.147 He fails however to understand that Kierkegaard‘s 
arguments in PF, CA, SUD and TA can be viewed as a plausible main 
examination of history and the historical. In fact, he does not even analyse CA 
and TA. His analysis is completed with the examination of CUP.  
Thulstrup, besides this omission, fails completely to be aware of Kierkegaard‘s 
complex and multiple relations to Hegel‘s philosophy.148      
Jon Stewart 
Stewart quotes an extract from Kierkegaard‘s notes where Kierkegaard states 
that: ‗I feel what for me at times is an enigmatic respect for Hegel;‘149 Stewart 
also quotes at the end of this extract: ‗But, nevertheless, it is no less true that 
someone who is really tested in life, who in his need resorts to thought, will 
find Hegel comical despite all his greatness.‘150 
Here, in my opinion, we can detect Kierkegaard‘s ambivalence to Hegel in 
general. This attitude is a general characteristic of Kierkegaard‘s approach to 
Hegel‘s philosophy, i.e. he acknowledges Hegel‘s philosophical ‗greatness‘, 
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but at the same time he believes that whoever is ‗tested in life‘ has to find 
Hegel comical. 
Hegel ultimately fails, for Kierkegaard, to understand that ‗existence‘ (actual 
life), cannot be completely explained by theories, even the most insightful 
ones. In CUP Kierkegaard states that: 
The thinker who in all his thinking can forget to think conjointly that 
he is existing does not explain existence; he makes an attempt to 
cease to be a human being, to become a book or an objective 
something that only a Munchhausen can become…Even if a man 
his whole life through occupies himself exclusively with logic, he 
still does not become logic; he himself therefore exists in other 
categories… [E]xistence mocks the one who keeps on wanting to 
become purely objective.   (CUP, 93).  
Stewart also fails to understand that Kierkegaard‘s claims in the ‗Interlude‘ are 
attacking Hegel‘s claims about the ‗absolute notion‘ of history. Stewart claims 
that Kierkegaard (or Climacus) in the ‗Interlude‘ attacks Martensen‘s doctrine 
of immanence, so we cannot argue that Hegel‘s claims on the nature of 
history is under any attack.151  
Stewart argues that Kierkegaard‘s claims on necessity within existence cannot 
possibly be a refutation of Hegel‘s relevant views. He claims that when 
Kierkegaard argues against the claim that: ‗necessity is the unity of possibility 
and actuality‘ he argues against Kant and not against Hegel. Stewart rightly 
points out that Hegel speaks of a more elaborate and complicated relation 
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between necessity, possibility and actuality.152 He fails however to understand 
the philosophical implications of another of Hegel‘s statement that he quotes: 
‗It is true that necessity has been rightly defined as the unity of possibility and 
actuality.‘153 
Hegel here specifically takes this definition as ‗right‘. Even if Stewart is 
correct, and Kierkegaard is mainly attacking Kant, Hegel is also rejected here. 
Stewart cannot argue that Hegel has a more complicated view on that matter 
and thus cannot be rejected here, because Hegel also considers the definition 
of necessity as the ‗unity of possibility and actuality‘ to be a correct one.  
In general Stewart fails to understand—or fails to acknowledge—that we do 
not need to argue specifically against someone in order to reject him. All we 
need to do is to argue against positions that are common to many different 
philosophers and by doing so, we reject at the same time all these 
philosophers that share the same positions that are under attack. We do not 
therefore have to find out whether Kierkegaard argues against Martensen; all 
we need to do is to examine if the Kierkegaardian claims can be used also as 
arguments against Hegel.  
We do not need, for example, to know if Kierkegaard‘s claim that necessity 
cannot be brought into the past by knowing (apprehending theoretically) this 
past aims at Martensen specifically. All we need to know is that Hegel clearly 
claims that we can detect necessity in the past if we examine this past 
philosophically (his famous owl of Minerva in the introduction of PR denotes 
emphatically Hegel‘s claim). Even if Kierkegaard knew nothing about Hegel‘s 
position, we still have the philosophical right to consider his claim as a 
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rejection of Hegel‘s position. Stewart‘s claims that Kierkegaard rejects simple 
knowledge of events instead of ‗knowledge according to the Concept‘154 
cannot be right, precisely because, for Hegel, we can know history‘s 
necessities. In IPH Hegel states again and again that we can know history (I 
have already quoted enough of these statements in my first chapter). 
Stewart further argues that: ‗The incarnation is not central to Hegel‘s theory of 
history…‘155 I do not agree. Hegel cannot ground his philosophy of history 
without the Incarnation.156 Incarnation in fact, constitutes the ground of both 
Hegel and Kierkegaard‘s arguments on history. Their crucial difference lies in 
the fact that for Hegel Incarnation can make us recognise within us our 
cognitive ability to arrive at a historical knowledge of history‘s aims and 
history‘s meaning while for Kierkegaard Incarnation represents the absolute 
paradox. 
Stewart goes on to argue regarding the critique of ‗the absolute method‘ by 
Kierkegaard in the ‗Interlude‘ (PF, 78), that: 
At most the critical comments about ―the absolute method‖ can be 
conceived as a metalevel critique about what philosophy is and 
what sort of an account it can give (i.e., a conceptual account of 
history or a personal account of the ethical life of the individual).157 
Even if Stewart is right, we still have to accept that this ‗metalevel‘ critique is 
still a critique. Kierkegaard here argues specifically against Hegel. We cannot 
invalidate the Kierkegaardian rejection of the absolute method on the ground 
of being ‗metalevel‘. More than this, Kierkegaard states beyond any doubt that 
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Hegel‘s absolute method, when it is applied in historical sciences, is a ‗fixed 
idea‘. (PF, 78, in the same note that Stewart refers to). 
 Stewart concludes that: ‗…Hegel‘s doctrine of the modal categories is 
considerably different from what Climacus presents in the ―Interlude‖.‘158 His 
argument that for someone to oppose Kierkegaard against Hegel on that 
matter would be ‗ahistorical‘ because ‗it is clear that Kierkegaard‘s intent is to 
carry out a polemic against Martensen‘159 is characteristic of Stewart‘s refusal 
to accept the (very simple but totally valid philosophically) idea that we can 
argue against someone, even when we do not intend to, whenever our 
philosophical arguments go against his arguments. 
Stewart‘s argument that Kierkegaard (or Vigilius Haufniensis) took the concept 
of the ‗leap‘ from Hegel says nothing about the use of this concept by these 
two thinkers. Stewart admits that ‗Kierkegaard develops this concept in his 
own way and puts it into a different context;‘160 but he adds that ‗…the basic 
Hegelian meaning is still present…‘161 Stewart of course aims to oppose 
directly Thulstrup‘s claim that Kierkegaard was wholly against Hegel. There is 
no doubt that Stewart succeeds in solidly grounding his rejection of 
Thulstrup‘s claim. Kierkegaard indeed has many levels and many ways to 
relate himself and his thought to Hegel‘s philosophy. What Stewart does not 
do however is to acknowledge that Kierkegaard mainly takes parts of Hegel‘s 
arguments and turns them against Hegel. 
Even if the concept of leap has been taken from Hegel, Kierkegaard uses it to 
prove and signal the existence of historical freedom in contrast to the sphere 
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of logic. Stewart admits it clearly, but he, nevertheless, does not follow the 
natural conclusion, i.e. he refuses to understand that when Kierkegaard uses 
the ‗leap‘ in order to refer to historical existence denoting individual freedom of 
will and personal freedom of choice, he argues also against the use of the 
‗leap‘ in logic: 
The sphere of historical freedom is presumably introduced to 
constitute a contrast to the sphere of logic. In the former, transition 
and movement take place in terms of radical qualitative leaps from 
one state to another. By contrast, in logic there is only a gradual 
quantitative increase or decrease but no real radical change in kind 
and thus no real movement.162 
Stewart concludes by stating that Hegel does philosophy while Kierkegaard 
(being mainly a religious thinker) is interested in the religious life, so we 
cannot really take as serious philosophical arguments Kierkegaard‘s 
arguments against Hegel‘s philosophy. 
In a sense one can see the difference between them in the simple 
fact that Hegel is primarily interested in doing philosophy (in the 
modern sense of conceptual analysis), whereas Kierkegaard is 
not…Kierkegaard, by contrast, is perhaps best seen as a religious 
thinker, who is interested in the religious life of the individual. While 
this is of course fully legitimate on its own terms, it is not 
philosophy.163 
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    Stewart here fails to acknowledge that Kierkegaard is offering us solid 
philosophical arguments.164 Stewart, while fully exploring Kierkegaard‘s 
references (or possible allusions) to Hegel, cannot ultimately find common 
ground to relate them under the same object (philosophy).  
It is understandable for someone to take a side in a conflict and thus it is 
understandable for Stewart to take the side of Hegel in the conflict of 
Kierkegaard and Hegel in the matters of ‗existence‘, ‗actuality‘ and ‗faith‘. 
What is not understandable here, however, is for Stewart to deny that is 
possible for Kierkegaard to respond to Hegel with legitimate and wholly valid 
philosophical arguments. 
Stewart considers The Sickness unto Death as an attack on Martensen and 
as a general attack against the established church.165 He gives us an 
amazingly elaborate analysis of Kierkegaard‘s use of dialectics in this text. I 
do agree with him that Hegel is not the main target of Kierkegaard‘s critique in 
SUD. My argument however (as it is displayed in the third chapter) is that 
Kierkegaard in SUD completes his arguments on history by giving us his 
structure of the human self. This self is inseparable from history and is 
grounded on the absolute ‗other‘. This absolutely different (God) grounds our 
(historical) existence. The very existence of despair can be explained as an 
(actual and thus historical) indication of this structure. 
Stewart does not take into account that the Kierkegaardian analysis of the 
human self in SUD can be used as a philosophical argument against Hegel‘s 
claim that individuals are not the main historical agents. In fact, this is my 
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general critique of Stewart‘s effort: he fails to acknowledge the philosophical 
implications of Kierkegaard‘s arguments against Hegel‘s philosophy of history. 
In fact, Kierkegaard‘s philosophical value can be proved through the help he 
gives us to find the (possible) errors in Hegel‘s philosophy. We need 
Kierkegaard‘s philosophical arguments to be able to point out possible 
Hegelian philosophical defects. More than that, we need Kierkegaard to have 
a different view of Hegel‘s (possible) incompleteness: 
A thinker erects a huge building, a system, a system embracing the 
whole of existence, world history, etc., and if his personal life is 
considered, to our amazement the appalling and ludicrous 
discovery is made that he himself does not personally live in this 
huge, domed palace but in a shed alongside it, or in a doghouse, or 
at best in the janitor‘s quarters. Were he to be reminded of this by 
one single word, he would be insulted. For he does not fear to be in 
error if he can only complete the system—with the help of being in 
error.     (SUD, 43-44). 
Jean-Paul Sartre 
Sartre on the other side understands Kierkegaard‘s possible philosophical 
use: ‗It must be borne in mind that this opposition between foreseen and lived 
experience was made manifest around 1850 in the opposition between Hegel 
and Kierkegaard.‘166 Sartre stresses that Hegel and Kierkegaard articulate two 
different ontological visions.167 Sartre thus, recognises the philosophical 
significance of Kierkegaard‘s thought. As Stewart rightly states, Hegel and 
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Kierkegaard do approach the problems of this world differently, but this does 
not render Kierkegaard‘s approach ‗non-philosophical‘.  
Dealt with in advance by Hegel, subjectivity becomes a moment of 
the objective spirit, a determination of culture. But if nothing of lived 
experience can elude knowledge, its reality remains irreducible.168 
Sartre is right to point out the ‗irreducibility‘ of personal existence, as a distinct 
trait of the Kierkegaardian philosophy. What he fails to mention however is the 
possibility of a synthesis of Hegel‘s and Kierkegaard‘s views. Sartre insists on 
stressing the ontological hiatus between Hegel‘s and Kierkegaard‘s thought 
without leaving us any possibility of finding a common ground somewhere in 
the middle. He implies however the need to try to synthesise their views on 
history when he gives us his explanation of these views in this way: 
… [I]n an individual the rationality of History is experienced 
irreducibly as madness, as an inner accident, expressive of random 
encounters… Man, irremediable singularity, is the being through 
whom the universal comes into the world; once fundamental 
chance starts to be lived, it assumes the form of necessity. Lived 
experience, we discover in Kierkegaard, is made up of non-
significant accidents of being in so far as they are surpassed 
towards a significance they did not possess at the beginning…169 
Sartre argues that on the one hand we have the epistemological 
apprehension of history in Hegel, while on the other hand Kierkegaard argues 
in favour of the irreducibility of individual existence to any cognitive 
apprehension. He is able to understand that we do need a synthesis of both of 
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these views in order for us to arrive at a more complete understanding of 
history but he never proceeds to provide any such synthesis. 
Mark C. Taylor 
Mark C. Taylor argues that: 
In a certain sense, Hegel brings modern philosophy to completion 
by transforming Descartes‘ turn to the subject into a comprehensive 
speculative system in which epistemology and ontology are 
creatively integrated to form absolute subjectivity, which 
simultaneously constitutes and surpasses individual selves. In 
Hegel‘s system, philosophy becomes the historical and history 
becomes philosophical.170 
I agree that in Hegel‘s thought, history and philosophy directly refer to each 
other. Spirit acquires its self-knowledge through the historical process and this 
self-knowledge can (and ought to) be expressed better in theoretical 
(philosophical in Hegel‘s jargon) terms. I also agree with Taylor when he 
states that: 
Kierkegaard, however, remained unconvinced of both the 
comprehensiveness and the comprehensibility of Hegelianism. In 
the machinations of the system, he detected traces of something 
that Hegel could neither escape nor comprehend… To think 
―beyond absolute knowledge,‖ it is necessary to think otherness 
without reducing it to sameness and to think difference without 
reducing it to identity.171 
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Kierkegaard indeed denies the (theoretical and actual) possibility of arriving at 
any kind of ‗absolute knowledge‘. History and the historical cannot be the 
object of any kind of absolute knowledge. What Taylor fails to acknowledge is 
that Kierkegaard is not arguing in favour of any kind of ‗anti-social‘ tendencies. 
Taylor admits that: ‗Kierkegaard does not deny that there are social 
dimensions of selfhood. As a matter of fact, he agrees with Hegel‘s 
characterization of spirit as at once universal and individual.‘172 He 
nevertheless concludes that: ‗The birth of such spiritual individuality requires 
severing the umbilical cord of sociality through the difficult labor of 
differentiating self and other.‘173  
Taylor thus fails to understand that the creation of self as Kierkegaard 
analyses it, does not oppose society per se. Kierkegaard argues against the 
point of view that: a) gives primacy to communities over their members and b) 
the claim that being a self is, first of all, a collective procedure. Taylor, more 
than that, fails to fully capture Kierkegaard‘s stress on the need to ground 
ourselves (and thus our societies) in something totally different from us. Hegel 
insists that God (or the Absolute Spirit) lives continuously within our universe. 
In philosophical terms, Hegel and Kierkegaard argue in favour of different 
grounds. 
It is not however, simply the problem of how I behave within my society, it is 
not even (only) the problem of where I ground my existence. Being a Self for 
Kierkegaard is a duty that freely creates the human self and its history. 
Being an individual cannot even be expressed with Hegel‘s terminology and 
method. Being a Self, for Kierkegaard, is a matter of free will and free choice. 
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If we decide, as Taylor does, to limit Kierkegaard‘s analysis of self in a 
religious procedure, we mutilate Kierkegaard‘s thought, because we fail to 
include the direct historical core of this self. If we decide to view Kierkegaard‘s 
analysis of self in terms of ‗anti-social‘ tendency, we fail to understand that 
Kierkegaard makes a very crucial (philosophical) point: if we forget that selves 
must be created through personal individual decisions, we will eventually 
loose our authenticity.  Being social remains, as Taylor admits, for 
Kierkegaard, a very important dimension of self-structure. Being an authentic 
and thus distinct (from every one else) self is the core of this self. 
Taylor however, allows for a possible synthesis of Hegel‘s and Kierkegaard‘s 
view: ‗It might, then, be possible to imagine a non-logo-centric logos, which is 
open rather than closed and thus leaves space and time for chance.‘174 Taylor 
however does not give us any such synthesis and he remains focused on the 
Hegelian arguments. 
James Bogen 
James Bogen rightly points out that Hegel and Kierkegaard ground selfhood in 
different foundations.175 He concludes that for Hegel, the individual cannot be 
a self by his own will and actions. The individual can acquire a self by being a 
part of reason.176 My point is that neither Hegel‘s approach nor Kierkegaard‘s 
can represent on their own the ‗totality‘ of the procedure of being a self. Hegel 
points to intersubjectivity; Kierkegaard underlines the irreducibility of our 
personal responsibility. We need however, a synthesis of these approaches if 
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we want to arrive at a more complete understanding of the problem of the 
creation of the self. 
Peter J. Mehl 
Peter J. Mehl is moving at the same direction (of a possible synthesis) when 
he tries to present to us with a possible ‗reconstruction‘ of Kierkegaard‘s view 
on selfhood in a Hegelian manner.177 My objection lies in his methodology. He 
chooses to explain Kierkegaard with Hegelian methods, without 
understanding the danger of mistreating Kierkegaard‘s view in this way. If 
Kierkegaard is explained in full Hegelian fashion we will significantly distort his 
philosophical points. We need (in my opinion) to first understand 
Kierkegaard‘s arguments in the general ‗existential‘ context in which he uses 
them, and then try to proceed to a possible synthesis with Hegel‘s views. 
Mehl however makes an interesting point that Kierkegaard: 
… ]I]s compelled to postulate a transcendent standard as the only 
adequate measure because he thinks that the human desire for 
existential orientation can mean only ultimate security and final rest 
in the flux and contingency of everyday life.178 
I also believe that Kierkegaard ultimately needs to find an objective ground of 
the flux and contingency of everyday life. Kierkegaard thus cannot complete 
the analysis of the human self without, in the end, resorting to an absolute. 
Both Hegel and Kierkegaard cannot avoid describing something that is 
supposed to be indescribable, i.e. they refer directly to an absolute. Hegel 
believes that his absolute is approachable and describable because it refers 
to a theoretical construction and Kierkegaard roots his approach in the 
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acceptance of the paradox. My point is that both of them are confined within 
the limits of their own final aims without understanding that what they analyse 
is not the whole picture but specific fragments of it. 
Merold Westphal 
Merold Westphal gives us strong arguments against those who believe that 
Kierkegaard‘s thought is ‗asocial‘.179 Westphal rightly points out that 
Kierkegaard is against the social tendency which results in the deification of 
society which in the end ‗dehumanizes‘ and ‗demonizes‘ itself. As Westphal 
states: 
Modern society deifies itself by taking itself to be the absolute point 
of reference both for itself and for its individual members. It 
dehumanizes itself by becoming mass society, a herd from which 
the individual in any ethically or religiously significant sense has 
been eliminated. The result is a demonic monster as powerful as it 
is unprincipled…180 
Kierkegaard cannot be blamed for being (or telling us to be) asocial. 
Kierkegaard‘s thoughts on politics however share common traits with Hegel‘s 
thoughts and that is something we should bear in mind whenever we want to 
understand his views on the nature of the relations between society and its 
members. Kierkegaard recognises that human beings have to live together by 
generating social bonds between them.181 
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What is crucial however for our analysis is that, by understanding that 
Kierkegaard‘s structure of self does not deprive it of its social context, we can 
have a better apprehension of Kierkegaard‘s opposition to some implications 
of Hegel‘s claim that structured communities have historical primacy over their 
members. As Westphal argues: ‗The fatal flaw of the Hegelian philosophy and 
of his ‗present age‘ is a tendency toward self-deification of the We.‘182  
Kierkegaard‘s belief that our existence is grounded in something totally 
different and outside us (God) is his answer to Hegel‘s belief that his system 
has achieved systematic (theoretical) finality, which, for Kierkegaard, is a kind 
of deification of Hegel‘s (theoretical) system. As Westphal underlines: ‗Thus 
the claim of the Hegelian system to have achieved systematic finality is a 
thinly disguised attempt to claim divine status for this particular expression of 
human wisdom.‘183  
Kierkegaard‘s critique of mass society is a critique against certain 
philosophical implications which necessarily follow from Hegel‘s ‗apotheosis‘ 
of states and structured communities. On the other hand, Hegel‘s analysis of 
the historical importance of societies and of the relational (social) nature of 
individual selves is an answer to the problems that any kind of ‗individualism‘ 
must, at the end, face. Hegel and Kierkegaard thus, need each other to 
accomplish a more complete and fair picture of the relations between 
societies and individuals. The crucial aim of any possible synthesis of their 
views on that relation would be to secure both the significance and 
authenticity of the individuals and the political role of their communities. 
Otherwise, we will end either in totalitarianism or in social insularism. 
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Westphal fails to acknowledge that Hegel‘s views are as equally necessary 
and important as Kierkegaard‘s. He is right to ‗use‘ Kierkegaard‘s arguments 
to point out the possible dangers of Hegel‘s approach, he is not right however 
to refuse to see that Kierkegaard also presents us with one-sided views. 
Westphal argues that ultimately Kierkegaard is the only one who can give us 
the right perspective in regard to the relations of the ‗I‘ and the ‗we‘. I argue 
that we fail to fully understand the relations between individuals and their 
communities when we choose to focus only either on the individuals or their 
societies. 
Unhappy consciousness 
There is a final question that we need to address when we try to understand 
the relations between Hegel and Kierkegaard. Hegel in PS describes a certain 
kind of self-consciousness which is unable to grasp that is utterly united with 
the objects of its thoughts. Hegel calls this self-consciousness an ‗unhappy 
consciousness‘. It is unhappy because it cannot fill the gap between itself as a 
thinking subject and its thoughts as its objects. This ‗unhappy consciousness‘ 
thus, is doomed, in Hegel‘s opinion, to never being ‗satisfied‘ because of this 
internal and permanent hiatus. As Hegel states: ‗… the Unhappy 
Consciousness is the consciousness of self as a dual-natured, merely 
contradictory being.‘ (PS, 126, italics are not mine).  
Is then Kierkegaard an ‗unhappy consciousness‘, who is unable to find peace 
and satisfaction because he cannot unite himself as a thinking subject and his 
thoughts (about history and the historical for the purposes of the current 
analysis)? If the answer is yes, Hegel‘s theoretical system incorporates 
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Kierkegaard‘s thought and thus, we have solved once and for all the problem 
of their relations. 
Sartre by underlining the irreducibility of Kierkegaard‘s stance says no to the 
above mentioned question. The central argument of this current analysis is 
also that Kierkegaard represents the limits of Hegel‘s system and Hegel does 
the same for Kierkegaard‘s thought. Kierkegaard thus cannot be absorbed in 
Hegel‘s ‗absolute system‘ and Hegel cannot be nullified or invalidated by 
Kierkegaard‘s arguments. We need both of them in order for us to arrive to a 
‗fuller picture‘. 
P. Christopher Smith examines the same question and his answer is that it: 
‗… is in fact Kierkegaard who incorporates Hegel… Kierkegaard has… 
shattered Hegel‘s claim to infinite absolute knowledge and broken out of the 
hold of philosophical reflection.‘184 Smith underlines that Kierkegaard can 
show us the fact that ‗… Hegel in staying on the conscious surface of the 
phenomenon cannot penetrate to the unconscious depths of it.‘185 Smith thus 
refuses even to see the possibility of a synthesis. For him, Kierkegaard, 
through his analysis of despair, shows us that such ‗unhappiness‘‘ is not the 
result of ‗self-conscious‘ thoughts but: ‗… such unhappiness and self-
abasement is precisely the self‘s unwillingness to abandon its finite self 
humbly to God‘s forgiveness.‘186 
Smith here by referring to Kierkegaard‘s analysis of despair as an analysis 
that incorporates Hegel‘s thought, makes us understand a very interesting 
point. If we believe that either Hegel is utterly and completely right or if we 
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believe that Kierkegaard is so, we will necessarily end by admitting that either 
Hegel or Kierkegaard incorporates the other. 
This gives us another reason to try to stay away from such views. We have 
already discussed the dangers that lie within ‗absolute‘ points of view. The 
only way to avoid such dangers is on the one hand to refuse to regard either 
Hegel or Kierkegaard as the only and the wholly ‗possessor‘ of the truth and 
on the other hand to try to proceed to a synthesis of their views. 
Epilogue 
Instead of any further arguments or analysis I would like Hegel and 
Kierkegaard to ‗write‘ my epilogue. In the following citations both thinkers 
recognise that faith and philosophy (philosophy and faith) are sturdily 
interconnected. If this is how these two thinkers view philosophy and faith, 
then the prospect of absolutely binding Hegel to philosophy and Kierkegaard 
to faith is utterly deceptive and the possibility of synthesising their views 
becomes even more legitimate. 
… man has a natural sense or consciousness of a supersensible 
world and an obligation to the divine. If nothing whatever in our own 
hearts responded to an external challenge to virtue and religion, if 
there were no strings in our own nature from which this challenge 
resounded, then Jesus‘ endeavor to inspire men to virtue and a 
better religion would have had the same character and the same 
outcome as St. Anthony of Padua‘s zeal in preaching to fish…187  
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If philosophy cannot define me more precisely, then to the best of 
my judgment its position does not become less unpleasant than 
mine and then, despite our great differences, we have a 
partnership. I am so obtuse that philosophy cannot become 
understandable to me. The opposite of this is that philosophy is so 
sagacious that it cannot comprehend my obtuseness.188 
Faith can be a ‗natural sense‘ and an ‗obligation to the divine‘. Hegel leaves 
the door open for something beyond philosophy. This duty, this natural 
disposition of human beings can play, does play a significant role in the shape 
of our world. It must be noted that Hegel here does not refer to religion as 
something inferior to philosophy. Human nature and human duty incorporate 
faith as one of their vital elements. 
Kierkegaard (in his notoriously playful manner) speaks of a ‗partnership‘ 
between his position and philosophy‘s. Ironic or not, Kierkegaard chooses to 
allow philosophy to become his interlocutor. Philosophy, even the ‗over-
sagacious‘ one, will always try to define Kierkegaard‘s claims; and 
Kierkegaard, obtuse or not, will always try to comprehend philosophy. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Heidegger’s response to the problem of history 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that Hegel‘s and Kierkegaard‘s responses to 
the problem of history are one-sided and a synthesis of their views is required 
in order to acquire a fuller and richer picture of the nature of history. Hegel 
points to knowledge of the past as the only objective feature of history, while 
Kierkegaard emphasises the role of personal choice in making history. A 
tension is created thus between an ‗objective‘ and epistemological view of 
history and a ‗subjective‘ and ethical one. Both views leave crucial elements of 
history out of their analysis of the nature of history. 
The synthesis of their views is a way to try to do justice to the problem of 
history. In this way Hegel and Kierkegaard stop being treated merely as 
philosophical enemies189 with contradictory views on history. Through 
synthesis we arrive at a more complete picture of the nature of history. This 
synthesis, however, must be able to fulfil one basic demand: the demand to 
present a full picture of the nature of history.190  
Martin Heidegger argues that neither Hegel, nor Kierkegaard (nor even their 
synthesis), provide the appropriate approach to history. Heidegger argues that 
an adequate approach to the problem of history is not possible unless history 
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is grasped neither as an object to be known by the faculties of our cognition 
nor as a personal (and thus purely subjective) adventure nor even as 
synthesis of both approaches. History, instead, is a matter of the most primary 
condition of human beings. He argues that the very procedure that makes 
human beings being human beings is their capacity to ‗temporalise‘ their 
existence. Heidegger thus argues that history directly refers to the most basic 
function of human nature. 
Heidegger therefore claims that we will fail to grasp history if we follow Hegel‘s 
or Kierkegaard‘s approaches (or even a synthesis of their approaches), first, 
because their methods do not properly analyse the nature of history and, 
second, because both of them fail to acknowledge the crucial role that history 
plays for human beings. Heidegger‘s answer to the problem of history 
(according to his view) at the same time contains and surpasses Hegel‘s and 
Kierkegaard‘s views on history.  
Heidegger‘s views history neither as a matter of epistemology nor as a 
necessary production of personal choices, nor as an overall synthesis of both 
theories. While Heidegger (as we shall see) refers to both the communal and 
personal aspects of history, he makes a crucial philosophical shift away from 
history understood through relations of Subject-Object to history as 
ontologically grounded in the structure of being human. In this way, Heidegger 
presents a view of history that, while encompassing the Hegelian and the 
Kierkegaardian views, nevertheless approaches history in a quite different 
way from theirs. History for him is an ontological problem. 
This is the reason why, in this thesis, I turn to Heidegger‘s approach 
separately from and after Hegel‘s and Kierkegaard‘s approaches. Heidegger 
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argues that his view is neither a supplementary one to theirs nor of the same 
philosophical ground.  
In the first part of this chapter I give a close analysis of the Heideggerian 
approach focussing mainly in his texts The Concept of Time,191 History of the 
Concept of Time,192 and Being and Time.193 In the second part I analyse the 
relation of the Heideggerian approach to the Hegelian and the Kierkegaardian 
approach. In the third and final part I present possible problems regarding his 
effort to redefine time and history. 
Part I 
Heidegger considers metaphysics to be strictly connected to human 
existence: ―Metaphysics is not some discipline of knowledge…metaphysics is 
a fundamental occurrence within human Dasein.‘194Heidegger thus 
understands metaphysics in a very different manner from either Hegel or 
Kierkegaard. For the last two, metaphysics is a distinct philosophical field 
quite distinct from human existence within the world.195 
From CT onwards Heidegger aims to re-think and redefine the whole Western 
philosophical tradition from a totally new point of departure and in a fresh way. 
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 Martin Heidegger, The Concept of Time, translated by William Mcneill, (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1992). (Hereafter CT). 
192
 Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, translated by Theodore Kisiel 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985). (Hereafter HCT). 
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 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2007). (Hereafter BT). 
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 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, translated by William 
Mcneill and Nicholas Walker, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), 
p. 9. 
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 ‗Dasein‘ in the Heideggerian philosophical jargon always refers to human existence in the 
world. In this way, Heidegger puts metaphysics within human worldly existence. 
 Hegel regards metaphysics to be part of his own ‗Logic‘ and considers it to be different from 
the mere human existence in the world. Although it can be argued that Hegel‘s ‗metaphysics‘ 
is nothing but a part of this spatio-temporal world, my opinion is that Hegel‘s metaphysics  are 
not specifically focused on the human existence. Hegel‘s ‗absolute‘ exists within this world but 
does not refer (only) to human beings. 
Kierkegaard on the other side considers metaphysics to be something that is totally 
‗disinterested‘ and thus something that is totally apart from the passionate human 
engagement with the world. 
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As Hannah Arendt boldly claims: ‗Heidegger never thinks ―about‖ something; 
he thinks something.‘196 We can detect here a basic element of Heidegger‘s 
philosophical enterprise. To think ‗about‘ something means that thinking 
presupposes someone who thinks and something which is being thought and 
a necessary ‗distance‘ between them. To ‗think something‘ alludes to a 
possible overcoming of the ontological distance between a thinking subject 
and the object of this thinking. 
Heidegger argues that every single philosophical effort, which tries to explain 
our experience of the world from the point of view of a thinking subject, falls 
short.197 As Piotr Hoffman underlines: 
The subjectivity of the self supplies both the point of departure and 
the validating ground for various philosophical attempts at a 
reconstruction of our knowledge of the world. One of Heidegger‘s 
aims in Being and Time was to question and to overcome this 
subjectivist tradition of modern philosophy.198 
To be able to ask questions and ask them in the right way is always better 
than trying to answer questions which are asked unreflectively. Only through 
questioning, Heidegger argues, can we understand ourselves and our world 
more fundamentally. He states this point emphatically at the end of his 
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 Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, edited by Michael Murray, (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1978), p. 296. 
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 Heidegger‘s essay The Age of the World Picture, can offer us a very illuminating example 
of Heidegger‘s approach. See for example what Heidegger states when he refers to modern 
sciences: ‗But the establishing of a law is accomplished with reference to the ground plan of 
the object-sphere. That ground plan furnishes a criterion and constrains the anticipatory 
representing of the conditions.‘ Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, ‗The Age of the World Picture‘, translated by William Lovitt, (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1977), p. 121.   
Heidegger argues that the way our ‗project‘ is understood by us (here modern physics), 
presupposes in almost every aspect our methods and our conclusions. So he argues that: ‗On 
the foundation of their character as ongoing activity, the sciences are creating for themselves 
the solidarity and unity appropriate to them.‘ Ibid, p. 125.  
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 The Cambridge Companion to HEIDEGGER, edited by Charles B. Guignon, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 195. 
 209 
lectures on the concept of time. The concluding words read: ‗Then Dasein 
would be: being questionable.‘ (CT, 22E).  
Therefore, one must always bear in mind these two basic traits of 
Heideggerian‘s thought, namely: his effort to bridge the gap between the 
subject and the object and his permanent insistence of doing philosophy 
within a purely aporetic context.199This provides the background to the 
opening of BT and its insistence on the ‗necessity of explicitly restating the 
question of being.‘ (BT, 21). He is attempting to restate the question. 
The main aspects of Heidegger‘s approach to history 
The main aspects of the Heideggerian approach to the problem of history are: 
a) Time does not exist. Human beings (Dasein) create time or (putting it in 
the Heideggerian dialect) temporalise their existence through their 
‗care‘. 
b) Human beings, while existing in the world, become authentic human 
beings only when they become conscious of the unavoidable fact of 
their personal death. When Dasein is confronted by the realisation of its 
certain and definite temporal end, it is able to fully and authentically 
grasp the meaning of its temporal existence. 
c) Dasein is historical in that history and temporality are the very modes of 
its existence. 
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 Paul Ricoeur points out Heidegger‘s intentions when he states that Heidegger‘s analyses: 
‗are aimed at destroying the claim of a knowing subject to be the measure of objectivity.‘ 
Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, p. 153. Hans-Georg Gadamer specifies even further this 
by stating that for Heidegger: ‗The true historical object is not an object at all, but the unity of 
the one and the other, a relationship in which exist both the reality of history and the reality of 
historical understanding.‘ Ibid, p. 183. Nullifying the distance between subject and object does 
not amount to a Hegelian union of the subject and the object. Heidegger, as both Ricoeur and 
Gadamer underline, tries to create a ‗proper hermeneutics.‘ Here his ‗aporia‘ functions as the 
main force which makes us continuously proceeding further and deeper into our 
hermeneutical effort. 
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d) History is therefore interconnected to Dasein and its nature.200  
Time 
As we have already pointed out, especially when we examined Kierkegaard‘s 
concept of history, in order to unravel the perplexities of history, we first have 
to approach the problem of time. Heidegger‘s strategy is similar. Before even 
mentioning history, he focuses on the concept of time.201 He begins with an 
Aristotelian definition of time: ‗Time is that within which events take place.‘ 
(CT, 3E). He then goes on to cite recent developments in physics (Einstein‘s 
relativity theory), namely: ‗Time…is nothing. It persists merely as a 
consequence of the events taking place in it.‘ (CT, 3E). His point here is to 
connect the philosophical-ontological definition of Aristotle with the scientific 
definition, in order to flag up the theoretical concurrence of these two 
approaches. For both of them time is nothing but the measurement of change. 
It exists merely as a second order symptom of the changes (or the ‗events‘ in 
Einstein‘s dialect). 
Heidegger then proceeds to provide three separate understandings of ‗times‘ 
(without, however, explaining why he considers them to be different or 
                                                 
200
 ‗Nature‘ here does not possess the connotations it does in Aristotle. We must be very 
careful about the use of the term ‗nature‘ in Heidegger‘s philosophy. His whole effort is 
focused on trying to prove the ‗dead end‘ of traditional ontology. Heidegger‘s ‗nature‘ answers 
the ‗how‘ and not the ‗what‘. Nature thus is not an essence but a necessary mode, an 
unavoidable ‗way of being‘. 
201
 It should be noted here, that Heidegger works first on a conceptional clarification of time. 
He states first that: ‗philosophy and science take place in the concept.‘ (CT, 2E). Before 
however someone starts considering Heidegger an absolute follower of Hegel, we must 
notice that Heidegger speaks negatively about this intellectual approach. In fact he almost 
taunts this approach to the problem of time by stating that: ‗If we achieve clarity about what a 
clock is, then the kind of apprehension thriving in physics thereby becomes alive, and so does 
the manner in which time gets the opportunity to show itself.‘ (CT, 2E).  
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distinct), namely: a) ‗the time that we encounter in everydayness‘, b) ‗the time 
of nature‘ and c) ‗world time‘. (CT, 3E).202  
On the back of this presentation, he goes to point out the philosophical 
‗deadlocks‘ which result from usual interpretations of time. If time is 
understood as ‗clock-time‘ (nine o‘clock in the morning for example), what 
exactly does this mean? What does it mean that time is what we see in our 
clocks? When we declare that ‗now the time is…‘ to what feature of time do 
we refer to exactly? 
Heidegger‘s intention here is to make apparent that on this understanding 
time always refers to ‗now‘. Yet, this ‗now‘ is utterly indefinable and opaque. 
Such an ‗everyday‘ temporality appears to be ultimately void of existence. And 
this is Heidegger‘s point: time cannot be approached by means of such naïve 
interpretations. But then, why do we need to have clocks? Are they not a 
definitive indication of the existence of time?  
Heidegger refers to Augustine for his answer. It is not the objective existence 
of time that disposes us to create clocks. It is, instead, ‗My very finding myself 
disposed…to what I measure when I measure time.‘ (CT, 6E). What is primary 
is the idea that the time of human beings is neither time itself nor the events 
which are taking place within space and time. We, as existing in the world as 
human beings (Dasein), are disposed to measure time. This disposition of 
ours is Dasein‘s basic function. 
Heidegger, then, is determined to approach the phenomenon of time through 
Dasein and not the other way around (as Aristotle and modern physics do). 
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 The advantage of Heidegger‘s analysis of time in CT is that he always begins from our 
everyday understanding of time, without however losing from his sight the philosophical and 
the scientific exposition of the nature of time. It is almost shocking for the readers of 
Heidegger‘s BT to see the profound easiness with which Heidegger explores the problems of 
time in CT, without however missing to point out his philosophical aims.  
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The question of what time is has pointed our inquiry in the direction 
of Dasein, if by Dasein we mean that entity in its being which we 
know as human life; this entity in the specificity of its Being, the 
entity that we each ourselves are, which each of us finds in the 
fundamental assertion: I am.  (CT, 6E). 
In this way, Heidegger reverses the traditional methodological approach to the 
problem of time. Instead of considering the human disposition to measure 
time as a direct product of either an objective time or the occurrence of 
change, he defines time as the direct product of a primary human disposition. 
The most important (and necessary) outcome of Heidegger‘s approach is that 
we (Dasein) create time through our disposition to be Dasein. Time becomes 
something characteristically human. But then, what about so-called ‗natural 
time‘? Can we speak of natural time when we define time as something which 
is produced entirely by human disposition?  
Nevertheless, the very heart of the Heideggerian approach to history is 
exactly that, Dasein is Dasein only and only when Dasein is ‗being temporal‘. 
In other words, this human disposition to temporality is the only authentic 
human disposition. 
Heidegger repeatedly makes this claim. Thus we read: 
Not ―time is‖ but ―Dasein qua time temporalizes its being.‖203 Time 
is not something which is found outside somewhere as a 
framework for world events. Time is even less something which 
whirs away inside in consciousness…The movement of nature 
which we define spatio-temporally, these movements do not flow 
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 The italics belong to the text. 
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off ‗in time‘ as ‗in‘ a channel. They are as such completely time-
free…They are encountered ‗in‘ the time which we ourselves are.  
(HCT, pp.319-320). 
We shall point to temporality as the meaning of the Being of that 
entity which we call ―Dasein‖. (BT, 38). Thus the fundamental 
ontological task of Interpreting Being as such includes working out 
the Temporality of Being. In the exposition of the problematic of 
Temporality the question of the meaning of Being will first be 
concretely answered.  (BT, 40). 
Time cannot be approached without dealing first with Dasein. Dasein‘s 
temporality is what produces time. In BT, Heidegger grounds his whole 
philosophical analysis on this presupposition. As Michael Allen Gillespie puts 
it: ‗The specific task of Being and Time, according to Heidegger, was to raise 
the question of the meaning of Being (Sein) through an analysis of human 
Being (Dasein) in terms of temporality.204   
To conclude this section, time does not exist, either as an objective dimension 
or as a derivative result of substantial changes. ‗Dasein, conceived in its most 
extreme possibility of Being, is time itself, not in time.‘205 (CT, 13E-14E).  
Care 
In the previous section, we have already seen the extent to which Heidegger 
changes the philosophical approach to the problem of time. His next step is to 
give us a phenomenological description of ‗how‘ Dasein creates time or 
‗temporalises‘ itself. Dasein‘s fundamental structure is that of being-in-the-
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 Michael Allen Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger, and the ground of History, (Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 123. 
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 This extreme possibility refers to the authentic experience of the Dasein‘s temporality. As 
we shall see further on, human beings tend to ‗misuse‘ their temporality, they do however 
have within their existing possibilities the possibility to be authentic. 
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world; in other words, we always already find ourselves within the world. We 
do not exist in this world in a theoretical and abstract way; on the contrary, we 
always find ourselves living with other people with specific actions to 
undertake, and always engaged with the world. As Heidegger puts it:  
Dasein is that entity which is characterized as being-in-the-
world…dealing with the world; tarrying alongside it in the manner of 
performing, effecting and completing, but also contemplating, 
interrogating, and determining by way of contemplation and 
comparison…As this being-in-the-world, Dasein is…being-with-
one-another, being with Others.  (CT, 7E). 
Heidegger goes on to analyse further the possible ways we experience our 
lives. We exist either as one among many other people, (that is, as a typical 
individual, refusing our uniqueness) or as someone who ‗cares‘ about our very 
personal lives (as a Dasein which is uniquely concerned with itself). Being ‗like 
everybody else‘ means being ‗nobody‘. Such a state is attained often in our 
everydayness, when we do not take a personal stance towards ourselves. If, 
however, we decide that our lives really ‗matter‘ to us, then we do ‗care‘ for 
ourselves. 
‗Care‘ in this context refers to the way we choose to experience ourselves. 
‗Care‘ is neither a concept nor a convenient way to describe a psychological 
aspect of our life. Care signifies a specific way of being-in-the-world; it is a 
specific mode of Dasein. Moreover, Heidegger goes on to make the following 
fundamental claim: care is the authentic mode of Dasein. This ‗authenticity of 
Dasein is what constitutes its most extreme possibility of Being.‘ (CT, 10E). 
What is more and crucially for my purposes, Heidegger defines this ‗extreme 
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possibility of Dasein‘ as ‗time itself‘. In other words, Heidegger argues that 
Dasein as care is time. What, however, does this mean? 
We must start with Heidegger‘s statement that ―time is the ‗how‘.‖ (CT, 22E). 
To speak of Dasein as time is to speak of Dasein in a specific way; it is to 
speak of Dasein existing authentically. And such authentic existence is ‗care‘. 
We care for ourselves whenever we understand our temporality not in terms 
of ‗now‘ (the time of clocks, the time of everydayness) but in terms of an 
engaged, concerned and unique relation to ourselves. 
If time is just a series of now, then our past is completely lost for us and our 
future is cut away from us. If however we decide to understand our existence 
in this world as something totally ours, if we decide to ‗care‘ for our existence, 
then suddenly our past, present and future becomes organised around our 
care. We start making future plans and through them we experience our 
present differently, at the same time as we re-visit and re-interpret our past. 
Dasein exists caringly, therefore, when Dasein acquires a past, a present and 
a future. Temporal Dasein is the Dasein which creates its time, i.e. the Dasein 
which acquires a past a present and a future that are activated and unified 
through the existence of our personal future projects.  
On the other hand, time as ‗now‘, Dasein as ‗everybody‘ or ‗nobody‘, creates a 
hiatus within our existence. The past no longer exists, the present is 
constituted by mere formalities (the time of a clock) and the future is yet to 
arrive. It is only care, as the ‗extreme possibility‘ of Dasein, that can unify and 
add significance to our experience of the past, the present and the future. As 
Jere Paul Surber argues: 
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Indeed, for Heidegger, the covering over of temporality as the 
existential horizon of Dasein and the substitution of an indifferent 
flow of ―nows‖ in its place lies at the very basis of the failure of the 
western tradition to raise authentically the question of Being.206 
A series of ‗nows‘ do not constitute time; this is merely a convenient way to 
avoid time.207 Nevertheless, we are drawn now to a further question: how can 
we really live with care? How can we escape dominant ‗clock-time‘? 
Heidegger‘s answer is that only when Dasein is confronted with its own 
unavoidable temporal ending can it begin to ‗temporalise‘ itself. 
Death 
Dasein operates and exists (simultaneously some times) as a distinct subject 
or as a part of an inter-subjective community. This is how Heidegger thinks 
that he can escape the problems that stem from Hegel‘s and Kierkegaard‘s 
views: 
As this being-in-the-world, Dasein is, together with this, being-with-
one-another, being with Others: having the same world there with 
Others, encountering one another, being with one another in the 
manner of being-for-one-another.    (CT, 7E) 
As we have already seen, Hegel believes that the whole grounds its members 
and so only states/nations are considered to be the proper historical subjects, 
while Kierkegaard claims that ‗states‘, ‗nations‘ or ‗societies‘ are nothing but 
abstract concepts and thus only individuals possess historical roles. 
Heidegger argues that Dasein can play different historical roles because 
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of time as a series of ‗nows‘. 
 217 
Dasein can act as a distinct subject or as a member of an inter-subjective 
community.  
But, how can Dasein grasp itself without ‗sinking‘ into being a ‗nobody‘? 
Heidegger‘s answer is that it is only when we are confronted by the definite 
(but also temporally indefinable) fact of our death (our temporal ending) that 
we can realise two important things, namely: a) the only thing which is 
irreplaceable is that we have to die. Our (personal and unique) death cannot 
be replaced with any other‘s death;208 b) the realisation of our temporal end 
enables us to start interpreting our life as unique and unified. We come to 
understand our temporality not in terms of ‗now‘ but in terms of a ‗destiny‘.209 
Dasein exists as time only when Dasein understands the possibility of being in 
time. Living in a series of ‗nows‘ is no time at all. The notion of destiny here 
signifies a kind of personal uniqueness, it is the identity of a life lived. We 
acquire this identity when we manage to escape being ‗everybody‘. 
In other words, Dasein‘s ‗care‘ is a matter of grasping itself as something 
unique. It is true that I can understand the whole of my existence as 
something that I can put under the rubric of ‗everybody‘. I can choose to see 
my Dasein as ‗everybody‘s‘ Dasein. I can never choose, however, to see my 
death as ‗everybody‘s‘ death. My death completes my temporal existence not 
only because it is the end of my temporal existence but most importantly 
because my death signifies the uniqueness of my temporal existence. 
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 See Heidegger‘s analysis in BT pp.281-311. 
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 As Wyschogrod puts it: ‗…the determination to death eliminates all accidental and 
temporary possibilities and reveals Dasein‘s destiny, which is the possibility of Dasein‘s 
determining itself as possibility.‘ Michael Wyschogrod, Kierkegaard and Heidegger, The 
Ontology of Existence, (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), p. 110. 
Destiny and fate in the Heideggerian universe are the marking points of an existential self-
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intention to stress out their necessary nature but with the intention to disclose their ability to 
existentially ‗awake‘ us in the face of our potentialities.  
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This death (my death) is not constituted by the mere fact that I am a mortal 
being. My death presents me with the unique possibility of caring to have a 
unique life which will be completed (and ended) by my unique death. 
Heidegger‘s analysis of death is not a psychological or an anthropological 
one. As Hoffman underlines: ‗Death is constant insofar as it is the only pure 
possibility of Dasein…‘210  
Death is ineluctably interconnected with care: 
…If we were not threatened by death, our basic state would not be 
care; but if our basic state were not care, our death would not be 
felt as threatening. Care and the sense of one‘s mortality are thus, 
to use one of Heidegger‘s favourite terms, ―equiprimordial‖.211 
Heidegger directly connects Dasein and time with care and death. Dasein‘s 
mode of existence reflects Dasein‘s possibility of escaping the stillness of 
time. Dasein has destiny only when Dasein actualises its possibility to care for 
itself. Temporalisation is Dasein‘s extreme possibility of grasping itself as a 
unique temporal existence. Past, present and future are united by the 
necessary fact of death. However, it is only when we realise that death is to 
be seen as the crucial beginning of grasping our Dasein as a unique and 
meaningful Dasein, can death impel us (through care) to start creating a life 
that belongs to us and only to us. 
To conclude this section, there still remains a final philosophical problem 
about death. Heidegger specifically believes that future is the crucial 
dimension of Dasein‘s temporality:  
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‗Being futural gives time, cultivates the present and allows the past 
to be repeated in how it is lived. With regard to time, this means 
that the fundamental phenomenon of time is the future.‘ (CT, 
14E).212 
Dasein‘s care is defined as personal engagement with future projects. In this 
way, death signifies not the end but the beginning of our temporality. Death 
gives us the opportunity to understand ourselves as beings that can have a 
destiny. In this way by making future projects, we begin to live differently in 
the present and continuously reinterpret our past. 
But if death can give us identity by ‗completing‘ our temporality, then how do 
we grasp our complete identity? In other words, even if death provides the 
opportunity to start creating our identity through our actions, we still lack the 
knowledge of how we are going to live. Life is about change, and death can 
tell us nothing about such change. The future may well be the crucial factor 
here, but it must be remembered that the future also leaves us with many 
different possibilities.213  
Therefore, Heidegger needs to explore the ‗how‘ of this (future) possibility. 
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 Time‘s ‗futurity‘, in Heidegger‘s philosophy, amounts to the specific role of our ‗life-
projects‘. We, as temporal beings, need to understand our temporal existence in terms of 
always making plans for the future. Heidegger arrives at this ‗futurity‘ through the existential 
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 Writing my PhD thesis refers to my future plan to become an academic, while at the same 
time helps me to understand my past and my present life in terms of this project. I can thus 
understand why I was interested in philosophy from the early years of my life and why I 
studied philosophy but most importantly enables me to interpret my existence in terms of 
trying to be a philosopher. Heidegger would argue that what made me interested in this 
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being by first realizing that I am a unique existence (because I will have a unique death) and 
then by interpreting my will as a will to become a philosopher.  
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 As Hoffman puts it: ‗…I cannot grasp just what my complete identity will be.‘  
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History 
Heidegger wrote much on the concept of history. His fundamental point of 
departure is that if we want to better grasp the problem of Being (ontology), 
then we begin by understanding the way in which human beings exist. By 
means of Dasein (as being-in-the-world) the problem of Being is clarified.214 
The question of what is to be a human being is then a preliminary to the 
question of Being. Ontology begins with Dasein and, of course, Dasein is a 
temporal (and thus historical) being per excellence. 215To analyse Dasein, 
therefore, Heidegger must provide a philosophy of history. Such a philosophy 
of history is required to clarify the ways in which human history can be 
experienced (rather than providing a definitive statement of ‗what‘ history is). 
From the outset Heidegger is clear that philosophy is unable to get at ‗what‘ 
history consists in: 
 Philosophy will never get to the root of what history is so long as it 
analyses history as an object of contemplation for method. The 
enigma of history lies in what it means to be historical.216  (CT, 
20E). 
Hence, his approach to history is not an epistemological enquiry, nor is it a 
phenomenological analysis of what is to be historical. His approach consists in 
a hermeneutic effort to analyse closely the ways Dasein exists ‗temporally‘: 
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 Dasein refers only to human beings who exist in this world, they exist thus always in 
spatio-temporal conditions. 
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 In my opinion, these few lines contain the very heart of the Heideggerian approach to 
history. Heidegger denies any possibility of acquiring an epistemological view to history. At 
the same time he directly connects history with ‗to be historical‘, which means that history is 
considered a procedure (‗to be‘) rather than being a pre-fixed and complete object . What 
remains is to find out what exactly Heidegger states with the use of the term historical. 
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Even though many structures of Dasein when taken singly are still 
obscure, it seems that by casting light upon temporality as the 
primordial condition for the possibility of care, we have reached the 
primordial Interpretation of Dasein which we require.  (BT, 424). 
Heidegger carefully refers to ‗temporality‘ instead of time. ‗Time‘ as an 
objective dimension or a natural ‗derivative‘ of changes is an empty shell. 
Heidegger concludes his lecture on the concept of time by stating that: 
‗Dasein is not time but temporality…Time itself is meaningless; time is 
temporal.‘ (CT, 20E-21E). This ‗temporality‘ is a very specific mode of being-
in-the-world and, more specifically, consists in having my own history (my 
destiny). A Dasein which cares and thus acquires a past, a present, and a 
future, is a Dasein which ‗historizises‘ itself; it is a Dasein which has achieved 
‗an ontological understanding of historicality.‘  (BT, 427). Such historicality is 
grounded in Dasein‘s possibility of being temporal. We are able to have and 
make history because we are (or because we have the possibility of being) 
temporal beings. Temporality is thus a necessary presupposition of 
historicality.217  
In analyzing the historicality of Dasein we shall try to show that this 
entity is not ‗temporal‘ because ‗it stands in history‘, but that, on the 
contrary, it exists historically and can so exist only because it is 
temporal in the very basis of its Being.  (BT, 428).218 
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Object of historiology; what is primary is rather the Interpretation of authentically historical 
entities as regards their historicality. (BT, 31). 
218
 This whole statement is written in italics in the original text which is an indication of its 
importance to the Heideggerian philosophy in general. 
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The disclosure of the actual role of history is not simply a matter of having a 
specific philosophy of history. The philosophical effort to reveal history‘s role 
and function is rather the very commencement of Heidegger‘s philosophy as 
such and its struggle against traditional ontology.219  
As David Couzens Hoy argues: 
Yet Heidegger‘s concept of historicity is a crucial part of the 
structure of Dasein…If Heidegger does indeed eventually occupy a 
major place in the history of philosophy, this will be due both to his 
profound concern with the historical nature of human existence and 
to his rethinking of the history of thought.220 
Heidegger is eager to present ‗destiny‘ not as a simple concept; instead, it 
refers to the entire factual context within which Dasein attempts to create its 
history. Dasein is a ‗being-with-others-in-a-world-already given‘, which means 
that: 
Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny 
becomes free. Dasein‘s fateful destiny in and with its ‗generation‘ 
goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein.   (BT, 436). 
‗Communication‘ within a pre-given social background (Dasein‘s ‗generation‘), 
provides the appropriate context for the idea of ‗destiny‘. We can further 
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 With the risk of repetition but also with the acknowledgement of its crucial role to 
Heidegger‘s philosophical enterprise, we must underline the skeleton of the Heideggerian 
approach to history: Time does not exist but only as Dasein‘s temporality. Dasein‘s 
temporality produces the necessary precondition for history. Dasein is not simply the 
individual human being in the world but also ‗being –with-one-another (as a community, as a 
society, as part of common cultural traditions). Its history thus does not refer only to Dasein‘s 
personal history but also to Dasein‘s social, communal and cultural history. History thus in 
Heidegger‘s philosophical context constitutes the basic and direct indication of Dasein‘s 
authentic existence. That is, history does not simply become an object of knowledge or 
theoretical contemplation or simply the field of personal adventure, but (history becomes) an 
ontological and thus necessary function which reveals Dasein‘s way of existence. Dasein‘s 
way of existence reveals (or must reveal) Being.  
220
 Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, 1978, p. 329. Hoy in his essay ‗History, Historicity and 
Historiography in Being and Time‘ pp.329-353 gives a thoroughly analysis of the 
Heideggerian approach to history. 
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understand the social and communal dimension of Dasein‘s destiny (and thus, 
Dasein‘s temporality, and thus, Dasein‘s history) through an examination of 
the role of ‗fate‘:  
Fate is that powerless superior power which puts itself in readiness 
for adversities…As such, fate requires as the ontological condition 
for its possibility, the state of Being in care—that is to say, 
temporality.  (BT, 436-437). 
An initial conclusion to be drawn from the above is that ‗fate‘ is grounded on 
‗care‘. That is, Dasein has to face this ‗fate‘, a ‗powerless superior power‘. 
This almost looks like a contradiction: either something is a superior power or 
it is powerless. In addition, fate requires care, which means that fate cannot 
(ontologically) be superior to care. 
The way out of this paradox is by means of a complete elaboration of the role 
of ‗destiny‘ in Heidegger‘s analysis. Destiny is both a personal and a 
communal destiny. Dasein finds itself living in a pre-given world and in a pre-
given society and fate is a matter of this pre-existent social background.221 
Fate is, therefore, a superior power because it functions as a pre-given social 
milieu for Dasein, but it is at the same time powerless because Dasein must 
choose how it is to utilise this inheritance. History is not strictly a matter of 
individuals, but rather choices (however they are made). History happens 
whenever: ‗Dasein temporalizes itself in the way the future and having been 
are united in the Present.‘ (BT, 449).  
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 As Wyschogrod argues: ‗What Dasein determines…consists of a taking over of the 
heritage into which it finds itself thrown.‘ Michael Wyschogrod, p. 110.  
My disagreement with Wyschogrod refers to the definition of this ‗heritage‘. While 
Wyschogrod stays in the specific role of this ‗heritage as a context for every individual human 
being, I argue that this ‗heritage‘ is always an ontological pre-given historical possibility 
referring to our ability to understand our Dasein in terms of a particular historical tradition. 
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Dasein is only able to historicise in a ‗moment of vision‘, in ‗resolute 
repetition‘. The moment of vision is Dasein‘s choice to project itself towards its 
future projects while (resolutely) repeating its past. In this way, Dasein‘s 
present stops being a series of empty ‗nows‘ and becomes the center of its 
current existence. Resolute repetition is Dasein‘s ongoing re-evaluation of its 
past in the light of its future projects.  
History thus, becomes the unified and dynamic expression of Dasein‘s 
authentic existence. Dasein is forever able to explore, in infinite ways, its past, 
at the same time as it is urged onward by its future projects. History becomes 
a ‗recurrence of the possible‘: 
But when historicality is authentic, it understands history as the 
‗recurrence‘ of the possible, and knows that a possibility will recur 
only if existence is open for it fatefully, in a moment of vision, in 
resolute repetition.  (BT, 444). 
Heidegger thus completes his analysis of history by pointing out the need for a 
complete shift away from understanding history as a given object to 
understanding history as a field which incorporates infinite ways (for Dasein) 
of interpreting the past, while focusing on the future. Historical truth in this 
context is not something fixed or absolute, it is Dasein‘s destiny.222  
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 That can raise suspicions of a Hegelian approach to history. We will examine closer these 
suspicions when we will refer to the relation of Heidegger to Hegel. J. L. Mehta makes an 
interesting remark on this: ‗Historically, the light of truth has taken possession of the Western 
mind in various forms from one epoch to another…Truth is therefore not only history but 
destiny (Geschick), in the sense that, from epoch to epoch, man finds himself thrown into and 
in the grip of the particular form in which truth prevails in a particular epoch, so that all his 
thinking and doing, the ways things show themselves to him, the way he comports himself 
towards them and what and how he thinks about them, the way he is in the world, is 
determined by the particular epochal light of truth in which he happens to live. But this 
dependence of man is not an onesided determination of man by the concealing-revealing light 
of Truth. Truth, as determinative of man‘s existence, needs being tended and cherished by 
man in order to prevail as truth.‘ J. L. Mehta, The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, (New York, 
Evanston, san Francisco, London: Harper Torchbooks, 1971), p. 232.  
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Part II 
Heidegger and Hegel 
Heidegger and Hegel share a common philosophical belief, namely that 
history and our understanding of its nature play a crucial part in our 
philosophical interpretation of the World and, especially, in our approach to 
the nature and the meaning of man. Hegel, however, stresses history‘s role as 
an epistemological object while Heidegger considers history an ontological 
indication of Dasein‘s temporality. 
In my exposition of their complex philosophical relation I analyse their 
philosophical approaches to three determinate historical problems: a) the 
problem of ‗historical relativity‘, b) the problem of time and c) the problem of 
the relation between subject and object.223 
Historical relativity 
                                                                                                                                            
Truth thus, refers to Heidegger‘s ‗fate‘ and is Dasein‘s choice (destiny) to embrace this or that 
part of this ‗epochal‘ truth. Dasein must energetically ‗cherish‘ this truth and make it its truth. 
We can thus have here a possible exposition of Heidegger‘s approach to truth. Truth is not 
something absolute but is always a possibility within a certain historical period. So far it looks 
as if this ‗truth‘ belongs to Hegel‘s philosophy. This cannot be the case however, because for 
Heidegger, Dasein has the freedom (and the duty) to personally choose and ‗endorse‘ a 
particular possibility of the truth between many others that are present (as possibilities) in any 
given historical era. In this way while Heidegger escapes any ‗absolute‘ truth, he manages 
also to make Dasein the crucial factor of the ‗truth‘. It still remains the problem of how 
Heidegger is going to escape historical relativism. More about this on the very next part of this 
chapter. 
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 Historical relativity refers not only to the nature of truth (if we must understand ‗truth‘ not as 
an eternal and absolute entity or essence or simply as a certain historical product) but also 
(and mainly) refers to which degree history and historical circumstances can create man or 
the other way around. The question of the exact relation of man to his history constitutes the 
basic concern for both Hegel and Heidegger.  
The nature of time for Heidegger is the axis of his argumentative approach to history and time 
thus represents a key point to his philosophy. Hegel on the other hand allocates the problem 
of time to his analysis of Nature. One very natural objection then would be that the concept of 
time is not an important aspect of the relation of Heidegger to Hegel because Hegel puts time 
in a different context from Heidegger. Heidegger nevertheless states clearly that we need to 
compare his idea of temporality with Hegel‘s conception of time (BT, 480). 
 The subject-object antinomy holds a crucial place both in Hegel‘s and Heidegger‘s 
philosophy. While this antinomy does not concern solely history, if we want to acquire a 
deeper understanding of their philosophical attitudes, and even more, if we aspire to fully 
grasp their overall philosophical relation, we must completely understand their answer to this 
particular problem.  
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For Hegel, a man cannot escape the limits of the historical period within which 
he lives. Hegel thus considers man‘s approach to truth as a historically 
confined effort. Man will understand as much as his historical period will allow 
him to understand. A necessary philosophical implication of this approach is 
that individuals in different historical periods possess different truths (or 
different versions of it). In order for man to know the whole truth he must look 
backwards to his past and after that he must understand his limitations without 
trying to arrive at any ‗absolute‘ truth. Hegel makes history a crucial and 
objective factor of what is truth.224 
Heidegger, on the other hand, is not looking for truth as ‗what‘ but as ‗how‘, 
which from the outset makes his approach different to Hegel‘s. Heidegger, 
however, considers Dasein‘s history to be directly related to destiny and fate. 
A human being, cannot but look in the given historical background to search 
for possible ways of being in truth. This means that Heidegger also 
establishes historical limits to Dasein‘s enquiry after truth.  
Heidegger‘s response, however, is that Dasein has infinite ways of 
interpreting its historical background and thus Dasein cannot be fully 
subjected to its historical era.225 ‗Dasein is historical‘ means not that truth is a 
matter of historical relativity; rather, it means that truth is grounded in Dasein‘s 
temporality. Dasein is permanently on its way of becoming authentic.226 
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 Hegel thinks that absolute truth in history is possible. He claims that this truth is Spirit‘s 
self-realisation through reason which concludes that ‗man is free‘. Human beings, however, 
lack the capacity to go beyond their historical period. Hence, history limits subjective historical 
knowledge, while history provides the objective (and ultimate) historical aim. 
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 As Michael Allen Gillespie also points out regarding this: ‗While man is thus crucially 
dependent upon Being as fate or destiny, he is not subject to historical necessity, and there is 
no historical limit upon human possibilities.‘ Michael Allen Gillespie, 1984, p. 169. 
226
 This does not mean that we cannot arrive at a secure true knowledge of a historical fact. 
But this is not what Heidegger defines as truth. This is simply a matter of ‗what happened‘. 
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The most important philosophical difference between Hegel and Heidegger is 
that the first considers history to shape man while the latter considers history 
to be a limitless reservoir of Dasein‘s possible hermeneutical interpretations. 
For Hegel, therefore, history is an objective necessity while for Heidegger, 
history is an ontological consequence. History for Hegel dominates man, 
history for Heidegger functions as a personal liberation towards authenticity. 
Nevertheless, in consequence, Heidegger‘s hermeneutics are always 
vulnerable to relativism and thus charges of historical relativism. 
If man‘s truth consists in hermeneutical freedom, then what we gain in 
freedom we lose in certainty.227 
Time 
Heidegger argues that the problem of time is indicative of the inefficiency of 
the traditional manner by which philosophers attempt to disclose Being. That 
is, for Heidegger Being has never (until his philosophy) been understood 
correctly.228  
Hegel on the other hand examines the problem of the nature of time in his The 
Philosophy of Nature.229 This indicates that time for Hegel is to be treated as a 
natural phenomenon. He does also refer to time in the Phenomenology of 
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 See also the three concluding pages in Hoy‘s essay. Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, 
1978, pp. 350-353. 
228
 ‗Indeed for Heidegger, the covering over of temporality as the existential horizon of Dasein 
and the substitution of an indifferent flow of ‗nows‘ in its place lies at the very basis of the 
failure of the western tradition to raise authentically the question of Being.‘ Jere Paul Surber, 
‗Heidegger‘s Critique of Hegel‘s Notion of Time‘, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Mar., 1979), p. 360. 
229
 ‗Philosophy of Nature‘ forms the second part of Hegel‘s ‗Encyclopaedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences‘, with ‗Science of Logic‘ being the first part and ‗The Philosophy of 
Spirit‘ being the third part. G.W.F Hegel, Philosophy of Nature: being Part Two of the 
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830),translated from Nicolin and Paggeler’s 
edition (1959) and from the Zusatze in Michelet’s text (1847)by A.V. Miller, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2004). 
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Spirit (in ‗Sense-Certainty‘ in particular), suggesting that time in Hegel‘s 
system is something more than a simple natural dimension.230 
The basic difference between Hegel and Heidegger‘s theories of time is that 
the former embeds it in a philosophical system subservient to speculative 
thought, whereas the latter establishes a hermeneutic phenomenological 
approach to time. In this context Hegel is obliged to analyse time along with 
space, but Heidegger provides a phenomenological analysis of how time 
functions within Dasein‘s existence. 
Hegel thus relates time to history only because time provides Spirit with a field 
for self-understanding. Heidegger, on the other hand, accuses Hegel (along 
with the whole Western philosophical tradition) of failing to understand that 
time cannot be approached as a natural phenomenon apart from Dasein‘s 
activities. 
All they share regarding time is their common belief that the so-called ‗bad 
infinite‘ (an endless succession of moments) cannot be the basis for a 
complete understanding of experience.231  
The question, therefore, is not whether Hegel or Heidegger is right but which 
conception of time provides a more profound grasp on history.232For Hegel, 
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 ‗Sense-Certainty‘ along with other modes of historical consciousness places time in a 
direct connection with history. See: Jere Paul Surber, 1979, p. 370. 
231
 Surber, 1979, p.375: ‗…Hegel and Heidegger agree on at least one crucial issue: the 
demand that the ―bad infinite‖ of a mathematical-like succession be overcome as the basis for 
the way in which experience is understood.‘ 
232
 To be fair to both of them, Hegel approaches time as a natural phenomenon which 
provides the necessary ontological field for history and the historical and Heidegger regards 
time to be a necessary product of human‘s ‗temporality‘. Time thus in their philosophies 
amounts to different ontological roles, i.e. for Hegel time is above everything else a natural 
and universal phenomenon and for Heidegger time is directly related to human existence. 
Having said that, we need to fully capture time‘s historical importance in their respective 
interpretations. Hegel disconnects time from human ontology while Heidegger makes time a 
direct outcome of human ontology. Time thus in Hegel‘s approach is firstly a measurable 
quantity while time in Heidegger‘s approach is an indefinitely immeasurable quality of human 
ontology. Time and history thus in Hegel amount to specific quantities while time and history 
for Heidegger amount to qualities always open to different interpretations.   
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time relates to history only as long as history is regarded as a field for human 
contemplation. Heidegger‘s approach to temporality ignores (and even 
‗scorns‘) such an abstract approach to time. Temporality functions as the very 
basis, the necessary ontological ground of history. In this way time stops 
being an object and starts being a structure of Dasein‘s historicity (Dasein‘s 
temporalisation).  
The problem with Hegel‘s notion of time is that it withdraws time from human 
activity: Spirit is that which unfolds ‗in time‘, people simply exist within it. 
Hegelian time exists within a supra-human dimension. On the other hand, the 
problem with Heideggerian temporality is that it leaves us with no specific 
indications of how to ultimately understand the relation between temporality 
and Being.233 This means that while Heidegger is able to provide an 
alternative philosophical point of view, he is unable to proceed further than 
that.234 
Subject-Object 
Hegel argues that the only way to overcome the hiatus between subject and 
object is his ‗absolute method‘. This method consists in an active unification of 
the subject and its object. His philosophy, however, still reflects a subjective 
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 Of course, that‘s because Being and Time was left unfinished; a late essay like ‗On Time 
and Being‘ is meant to give such indications. Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, 
translated by Joan Stambauch, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 1-54. 
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 Heidegger never gave us even the way in which Dasein‘s temporality leads us to Being. All 
we have is Being and Time, which examines Dasein in terms of temporality. He left us with 
the ‗anticipation‘ of temporality. See for example the definition of temporality as Ernest Daniel 
Carrere understands it: ‗this distinctive quality of anticipatory resoluteness, of Dasein‘s 
authentic Being, Heidegger calls ―temporality‖. Only as temporality is one authentically 
―there‖, embracing the having been of throwness into futural death through the moment of 
vision—or insight—of the authentic present.‘ (The italics belong to the text.) Ernest Daniel 
Carrere, Creating a Human World, (Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 2006), p. 53. 
The problem is that history cannot only be approached through anticipation; history must be 
experienced. Heidegger can give us a different point of view, but is that enough? This 
question must be answered by every single thinker of history and is a very difficult one. 
Heidegger again could answer back to us that it never was his intention to give us answers… 
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stance, at least according to Heidegger.235 Heidegger, on the other hand, 
regards the ‗subject-object‘ condition as an obstacle which conceals instead of 
revealing Being.236  
Historical agents for Hegel are the ‗great individuals‘, but even they have to 
obey the deeper force of Spirit‘s self-realisation. Spirit thus is the only actual 
historical subject. Its object is its own self-consciousness. In this way, Hegel 
believes to have shown how within history the subject incorporates its object. 
Human beings remain mere puppets in this process; Spirit moves their strings.  
While Heidegger provides an analysis of what he believes to be the real 
function of historical agency, and while he does give back to human beings 
(as authentic Dasein) their historical role, he still opens the door to a possible 
fragmentation of the historical subject.237  
One possible philosophical advantage of Heidegger‘s approach to history is 
that it enables Dasein‘s past to be continuously activated. Whenever Dasein 
makes a future plan, it must re-evaluate its past in order to recover from its 
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 No matter what Hegel believes, ‗Spirit‘ is an ‗absolute‘ Subject rather than being an 
‗absolute‘ Object.  
236
 For Heidegger the subject-object antinomy is a direct philosophical product of the 
‗obsession‘ of western philosophy with knowledge. He regards epistemology as a wrong way 
to approach Being. Heidegger, instead of creating knowing subjects, tries to prove the dead 
ends of them. As Stephen Mulhall points out: ‗…Dasein can truly question the meaning of 
Being only by recognizing that none of its time-hallowed ontological categories are self-
evidently necessary…‘ Stephen Mulhall, Inheritance and Originality, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2007), p. 210. 
237
 Heidegger‘s persistence at situations rather than subjects leaves us open to fragmentation. 
If all we have is our activities and if only through these activities we can have a possible 
indication of our agency, then we lose from our sight a steady point of reference. Heidegger 
speaks of ‗being authentic‘ instead of ‗I‘. He maybe escapes the problems that come along 
with it but he nevertheless cannot secure our unity. This is the reason why Berel Lang argues 
that: ‗…the individual self then appears as a series of contingent and dissociated moments of 
agency, divided so sharply that efforts at reconstruction must also be transparently partial and 
fragmentary. Connections discovered among such moments must then be either imposed 
externally or devised by the subject—in any event, created out of whole cloth and excluding 
any intrinsic or conceptual link between the theoretical and the practical.‘ Berel Lang, 
Heidegger’s Silence, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 84. 
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past hidden hermeneutical possibilities. Hegel, on the other hand, confines 
man‘s past to an object for the human contemplation.238 
In conclusion, Hegel and Heidegger, while representing different ways of 
‗doing philosophy‘, both share much in their theories of history. History, for 
both of them, constitutes a vital and central dimension of man‘s ultimate 
reality.239 Their most important difference is that Hegel understands history as 
an object for reflection, while Heidegger makes history the ontological basis 
for man.240 
Heidegger and Kierkegaard 
My aim here is not to present a full analysis of the possible relations of 
Heidegger‘s philosophy to Kierkegaard‘s thought.241 My purpose here is to 
briefly present a comparison of their approaches to history. 
Heidegger ‗condescends‘ to refer to Kierkegaard in only three footnotes of 
Being and Time and even in these footnotes his tone is rather negative.242 
‗There is more to be learned philosophically from his ‗edifying‘ writings than 
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 David Couzens Hoy in its ‗The Owl and the Poet: Heidegger‘s Critique of Hegel‘, boundary 
2, Vol. 4, No. 2, Martin Heidegger and Literature (Winter, 1976), pp. 395-396, argues that: 
‗The past, however, includes human beings, and individuals cannot treat their pasts (or the 
pasts of others) in that way. The meaning of the past can still change with present or future 
actions. Thus, Heidegger can even say that the past (as Gewesenheit) is still operant in the 
present, and indeed, even ―arises from the future‖.‘  
239
 ‗Heidegger himself indicates parallels between his own thought and Hegel‘s. In fact, he 
translates dialectical terms from the Phenomenology into terms used in Being and Time.‘ Ibid. 
p. 405. Dasein is human existence in spatio-temporality and thus Dasein always is an existing 
(historical/temporal) human being. 
240
 Hegel can guarantee us that history can be seen as something utterly comprehensible and 
Heidegger can open for us a way to live history as an active force of our lives. The only 
problem is that a possible ‗reconciliation‘ between these two approaches to history is blocked 
by Heidegger‘s refusal to acknowledge history as an object and by Hegel‘s rejection of human 
beings as primary historical agents.  
241
 This would require a whole new thesis, not only a part of a chapter. 
242
 BT, p. 492 (footnote four to H. 190), p. 494 (footnote six to H. 235) and p. 497 (footnote 
three to H. 338).  
For an excellent analysis of Heidegger‘s ‗debt‘ to Kierkegaard see: After the Postsecular and 
the Postmodern. New Essays in Continental Philosophy of Religion, edited by Anthony Paul 
Smith and Daniel Whistler, (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 
chapter six: ‗Existence, Anxiety and the Moment of Vision: Fundamental Ontology and 
Existentiell Faith Revisited‘ by George Pattison, pp. 128-151.  
 232 
from his theoretical ones…‘ (BT, 494, footnote six to H. 235). Heidegger 
seems, therefore, to neglect any positive Kierkegaardian contribution not only 
to his thought but also to philosophy in general. 
Kierkegaard certainly never built a system nor did he write in a ‗philosophical-
scholarly‘ manner, but nevertheless he managed to shape almost every single 
concept Heidegger uses in BT. ‗Existence‘, ‗repetition‘, ‗anxiety‘, ‗idle talk‘, ‗the 
one‘, ‗guilt‘, ‗the moment of vision‘, even ‗confrontation with death‘, are 
concepts, topics and ideas that Kierkegaard first coined, in his effort to 
establish an alternative to ‗official‘, systematic philosophy.  
There is one basic difference between Kierkegaard and Heidegger, namely: 
Kierkegaard grounds the human self in God whereas Heidegger grounds 
(authentic) Dasein in temporality and ultimately in Being.243 Kierkegaard thus 
considers God the ultimate ground of the (authentic) human historical self. 
This means that authentic human historical existence needs God to become 
authentic. A supra-historical entity appears here to ground man‘s historical 
existence. Heidegger, however, ultimately fails to present us with the specific 
way in which Dasein grounds itself in Being. Heidegger, therefore, falls far 
short of establishing and proving what is the ground of human historical 
existence. 
When it comes to the question of grounding history, Kierkegaard and 
Heidegger resort to either a paradoxical supra-entity (God) or to an 
                                                 
243
 See for example: Harrison Hall, ‗Love and Death: Kierkegaard and Heidegger on authentic 
and inauthentic human existence‘, Inquiry, 27:1-4, p. 194:‘Heidegger‘s version of 
existentialism is at most agnostic, whereas Kierkegaard‘s is clearly Christian (albeit a very 
unorthodox version of Christianity).‘ 
Hall concludes his article by stating that Heidegger owes his notion of ‗authenticity‘ and 
‗inauthenticity‘ on Kierkegaard. Ibid, p. 196.  
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indefinable and ultimately ‗fuzzy‘ Being. The latter is certainly no better than 
the former. 
In order to bring this out further, I want to compare Kierkegaard and 
Heidegger further in relation to two points, namely: a) time and b) the nature 
of the human historical agency.244 
Time 
Heidegger recognises the significance of Kierkegaard‘s concept of the 
‗moment of vision‘. According to Heidegger, however, Kierkegaard singularly 
failed to overcome the Aristotelian and the Hegelian interpretations of time. 
(BT, 497, footnote three to H. 338). 
Kierkegaard defines the ‗moment of vision‘ as the specific moment in which a 
man decides to make a choice. In this way, the moment of vision enables man 
to be responsible for his self-creation and thus, the moment of vision ‗breaks‘ 
time as a series of ‗nows‘ such that it succeeds in giving time its future. The 
moment of vision in the Kierkegaardian context is, therefore, the cause of the 
actual existence within man‘s life of his past, his present and his future. More 
than this, the moment of vision directs man‘s historical time (temporality) 
towards the future.  
Man‘s history is, therefore, no longer a series of nows. Man‘s history becomes 
a form of active unification, that is, man is now a historical agent. In this way, 
the moment of vision originates the human historical agent. We cannot be the 
makers of our history without deciding responsibly about our future. 
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 The definition of time and its role to human history is central in both approaches to history. 
Kierkegaard defines time in a way that enables him to define history as human responsible 
choice towards future and Heidegger comes with the notion of temporality as the very ground 
of (human) history. 
 The role of humans within history is the most vital conception for both of them. Kierkegaard 
along with Heidegger declares that history is only man‘s history. The way thus they create 
human historical self is of the greatest importance for both approaches to history. 
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Heidegger speaks of ‗care‘ and the ‗ecstatic moment‘, and what is more, he 
still speaks of man who decides to take his life in his own hands. Heidegger is 
right to point out that Kierkegaard never systematically attacks the Aristotelian 
conception of time, but what he fails to mention is that Kierkegaard does not 
need to. Heidegger makes his own conception of time the very heart of his 
philosophy, but this is not to deny that Kierkegaard acknowledges the 
importance of the individual moment of decision as the most crucial part of 
having history. Hence, Kierkegaard also renders the understanding of the 
‗moment‘ (time) the very heart of understanding history. 
Their only difference is that Heidegger makes temporality the very ground of 
Dasein, while Kierkegaard regards God as the ultimate ground. Although 
someone might argue (and Heidegger certainly does so argue) that it is only 
this move which is of philosophical importance, it still needs to be reaffirmed 
that, despite this difference, the moment of vision (a key aspect of both 
theories of time) is defined identically in Kierkegaard and in Heidegger. Hence 
when Heidegger accuses Kierkegaard of not making explicit the ‗existential‘ 
importance of temporality (as the very ground of Dasein) and remaining bound 
to the ‗existentiell phenomenon of the moment of the vision‘ (BT, 497), what 
he forgets is that he (Heidegger) never provides an exact definition of the 
difference between ‗existentiell‘ and ‗existential‘.245 
In conclusion, Heidegger attacks of the idea that time exists as a series of 
nows, while Kierkegaard too undermines it through his definition of the 
moment of vision. Their only difference consists in the fact that Heidegger 
uses this moment as the ontological basis of Dasein‘s temporality, whereas 
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 For this point see Pattison, especially the section: ‗The Existentiell, the Existential, and the 
Question of Method‘ from After the Postsecular and the Postmodern, pp. 132-141. 
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Kierkegaard is more interested in pointing out the responsibility involved in 
making decisions.  
Historical agency 
The importance of both Kierkegaard‘s and Heidegger‘s theories of history is 
that both of them make man the sole historical agent. Only human beings qua 
human beings are historical beings. Kierkegaard speaks of human 
consciousness and human decision along with human responsibility. 
Heidegger speaks of Dasein‘s temporality along with care and destiny. Both of 
them recognise the objective historical importance of pre-given social, cultural 
and natural conditions. Kierkegaard speaks of necessity and Heidegger of fate 
and destiny.  
And yet Heidegger does not confine individual human existence (Dasein) to 
the limits of personal decision, and this is because he recognises Dasein as a 
social being. Being-with-one-another is an important mode of Dasein. 
Kierkegaard, however, seems to confine historical agency to the interior world 
of individual consciousness. Nevertheless (as we have seen), such an 
opposition is facile, since in Two Ages Kierkegaard does describe the social 
dimensions of individuality. Both Heidegger and Kierkegaard point out the 
danger of losing ourselves in the crowd and the need for personal struggle to 
acquire an original and authentic self. 
What makes Heidegger‘s approach more effective, however, is that he 
provides a definite theoretical structure that gives Dasein a firmer relation to 
history. While Kierkegaard remains rooted to a discourse of ‗taking decisions 
about my future‘, Heidegger is able to assign Dasein the role of the 
‗interpreter‘ of history, and through this, the role of the only being who can 
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give meaning not only to the present and future but also to the past. 
Heidegger‘s Dasein through continuously re-approaching the past renders it 
permanently active and alive. Heidegger hermeneutics thus, enrich man‘s 
historical agency. 
Part III 
 Conclusion 
Heidegger‘s importance is evident. What matters here, however, is the 
question of whether we can still use his thought for a philosophy of history. In 
other words, is Heidegger‘s contribution to a philosophy of history more 
important than Kierkegaard‘s? It is certainly true that Heidegger, at the very 
least, gives us a new perspective on historical reality. History suddenly 
becomes an infinite field of possibilities. These possibilities do not refer merely 
to our future but also to our past. Hermeneutics in Heidegger‘s thought 
acquire the force of an everlasting question. In this way history can never 
come to an end. Dasein will always have the possibility to re-interpret and 
thus re-invent itself. 
The most intractable problem, however, is the very fact that history cannot 
come to a conclusion. The question of history must remain an enigma. What, 
then, of the moral and practical implications of history? Heidegger never 
provides any kind of moral or political point of reference. The consolation 
Heidegger gives is that of having the possibility to become authentic Daseins. 
Such authenticity is, however, amoral.246 
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 Every single criminal who decides to be something unique and opposed to the mass, and 
who do care about his criminal activities, is an authentic Dasein. Hitler thus, is an authentic 
Dasein.  
Gillespie points out this when he searches for Heidegger‘s possible answer to the question 
‗what is the history‘: 
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In consequence, history for Heidegger is in grave danger of falling into the 
dark abyss of obscurity. Even if we choose to approach history as an enigma 
we need to believe that we do have the possibility of finding (someday) the 
correct answer. With Heidegger‘s approach to history we cannot even hope 
for any answer, even a wrong one. All interpretations are equally plausible as 
long as they allow human beings to actualise and realise their (existential) 
‗uniqueness‘.  
Heidegger believes that history is Dasein‘s ultimate ontological field and the 
historical is Dasein‘s ultimate product. Dasein, however, remains an eternal 
question. Authentic Dasein establishes history without concern for morality. 
The history of the 20th century has proven how dangerous this can be. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
‗History for Heidegger is fundamentally bound up with Being, which is a question. The answer 
to our question [What is history?] is thus itself a question. Heidegger‘s examination indicates 
that our question itself may be wholly inappropriate and in fact positively misleading. 
Heidegger, however, thereby redirects our questioning toward a realm that is today 
unexplored. The consequences of this redirection of the question of the history for human life 
and politics have scarcely been perceived and certainly have not been adequately 
comprehended.‘ Michael Allen Gillespie, 1984, p. 164.  
Also: ‗Heidegger almost entirely neglects the consideration of actual history and historical 
causes without ever explaining why they are unimportant or how they derive from the 
prevailing revelation of Being.‘ Ibid, 171.  
Gillespie of course is mainly interested in underlining the possible political implications of 
Heidegger‘s philosophy while I am here mainly underlining the possible moral implications. 
My only problem with Gillespie‘s interpretation is that he fails to see that morality is the 
necessary basis for any political behaviour or any political theory. 
 238 
Conclusion 
 
 
What is the nature of history remains a question that is open to debate among 
historians and philosophers of history. It seems, however, that this ongoing 
debate is mainly focused on the possible ways we can either know or 
understand or interpret something which already took place.247 History, then, 
appears to be orientated either towards knowledge of the past or 
interpretation of the past in the present. Hence, as I will show in the next 
paragraphs, history as a future to be responsibly chosen by an ethical subject 
is totally absent from this debate.  
Take, for example, the contemporary philosopher of history, Martin Stuart-
Fox: when he summarises the current debate on the nature of history, he 
does not even mention future ethical choices as a possible answer to the 
question of ‗what is the nature of history‘: 
The nature of history and its relationship to science on the one 
hand and literature on the other seems to hold perennial 
fascination for philosophers of history and historians who reflect 
upon their discipline…Much of the debate has centred on the 
possibility of arriving at some kind of historical truth, denied by the 
most radical postmodernists (Jenkins 1991), but claimed to some 
degree at least by most other historians.248 
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 In my introduction I have demonstrated the main current theories concerning this debate. 
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 Martin Stuart-Fox, ‗Two views of the history of historiography and the nature of history‘, 
History Australia, 4 (2), 2007, pp. 44.1- 44.17. 
I quote this article because here we can find a summary of the whole analysis of the current 
debate among historians and philosophers of history. Stuart-Fox summarises the arguments 
of every participant and thus helps us capture the nature of the whole debate.  
For a thorough analysis of the current problems concerning the nature of history (and some 
possible answers) see also: Arthur Marwick, The New Nature of History Knowledge, 
Evidence, Language, (Chicago: Lyceum Books Inc., 2001). 
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I have argued that Kierkegaard‘s approach to history is: a) an original and 
important contribution to philosophy of history and b) beneficiary and 
significant for the contemporary practice of philosophy of history.  
Kierkegaard gives us a new perspective on what the nature of history is. He 
can do so, because he redirects focus from  knowledge of the past towards 
the responsible creation of the future. Kierkegaard argues that what matters in 
history is not an abstract and disinterested knowledge of ‗what happened‘ but 
‗to be infinitely interested in existing‘: 
The demand of abstraction upon him is that he becomes 
disinterested in order to obtain something to know; the requirement 
of the ethical upon him is to be infinitely interested in existing.   
(CUP, 316). 
The contemporary practice of philosophy of history can benefit from 
Kierkegaard‘s arguments concerning the nature of history in two ways: a) by 
considering history as a future choice, that is, to recognise that history is not 
only the possibility to know or to interpret the past but to also consider that 
history can be an individual ethical choice creating the future history and b) by 
taking under consideration Kierkegaard‘s arguments regarding the structure of 
the historical subject, that is, to incorporate in the current debate the 
Kierkegaardian claim about the absolute interconnection between human 
conscious choices and the historical subject.  
Philosophy of history then: a) can be enriched by incorporating future ethical 
decisions. Future will be a crucial part of history enabling historians and 
philosophers of history to better comprehend history. And b) contemporary 
philosophy of history will be able to approach the problem of historical agency 
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from a different perspective than the current one. Kierkegaard‘s 
argumentation concerning the indecomposable unity of human consciousness 
and historical reality will open new ‗windows‘ and will bring forth new 
perspectives regarding the relation of historical agents and the creation of 
history. 
Hegel249 approaches history with the expressed intention to decipher the 
hidden meaning of the past. He claims that we can know history as the field in 
which necessity (of reason) rules. He denies to individual human beings any 
historical significance and he contends that only the organised social 
communities, such as nations or states, can play an important role in the 
making of history.  
Heidegger argues that temporality is the very ground of Dasein and, thus, 
history can always be re-interpreted; that is, history for Heidegger cannot be 
approached by any ‗objective‘ method which would aim at obtaining secure 
and conclusive knowledge of what happened. 
As Stuart-Fox states, with respect to the current debate surrounding the 
nature of history, history can be understood either as an epistemological effort 
to acquire true knowledge or as an interpretative effort to analyse past history 
from the standpoint of the present. Hegel represents the former approach to 
history and Heidegger represents the latter. Kierkegaard, however, provides 
us with an alternative: on the one hand, he speaks of history as a future 
ethical choice and, on the other, he interweaves history and the human 
subject in such a way that to become a human subject is to create history and 
to have a history is to acquire a self through personal choices. 
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 I have already demonstrated why I chose Hegel and Heidegger as Kierkegaard‘s 
interlocutors concerning the nature of history. 
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Kierkegaard‘s contribution to the philosophy of history then, consists of his 
philosophical effort to point out: a) the futurity of history and b) the way in 
which history and the becoming a human self are totally dependent on each 
other. 
Yet, this is not to choose Kierkegaard, rather than Hegel – or the future 
instead of the past. Both must be taken into account in a comprehensive 
philosophy of history. Hence, in this thesis I have argued in favour of a 
‗synthesis‘ of Hegel‘s approach to history and Kierkegaard‘s one. This is 
because I claim that it is only in this way that we can acquire a fuller and more 
accurate picture of what history is. I contend that, if we choose to do 
otherwise, we are in the danger of losing from view crucial elements of history. 
Hegel and his epistemological and ontological claims neglect the historical 
importance of the individual human being. Kierkegaard does not make room 
for the historical importance of the social character of our subjectivity; that is, 
for Kierkegaard, what make us complete human subjects is only our personal 
choice; he does not acknowledge the significance of our social ‗inter-
subjectivity‘. 
My synthesis aims to do justice to both Hegel and Kierkegaard; that is, to take 
advantage of their arguments in a way that does not simply oppose the one to 
the other.  Rather, I have complemented one‘s view with that of the other, 
arriving at a fuller view of history. 
I have also argued that Heidegger‘s approach to history is derived from the 
Kierkegaardian concept of history. That is, Heidegger is prone to ‗borrow‘ 
many of Kierkegaard‘s basic terms (such as ‗the moment‘). And yet, on the 
one hand, Heidegger‘s approach does not provide any specific definition as to 
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what the nature of history is and, on the other, Heidegger‘s ‗amoral‘ approach 
to history endangers moral concerns surrounding the march of history.  
It is then, Kierkegaard‘s ‗existential‘ approach to history which provides a 
decisive supplement to the philosophy of history – a crucial addition to 
historical knowledge. That is, the Kierkegaardian concept of history 
foregrounds ethical, individual human existence, which: a) lives in the present, 
b) is engaged with the past, and, most importantly, c) plans the future. 
Kierkegaard denies the absolute certainty of historical knowledge in order to 
affirm the ‗wholeness‘ of the individual historical existence: 
Every subject is an existing subject, and therefore this must be 
essentially expressed in all of his knowing and must be expressed 
by keeping his knowledge from an illusory termination in sensate 
certainty, in historical knowledge, in illusory results. In historical 
knowledge, he comes to know much about the world, nothing about 
himself…Nothing historical can become infinitely certain to me 
except this: that I exist.     (CUP, 81). 
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